STEVEN SAPP, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1995-03-23
No. 94-1560
ERVIN, BOOTH and JOANOS, JJ., concur.
652 So. 2d 1194 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1995) Negative Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

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Synopsis

Steven Sapp appeals the denial of his motion for proper sentencing credit following probation revocation. The court holds that Sapp is entitled to credit for all time served, including gain time earned prior to probation, and reverses and remands for resentencing to ensure compliance with State v. Green.


Holding

Under State v. Green, a defendant is entitled to credit for all time served, including gain time awarded prior to being placed on probation, when the offense occurred prior to October 1, 1989. The sentencing court must assure compliance with Green and remand is required for resentencing.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant is entitled to credit for all time served, including gain time awarded prior to being placed on probation, for offenses committed before October 1, 1989.

[2] "Credit for time served" includes time actually served and gain time granted pursuant to section 944.275, but does not include provisional credits or administrative gain…

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Key Quotes

“Sapp is entitled to credit for all time served, including gain time awarded prior to being placed on probation, since his offense occurred prior to October 1, 1989.”

Establishes the court's holding on entitlement to gain time credit based on the date of the offense.

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Facts & Procedural History

In 1989, Sapp received a split sentence of incarceration followed by probation for robbery with a firearm. When his probation was revoked, he was rese…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Steven Sapp appeals the denial of his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), in which he argued that the trial court failed to fully credit him with time served prior to the revocation of his probation. We agree that the sentence imposed failed to afford the proper credit, and therefore reverse and remand.

In 1989, Sapp received a split sentence of incarceration followed by a term of probation for the offense of robbery with a firearm. Upon revocation of his probation, Sapp was resentenced to a term of incarceration, and was allowed credit for “all time previously served at DOC in this case.” The Department of Corrections, however, advised Sapp that in recalculating his sentence, it did not credit him with unforfeited gain time earned during his prior incarceration because the trial court did not expressly authorize such credit. The department’s memorandum advising Sapp of this fact suggested that he may wish to petition the trial court for this credit, which he did through the motion at issue here. In considering same, the trial court concluded that the sentence imposed after violation of probation already afforded Sapp the credit he sought, and therefore denied relief.

Pursuant to State v. Green, 547 So. 2d 925 (Fla.1989), Sapp is entitled to credit for all time served, including gain time awarded prior to being placed on probation, since his offense occurred prior to October 1, 1989. But see Tripp v. State, 622 So. 2d 941, 942 n. 2 (Fla.1993) (“credit for time served” under Green includes time actually served and gain time granted pursuant to section 944.275, but does not include provisional credits or administrative gain time). Because it is the function of the sentencing court to assure compliance with Green, this case must be remanded for resentencing. See Branton v. State, 646 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). We note that while the trial court is required to specifically provide for Green credit in its sentence, it may delegate to the Department of Corrections the ministerial task of determining the exact amount of such credit. Bacon v. State, 647 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Mongiouvi v. State, 639 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

ERVIN, BOOTH and JOANOS, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Genorval Slay v. Singletary, 676 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
    …lement exists under Green. Smith v. State, 659 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).3 We now expressly align ourselves with the decision in Smith, and to the extent prior eases such as Allen v. State, 642 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) and Sapp v. State, 652 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) are read to suggest that a sentencing court must do more in order to effect a full award of Green credit, we recede from those opinions. Although appellee suggests that this conclusion conflicts with the decisions in Byers v. Sta…
  • Clark v. State, 656 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
    …the duty of the trial court to make an award providing for time to be credited pursuant to Green, 547 So. 2d at 925, the court may enlist DOC to perform the ministerial duty of calculating the amount of time to be credited. See, e.g., Sapp v. State, 652 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). If the trial court does enlist the aid of DOC again, DOC must proceed in accordance with this opinion. Appellee argues that DOC could have can-celled provisional credits or administrative [*254] gain-time credits, which are bas…
  • Woodell v. Transflorida Bank, 717 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
    …t in an earlier appeal by these parties concerning this same issue, this court reversed a dismissal of Appellants’ counterclaim for conspiracy to engage in a fraudulent scheme, citing Florida Statutes § 726.105-107. See Elie v. TFB Properties, Inc., 652 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). That lower court action has been consolidated with this matter because of the similarity of the facts, issues, and parties involved. As to all other issues raised, and as to the dismissal of all other causes of action set forth…

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