ROMEO G. GUZMAN, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
BARBARA K. GUZMAN, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT

Fla. 5th DCA | 1995-04-21
No. 93-2706
COBB and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
653 So. 2d 1118 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1995) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

Romeo G. Guzman appeals a final divorce judgment, contending the trial court awarded excessive permanent periodic alimony. The court reversed portions of the judgment relating to equitable distribution, alimony, and attorney's fees because the alimony and payment obligations left Romeo with insufficient funds for basic living expenses, remanding for reconsideration.


Holding

The trial court abused its discretion by requiring alimony and other payments that left Romeo without sufficient funds for living expenses. The court affirmed the divorce judgment but reversed and remanded the portions addressing equitable distribution, alimony, and attorney's fees for reconsideration to either adjust equitable distribution, reduce alimony, fashion a different equalization method, or use some combination thereof.


Headnotes

[1] An award of permanent periodic alimony is an abuse of discretion when the obligor spouse is left with insufficient funds for basic living expenses after making all requir…

[2] A trial court must make specific findings regarding the source and amount of any income imputed to a party.

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Key Quotes

“Romeo is left with $37 per month for his living expenses beyond his mortgage payment. On the other hand Barbara, aside from any income tax on her alimony, will have nearly $7,500 per month to cover living expenses for herself and the parties' two children.”

Demonstrates the unreasonable disparity created by the trial court's alimony and payment orders, establishing the abuse of discretion

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Facts & Procedural History

Romeo and Barbara Guzman were married and had two children. Romeo earned net monthly income of $10,966 from employment, while Barbara earned $1,206. T…

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Opinion of the Court
PETERSON, Judge.

PETERSON, Judge.

Romeo G. Guzman appeals the final judgment of dissolution of his marriage to Barbara K. Guzman, who cross-appeals. Romeo contends that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding an excessive amount of permanent periodic alimony. Barbara challenges the denial of her request for attorneys’ fees. Because we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in requiring Romeo to make alimony and other payments that leave him without sufficient funds for living expenses, we reverse the portions of the judgment relating to equitable distribution, alimony, and attorney’s fees, and remand for reconsideration.

The final judgment contains specific findings regarding certain monthly revenues and obligations of each of the parties. A tabular synopsis of these findings is presented below:

Romeo Barbara

Net monthly income from employment $10,966 $1,206

Child support (2,754) 2,754

Permanent alimony (3,500) 1 3,500

Sixty monthly payments to equalize equitable distribution (2,150) 2,150

Monthly amount available to each party after consideration of above $ 2,562 $9,610

The monthly mortgage payment on the marital home, which was distributed to Romeo, was $1,774 per month. In addition, according to the parties’ financial affidavits, it appears the premium on a life insurance policy that Romeo is required to maintain pursuant to the final judgment is $751 per month. Thus, aside from the tax benefit Romeo will presumably receive from the alimony payment, Romeo is left with $37 per month for his living expenses beyond his mortgage payment. On the other hand Barbara, aside from any income tax on her alimony, will have nearly $7,500 per month to cover living expenses for herself and the parties’ two children. We recognize that the additional payments to Barbara of $2,150 per month to equalize the equitable distribution will not be required after the sixtieth month, but we also note that it is apparent that Romeo will not have funds with which to defray even basic expenses in the interim.

There was some testimony at trial which supports Barbara’s contention that Romeo earns additional income as a consultant for several corporations. The trial court may have considered this in determining the amount of alimony and the time within which the equitable distribution payments were to be made, but the court made no finding imputing income to the husband. If income is to be imputed to Romeo, the source and amount must be indicated. Strickland v. Strickland, 639 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).

We agree that an award of alimony and a relatively equal distribution of the parties’ marital assets is warranted in this ease. We also find that the trial judge acted within his discretion in valuing the husband’s IRA. We disagree only with the unreasonable amount of monthly income that remains available to Romeo after the payments are made pursuant to the final judgment. If additional income is not imputed to him, it appears that either some adjustment to the equitable distribution will be necessary or alimony must be reduced, or a different method of equalizing the parties’ equitable distributions must be fashioned, or some combination of the three must be considered.

The final judgment dissolving the marriage is affirmed, but we vacate paragraph 3, Division of Marital Estate, paragraph 4, Alimony, and paragraph 7, Attorney’s Fees and Suit Money,2 and we remand for further proceedings consistent herewith.

REVERSED; REMANDED.

COBB and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . Barbara requested an award of $1,500 permanent alimony per month during closing arguments. Her financial affidavit facially demonstrated a need for almost $4,000.

. The denial of attorney’s fees and suit money is vacated only to allow the trial court to reconsider Barbara's request after a revised schedule of equitable distribution and a revised amount of alimony is fashioned. The parties may be in comparable financial situations at that time so that denial may again be appropriate.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Narcis v. Narcis, 707 So. 2d 936 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
    …usband was allegedly failing to report. In the absence of record support for the finding that the former husband has substantial unreported income, we are compelled to reverse. See Gomez v. Gomez, 659 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Guzman v. Guzman 653 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The absence of record support also makes it unclear whether the former husband has the financial resources to make the required alimony payments. It is well settled that alimony awards must not exceed a spouse’s ability to pay.…
  • Chereskin v. Chereskin, 665 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
    …torney’s fees, and certain provisions regarding [*1134] child support and visitation. We vacate the final judgment, except for the portions dissolving the marriage and establishing the terms of visitation, for the reasons stated in Guzman v. Guzman, 653 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995): We disagree only with the unreasonable amount of monthly income that remains available to [the former husband] after the payments are made pursuant to the final judgment. If additional income is not imputed to him, it appears t…
  • Ottmar K.T. Dippold v. Marika Dippold, 712 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
    …ents in light of a 56% reduction in the former husband’s earnings was an abuse of discretion, so we reverse the modification order and remand the cause to the trial court with directions to consider a greater alimony reduction. See Guzman v. Guzman, 653 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). REVERSED and REMANDED. COBB and W. SHARP, JJ., concur.…

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