OTTMAR K.T. DIPPOLD, APPELLANT,
v.
MARIKA DIPPOLD, APPELLEE
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In this alimony modification case, the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order reducing permanent alimony by only 20% where the former husband's income had decreased by 56% due to circumstances beyond his control. The court held that such a modest reduction constituted an abuse of discretion given the substantial change in circumstances and the former wife's significant financial resources.
The court held that a 20% reduction in alimony in light of a 56% reduction in the former husband's earnings constituted an abuse of discretion and was insufficient to meet the requirements of substantial change of circumstances doctrine. The court reversed and remanded for the trial court to consider a greater alimony reduction.
[1] A substantial reduction in a payor's income, through no fault of their own, constitutes a substantial change of circumstances justifying a modification of alimony.
[2] A trial court abuses its discretion by failing to adequately reduce alimony payments when the payor's income has been substantially reduced.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Most significant, however, is the reduction of the former husband's income to less than half of his pre-dissolution income.”
Identifies the critical factor supporting reversal—the 56% income reduction warranted greater alimony modification than the 20% reduction granted
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe former husband's monthly income decreased from $20,000 to $8,750 through no fault of his own. The trial court found a substantial change of circum…
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ORFINGER, M., Senior Judge.
Appellant, the former husband, appeals from an order reducing the amount of permanent alimony to be paid to the former wife contending that the reduction should have been greater and that because of the drastic reduction in his income, he is left with insufficient funds to meet his monthly living expenses. We agree, and reverse. The trial court found that there had been a substantial change of circumstances which reduced appellant’s income, through no fault of his own, from $20,000 per month to $8,750 monthly. The court also found that although the parties had contemplated a fairly equal division of their assets, because of unforseen market conditions the former wife had received the lion’s share of those assets, and now had cash assets of approximately $500,000 “... which can earn a minimum of $25,000 annually by being invested at a most conservative rate.” In addition, the wife was earning $500 per month with an insurance agency so that she had an excess of income over that which she asserted were her monthly living expenses.
There was substantial competent evidence to support the finding of a substantial change of circumstances. See, Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla.1992). Most significant, however, is the reduction of the former husband’s income to less than half of his pre-dissolution income. Cook v. Cook, 574 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Under these circumstances a reduction of 20% in alimony payments in light of a 56% reduction in the former husband’s earnings was an abuse of discretion, so we reverse the modification order and remand the cause to the trial court with directions to consider a greater alimony reduction. See Guzman v. Guzman, 653 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
COBB and W. SHARP, JJ., concur.
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Jarrard v. Jarrard, 157 So. 3d 332 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)…percent, and his support obligation had jumped to 70 percent of that income. This is not a situation in which the initial income was extremely high or where other assets existed to protect this couple from the loss of income. In Dippold, v. Dippold, 712 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), a change similar to the change here not only was found to be substantial, but it also required the trial court to reduce the support by more than 20 percent. Ms. Jarrard has cited no case in which a trial court or an appellate c…
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Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pimm v. Pimm, 601 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1992)
- Cook v. Catharine S. Cook, 574 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Romeo G. Guzman v. Guzman, 653 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)