E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
BILLY W. LAMBERT; AMELIA P. LAMBERT; CONRAD LIFSEY AND MARY ANN LIFSEY, PARTNERS, DOING BUSINESS AS SUNSHINE FOLIAGE WORLD, A FLORIDA GENERAL PARTNERSHIP; THE LAKELAND PUBLISHING CORPORATION; FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS; ASGROW FLORIDA COMPANY; AND HELENA CHEMICAL COMPANY, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The trial court erred by setting aside a confidentiality order without affording DuPont procedural due process, specifically the opportunity to be heard.
[1] A trial court commits error by summarily resolving issues under the Sunshine in Litigation Act without affording the parties an opportunity to present evidence.
[2] Due process requires that litigants be provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard in any judicial proceeding.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellees sued DuPont alleging commercial plant damage from Benlate, with claims limited to lost profits. DuPont provided confidential documents under…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Confidentiality Order cases and more on FLexlaw
QUINCE, Judge.
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Company (DuPont) appeals an order setting aside a confidentiality order. Because the trial court did not afford DuPont procedural due process, we reverse.
Billy Lambert and others (the appellees) brought suit against DuPont and others alleging that ornamental plants grown for commercial sale were harmed by Benlate® 50 DF (Benlate). The suit against DuPont was based upon negligence and strict liability.
The appellees’ claims were confined strictly to loss of profits to their commercial enterprise. During the course of pretrial discovery, the parties introduced no evidence regarding possible health effects of Benlate, nor any evidence suggesting Benlate had caused or would cause personal injury.
Because of the complexity of the litigation, DuPont made documents available to the plaintiffs which contained confidential, proprietary and trade secret information. This information was made available after the court issued a confidentiality order. The Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department) and the Lake-land Publishing Corporation, doing business as the Lakeland Ledger (Ledger), filed motions pursuant to the Sunshine in Litigation Act (Sunshine Act),' section 69.081, Florida Statutes (1991), to set aside the confidentiality order. Based upon allegations that Ben-late was a public hazard pursuant to section 69.081, the motions sought to have the confidential information made available to the public. DuPont responded by describing the confidential, proprietary, and trade secret significance of the protected documents.
The Sunshine Act claims advanced together with pretrial activity in the underlying suit. The Sunshine Act portion of the litigation was set for trial several times but was continued prior to each hearing. Before a hearing was held on the Sunshine Act issues, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the appellees in the underlying suit. Following the verdict, the trial court found Benlate a public hazard on the basis of evidence it had heard when presiding over the trial. The court then set aside its earlier confidentiality order almost in its entirety. Over objection, the court did not allow the parties a hearing on the merits of the Sunshine Act issues.
Due process mandates that in any judicial proceeding, the litigants must be afforded the basic elements of notice and opportunity to be heard. County of Pasco v. Riehl, 635 So. 2d 17 (Fla.1994); Cavalier v. Ignas, 290 So. 2d 20 (Fla.1974). The Department, the Ledger, and DuPont proceeded in this litigation anticipating a separate hearing solely on the Sunshine Act issues. Not only were separate witness lists exchanged in anticipation of the hearing, but also numerous hearings were both scheduled and held with the sole issues being related to this aspect of the litigation. Furthermore, DuPont argued the evidence and arguments concerning the Sunshine Act litigation would not be encompassed in the underlying suit.
The trial court’s summary resolution of the Sunshine Act issues without giving the parties an opportunity to present evidence was error. Riehl; Fickle v. Adkins, 394 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). We reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the issues involved with the Sunshine in Litigation Act, including the constitutionality of the statute.
FRANK, C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (16 total)
-
Vollmer v. KEY Dev. Props., Inc., 966 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…s Vollmer properly points out, the constitutional guarantee of due process requires that each litigant be given a full and fair opportunity to be heard. County of Pasco v. Riehl, 635 So. 2d 17, 18 (Fla.1994); E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Lambert, 654 So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Edelman v. Breed, 836 So. 2d 1092, 1094 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). The right to be heard at an evidentiary hearing includes more than simply being allowed to be present and to speak. Baron v. Baron, 941 So. 2d 1233, 1236 (Fla. 2d…
-
Shlishey THE Best, Inc. v. Citifinancial Equity Servs., Inc., 14 So. 3d 1271 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…ial’s motion without an opportunity for Shlishey to be heard. “Due process mandates that in any judicial proceeding, the litigants must be afforded the basic elements of notice and opportunity to be heard.” E.I. Du-Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Lambert, 654 So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (citing Cavalier v. Ignas, 290 So. 2d 20, 21 (Fla.1974)); see also Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (“ ‘The fun [*1274] damental requisite of due process of law i…
-
Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Huso Dzidzovic, 249 So. 3d 1265 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018)…be heard, the trial court acted ex parte. This was error. "Due process mandates that in any judicial proceeding, the litigants must be afforded the basic elements of notice and opportunity to be heard." E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Lambert, 654 So. 2d 226, 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); see also Arcila v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 145 So. 3d 897, 898-99 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (reversing trial court's ex parte order vacating an order of dismissal); Shlishey the Best, Inc. v. CitiFinancial Equity Servs.,…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cavalier v. Ignas, 290 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1974)
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 394 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Fickle v. Adkins, 394 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Cnty. OF Pasco v. Chris and Wendy Riehl, 635 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1994)