FORREST HOPE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court reversed Forrest Hope's strong-armed robbery conviction because the trial court erred by denying the public defender's motion to withdraw based on a conflict of interest. The public defender's office had previously represented the alleged victim, creating an impermissible conflict that required separate counsel under Florida law.
The trial court must grant a motion to withdraw by the public defender when the public defender determines a conflict exists due to adverse or hostile interests. The trial court is not permitted to reweigh the public defender's determination of conflict, and the public defender's office functions as a law firm such that different attorneys within it cannot represent clients with conflicting interests.
[1] A trial court must grant separate representation when a public defender moves to withdraw based on a conflict due to adverse or hostile interests between clients, and the…
[2] The public defender's office is considered the functional equivalent of a law firm, meaning different attorneys within the same office cannot represent defendants with co…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[O]nce a public defender moves to withdraw from the representation of a client based on a conflict due to adverse or hostile interests between the two clients, under section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1991), a trial court must grant separate representation.... [A] trial court is not permitted to reweigh the facts considered by the public defender in determining that a conflict exists.”
Establishes the mandatory nature of granting withdrawal motions based on conflict of interest and the trial court's lack of discretion to reweigh the public defender's determination.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHope was charged with strong-armed robbery. Prior to trial, his assistant public defender moved to withdraw, asserting an irreconcilable conflict of i…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant was found guilty of strong-armed robbery. Prior to the trial, appellant’s counsel, an assistant public defender, filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1993). The motion asserted that an irreconcilable eon-flict of interest existed because the public defender’s office had represented the alleged victim, the state’s witness in an unrelated case. The trial court denied the motion.
Section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1993), provides in pertinent part that:
(3) If at any time during the representation of two or more indigents the public defender shall determine that the interests of those accused are so adverse or hostile that they cannot all be counseled by the public defender or his staff without conflict of interest, or that none can be counseled by the public defender or his staff because of conflict of interest, it shall be his duty to move the court to appoint other counsel. The court may appoint one or more members of The Florida Bar, who are in no way affiliated with the public defender, in his capacity as such, or in his private practice, to represent those accused.
The supreme court recently addressed section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1993), and stated that:
[O]nce a public defender moves to withdraw from the representation of a client based on a conflict due to adverse or hostile interests between the two clients, under section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1991), a trial court must grant separate representation.... [A] trial court is not permitted to reweigh the facts considered by the public defender in determining that a conflict exists. This is true even if the representation of one of the adverse clients has been concluded.
Guzman v. State, 644 So. 2d 996, 998-999 (Fla.1994) (citations omitted).
Following the dictates of Guzman, once the public defender determined that a conflict existed due to their office’s prior representation of the alleged victim, the trial court was required to grant the motion to withdraw. Id. at 998-999. The “public defender’s office is the functional equivalent of a law firm. Different attorneys in the same public defender’s office cannot represent defendants with conflicting interests.” Bouie v. State, 559 So. 2d 1113, 1115 (Fla.1990).
In this case, the public defender’s office previously represented the alleged vie- tim. Appellant had an interest in discrediting the testimony of the alleged victim and the alleged victim had an interest in seeking retribution against appellant. These interests were directly adverse. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7(a). The trial court is not permitted to reweigh the facts considered by the public defender in determining if a conflict exists. Guzman, 644 So. 2d at 998-999.
Finding clear error in the trial court’s denial of the assistant public defender’s motion to withdraw, we reverse and remand for a new trial and for the trial court to appoint counsel for appellant who is not affiliated with the public defender’s office. Our resolution of this issue moots the other issues on appeal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HERSEY, GLICKSTEIN and POLEN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Roberts v. State, 670 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…or hostile to those of another client that the public defender cannot represent the two clients without a conflict of interest.” Guzman v. State, [*1044] 644 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla.1994); Babb v. Edwards, 412 So. 2d 859, 860 (Fla.1982); Hope v. State, 654 So. 2d 639, 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). In that situation pursuant to section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1993), “a trial court must grant separate representation.” Guzman, 644 So. 2d at 999. The trial court is not permitted to reweigh the facts in determining wh…
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Valle v. State, 763 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…uthority, and we find them to be without merit.2 Having concluded that Guzman is no longer controlling and that trial courts can inquire into the adequacy of the motion alleging conflict, we proceed to the substance of the motion. In Hope v. State, 654 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), as in the present case, the public defender moved to withdraw from representing the defendant because of previous representation of the victim of the crime. Although [*1178] this court relied on the mandatory requirement of Guzm…
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Reardon v. State, 715 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…that the trial court has no discretion in this matter. See, e.g., Costa v. State, 712 So. 2d 455, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1472 (Fla. 4th DCA June 17, 1998) (public defender’s office should be allowed to withdraw upon certifying conflict); Hope v. State, 654 So. 2d 639, 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (“Following the dictates of Guzman, once the public defender determined that a conflict existed ... the trial court was required to grant the motion to withdraw.”); Crowe v. State, 701 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (Da…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Guzman v. State, 644 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1994)
- Bouie v. State, 559 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1990)