JOHN W. BOYD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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John Boyd appealed the trial court's order requiring him to pay prosecution costs following his no-contest plea to sexual battery with adjudication withheld. The appellate court reversed, holding that costs cannot be imposed under the statute when adjudication is withheld, but may be imposed as a probation condition if authorized by the plea agreement.
The court held that costs cannot be authorized under section 939.01 when adjudication is withheld because the statute requires a 'conviction,' but costs may be imposed as a condition of probation under the Clinger doctrine. The court also held that costs were implicit in the plea agreement through Boyd's acknowledgment that the court could impose the same punishment as if he had been convicted, so no opportunity to withdraw the plea was required.
[1] A cost of prosecution cannot be imposed under section 939.01, Florida Statutes, when adjudication of guilt has been withheld.
[2] A cost of prosecution may be imposed as a condition of probation even when adjudication of guilt has been withheld.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the cost was not authorized by section 939.01, because he was not "convicted," rather, adjudication was withheld”
Establishes that statutory authorization for costs requires conviction, not merely a plea with adjudication withheld
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBoyd entered a no-contest plea to sexual battery in exchange for the State's recommendation of three years probation with adjudication of guilt withhe…
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JOANOS, Judge.
In this direct criminal appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred in ordering him to pay a cost of prosecution which the court ordered pursuant to section 939.01, Florida Statutes, in a separate “Order Assessing Costs and Converting to Civil Judgment.” We reverse and remand.
The trial court accepted appellant’s plea of no contest to one count of sexual battery. In exchange for the plea, the State had agreed to recommend three years of probation, withholding adjudication of guilt, and appellant had agreed to sexual abuse counseling. The written plea did not specifically mention payment of costs, but it did provide that appellant understood that the court could “impose the same punishment as if I had plead not guilty, stood trial, and been convicted.”
First, appellant contends, and we agree, that the cost was not authorized by section 939.01, because he was not “convicted,” rather, adjudication was withheld, see Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (en banc opinion on rehearing); Knaus v. State, 608 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Clinger v. State, 533 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). However, appellant acknowledges that under the theory set out in Clinger, when adjudication is withheld, the cost can be imposed as a condition of probation.1
Next, appellant contends the cost cannot be imposed as a condition of probation without first giving him an opportunity to withdraw his plea, because it was not part of the negotiated plea agreement. We dis agree. In the written plea agreement, appellant acknowledged that “the Court may impose the same punishment as if I had plead not guilty, stood trial and been convicted.” The imposition of the costs of prosecution was implicit in the plea agreement. See State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139 (Fla.1991) (“publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions”). On remand, the trial court may impose the cost as a condition of probation.
Finally, we reject appellant’s argument that the cost was not reasonably related to the offense.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BOOTH and MINER, JJ., concur. . We note that, had the cost been imposed validly under section 939.01, the statute directs that it shall be made a condition of probation. See § 939.01(4), Fla.Stat.
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Patton v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n & Chase Home Mortg. Corp., 685 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…ilty plea equates with a conviction and, thus, she lied on her application. This court, however, has determined that a conviction attaches only upon an adjudication of guilt. Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); see also Boyd v. State, 654 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Patton has not been convicted of welfare fraud. The referee’s determination of work-related misconduct was based solely upon the misrepresentation of her plea; therefore, we reverse and remand for the award of benefits.1 SCHO…
Authorities Cited
- Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1991)
- Clinger v. State, 533 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
- Moore v. State, 608 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)