ROBERT V. DEAN, APPELLANT,
v.
SARAH H. DEAN, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage case, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's interpretation of a settlement agreement regarding MCI stock options, holding that the ex-husband was entitled to the full value of the options including taxes withheld by MCI, and reversing the denial of attorney's fees available under the contract's mandatory fee provision.
The husband was entitled to the full amount of taxes withheld by MCI as part of the "proceeds" owed under the agreement. Additionally, the husband is entitled to recover attorney's fees under the mandatory terms of the settlement agreement itself, which governs fee awards independent of Florida Statutes § 61.16.
[1] A settlement agreement's "proceeds" from stock options include sums deducted for taxes if the agreement contemplated the transfer of those options and the tax consequence…
[2] A party is entitled to attorney's fees for litigation concerning the enforcement or interpretation of a settlement agreement when the agreement itself mandates such fees…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“in return for the wife's bearing what they discovered were the highly uncertain tax consequences of the transfer of her MCI stock options, the husband agreed to accept only 37½% of those options, rather than the 50% they had previously contemplated”
Establishes the bargain struck between the parties and the basis for the husband's entitlement to tax withholdings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties agreed to a settlement in which the husband would receive 37.5% of the wife's MCI stock options instead of the originally contemplated 50%…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The ex-husband appeals from an adverse ruling concerning the interpretation of a dissolution settlement agreement. In two respects, we reverse.
I.
The record indisputably shows that, in return for the wife’s bearing what they discovered were the highly uncertain tax consequences of the transfer of her MCI stock options, the husband agreed to accept only 37½% of those options, rather than the 50% they had previously contemplated. The trial judge was therefore clearly in error in deter mining that the “proceeds” of the 37% to which he was entitled under the agreement1 did not include the sums deducted by MCI for those very taxes. See Child v. Child, 474 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Accordingly, judgment must be entered for the husband in the amount of the taxes withheld, with interest from the dates the respective payments were due from the wife under the contract.
II.
In the light of this decision,2 the husband is entitled to attorney’s fees for this litigation under the mandatory terms of the contract itself.3 See Oliver Gen. Fence, Inc. v. Roche, 594 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Vistaco, Inc. v. Prestige Properties, Inc., 559 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); B & H Constr. & Supply Co., Inc. v. Tallahassee Community College, 542 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), review denied, 549 So. 2d 1013 (Fla.1989). We agree with the husband that the right to attorney’s fees is governed only by the contract and that section 61.16, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), and the conditions to an award under that statute are therefore irrelevant. Crews v. Crews, 629 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Witt v. Witt, 568 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). The amount of these fees shall be determined after remand.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
. The clause in question provided as follows: 4. b. The proceeds of 1500 stock options (MCI stock) to be given to the Husband as follows: the proceeds of the exercises of 750 stock options shall be transferred to the Husband within ten days from execution of this agreement. The proceeds from the sale of 750 stock options within ten days from the date the Wife becomes vested with MCI on 28 January 1994.
. We need not decide whether the appellant was erroneously denied fees under the agreement based only on the relatively minor issues on which he prevailed below.
. On this issue, the agreement provides:
IX. ATTORNEY’S FEES
In the event that either party in this Agreement defaults in his or her obligations hereunder, the party in default shall be liable to the non-defaulting party for all reasonable expenses incurred, including attorney’s fees, in the enforcement or interpretation of the obligation created by this agreement.
XII. AMENDMENT AND ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENT
The parties agree that if the terms of this agreement are not complied with, the noncomplying party will be liable for and pay the reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred by the party seeking to enforce the terms of this agreement.
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Edson Carlos de Campos v. Ferrara, 90 So. 3d 865 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…, including enforcement and modification proceedings and appeals.. . See e.g., Bane v. Bane, 775 So. 2d 938, 943 (Fla.2000); Vitale v. Vitale, 31 So. 3d 970 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Ulbrich v. Coolidge, 935 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Dean v. Dean, 655 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).…
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Ulbrich v. Coolidge, 935 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…ases involving a marital settlement agreement with a prevailing party provision, section 61.16, Florida Statutes, cannot be used as a basis for an award of attorney’s fees. See Zakian v. Zakian, 837 So. 2d 549, 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Dean v. Dean, 655 So. 2d 243, 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). In this case, the Agreement provided that Ulbrich would pay Coolidge equitable distribution in the annual sum of $62,500.00 for eight (8) years. These payments were conditioned on Ulbrich’s continued visitation with his ste…
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Vitale v. Anne Vitale, 31 So. 3d 970 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…rty provision, section 61.16, Florida Statutes, cannot be used as a basis for an award of attorney’s fees.” Ulbrich v. Coolidge, 935 So. 2d 607, 608 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (citing Zakian v. Zakian, 837 So. 2d 549, 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Dean v. Dean, 655 So. 2d 243, 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)). Instead, the provisions in the marital settlement agreement awarding attorney’s fees are generally enforced. Id. In this case, under the terms of the attorney’s fee provisions incorporated into the final judgment, the preva…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- B & H Constr. & Supply Co., Inc. v. The Dist. Bd. OF Trs. OF Tallahassee Cmty. Coll., 542 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Child v. Child, 474 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Vistaco, Inc. v. Prestige Props., Inc., 559 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Witt v. Witt, 568 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Oliver Gen. Fence, Inc. v. Roche, 594 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
- Longo v. State, 629 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Crews v. Emmett Crews, 629 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)