IN THE INTEREST OF J.G., A CHILD
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A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for criminal mischief after striking a vehicle window while attempting to strike a person. The appellate court reversed, holding that the doctrine of transferred intent cannot apply to criminal mischief because it only transfers intent as to the victim, not as to the nature of the harm (personal vs. property damage).
The doctrine of transferred intent cannot sustain a conviction for criminal mischief. Transferred intent only operates to transfer the defendant's intent as to the intended victim to an unintended victim, not to transform an intent to harm a person into an intent to damage property, which is required for criminal mischief.
[1] The doctrine of transferred intent applies only to transfer a defendant's intent as to an intended victim to an unintended victim.
[2] The doctrine of transferred intent does not apply to transfer the intent to commit an offensive touching to an inanimate object.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the doctrine of transferred intent will not sustain the finding of guilt. As we held in Mordica v. State, 618 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), the doctrine only operates to transfer the defendant's intent as to the intended victim to the unintended victim.”
Establishes that transferred intent only applies to transfer intent between victims of the same offense, not to change the nature of the harm intended.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJ.G. intended to strike the victim with his closed fist but instead struck and shattered the rear window of the victim's automobile. The trial judge a…
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STEVENSON, Judge.
J.G., a juvenile, challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of criminal mischief. Because the doctrine of transferred intent was improperly applied to the facts of this case, we reverse. At trial, it was established that J.G. intended to strike the victim with his closed fist but instead struck the victim’s automobile, shattering the rear window. After closing arguments, the trial judge stated, “there’s no doubt in my mind he hit that window, but I don’t think that’s what he meant to hit.” The trial judge asked both defense counsel and the prosecutor to do some additional legal research to determine “if you intend to strike a person and hit an object and cause damage ... whether that will qualify for criminal mischief’. At a subsequent hearing, neither counsel produced any additional authority on the trial court’s point of inquiry. Finding that the doctrine of “transferred intent” applied, the trial court found J.G. guilty of criminal mischief. We reverse.
The doctrine of transferred intent was recently addressed in D.J. v. State, 651 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). There, a high school student was adjudicated delinquent after being found guilty of attempted battery on a school employee and affray. The defendant was involved in a schoolyard fistfight with another student when he mistakenly struck an assistant principal who was attempting to stop the fight. In reversing the finding of guilt on the attempted battery of a school employee charge, the court stated:
We agree with the appellant that the doctrine of transferred intent will not sustain the finding of guilt. As we held in Mordica v. State, 618 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), the doctrine only operates to transfer the defendant’s intent as to the intended victim to the unintended victim. Thus, only the appellant’s intent to strike his opponent — a student — could be transferred, and there could be no intent to strike a school employee.
Id. at 1256.
Similarly, in the instant case, only J.G.’s intent to strike his intended victim — a person — could be transferred. The offense of criminal mischief requires that the actor possess the specific intent to damage the property of another.1 The intent to damage the property of another does not arise by operation of law where the actor’s true intention is to cause harm to the person of another. The doctrine of transferred intent could only operate to transfer J.G.’s intent to commit an offensive touching, (i.e., a battery), and since there is no such charge possible against an inanimate object, the doctrine is simply not applicable in the present case.
Accordingly, because the criminal mischief statute requires that the offender act against the property of another willfully and with malice, we hold that the trial court erred in denying J.G.’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
Reversed.
WARNER and POLEN, JJ., concur. . Section 806.13(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1993) provides in part that
A person commits the offense of criminal mischief if he willfully and maliciously injures or damages by any means any real or personal property belonging to another ...
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Sanchez v. State, 909 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…, the mischief criminalized under this statute requires that the defendant specifically intend to damage or destroy the property of another: it is not enough that the defendant act with malice toward the person of the owner. In the Interest of J.G., 655 So. 2d 1284, 1285 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (“The offense of criminal mischief requires that the actor possess the specific intent to damage the property of another. The intent to damage the property of another does not arise by operation of law where the actor’s tru…
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Austin v. State, 700 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…he point is important because, if the jury believed that Appellant first struck the victim with the rock and it bounced off her body before smashing the window, then Appellant could not have violated section 790.19, according to In Interest of J.G., 655 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). That ease held that the intent to strike a person could not be transferred into the specific intent to damage certain property required by the criminal mischief statute. Id. at 1285. We deem J.G. inapposite. Opinions interpreti…
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M.H. v. State, 936 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)…es not arise by operation of law where the actor’s true intention is to cause harm to the person of another.... [T]he criminal mischief statute requires that the offender act against the property of another willfully and with malice....” In re J.G., 655 So. 2d 1284, 1285 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)(em-phasis added); see also Sanchez v. State, 909 So. 2d 981, 985 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)(finding that where defendant, with ill will and malice toward a store clerk attempted to rob him, and in the process damaged the clerk’s t…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mordica v. State, 618 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- D.J. v. State, 651 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)