LORRAINE PESCOW MARRERO, APPELLANT,

v.

JOSEPH PESCOW, APPELLEE

STONE, Judge.

The former wife appeals from a judgment awarding child support prospectively but rejecting her claim for support retroactive, for over three years, to the date of a final judgment of dissolution. We affirm.

The initial final judgment of disso-, lution, awarding custody to the former wife, established the obligations of the parties until modified. See de Jesus Paris v. Bollon, 503 So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Although we do not have the benefit of either a complete record or the trial court’s reasoning with respect to not awarding her child support in the initial proceedings, we note that there is evidence that the former husband lacked the ability to pay at that time. Also, although there were brief periods during which he was employed subsequent to the initial proceeding, the record reflects other periods of unemployment, disability, and incarceration.

Although we do not have the benefit of transcripts from either the initial proceeding or the subsequent modification hearing, there is support in the limited record for the trial court’s conclusion. We also note that the former husband was denied visitation in the initial judgment.

We have considered the authorities cited in the dissenting opinion, but conclude that they are inapposite. In Amend v. Amend, 341 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), as Judge Polen acknowledges, the issue did not involve an order imposing support retroactive to the initial judgment, and in Fowhand v. Piper, 611 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), the issue involved imposing an initial paternity obligation retroactively to birth. Here, however, there is an initial final judgment by the court which does not purport to retain jurisdiction over, or defer, the issue. That judgment was not appealed or otherwise ever challenged.

KLEIN, J., concurs.

POLEN, J., dissents with opinion.

POLEN, Judge,

dissenting.

I disagree that de Jesus Paris v. Bollon, 503 So. 2d 1387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) limits the trial court’s ability to award child support for a period prior to the petitioner’s April 19, 1993 petition, under the facts of this case. Unlike the earlier decree in de Jesus, which (erroneously) denied child support, but was not appealed, here the 1990 decree was silent as to any obligation for child support1. In Amend v. Amend, 341 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), this court approved an award of support for the children where a prior New York decree was silent as to that issue. However, the Amend opinion does not reflect whether or not the child support award was retroactive to the filing of the Florida petition. But see Fowhand v. Piper, 611 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), where the court allowed an award of child support prior to the filing of the petition in a paternity proceeding. I don’t see why the same result should not obtain here.

Alternatively, at the very least, I would reverse for an award of child support for the period from April 19, 1993 through September 1,1993. Even if the trial court agreed to defer enforcement of support for that period, because of the father’s alleged disability, he agreed that he should support his children, and any award attributable to that four and one-half month period could accrue to a later time when appellee was able to pay. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. We are told the reason may have been that the former husband was in jail in 1990, but I do not believe the reason for the 1990 decree’s silence as to child support — not even a reservation of jurisdiction — should affect the children's right to support, de Jesus.