ANTHONY JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that a written sentencing order must be filed contemporaneously with the oral pronouncement to be legally valid.
The trial court orally pronounced a sentence and discussed statutory criteria but failed to file the written order on the same day as required. The wr…
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FARMER, Judge.
When the trial court resentenced defendant pursuant to our mandate in Jones v. State, 634 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), the court orally pronounced the sentence and discussed on the record all of the statutory criteria but did not contemporaneously file the written order containing the requisite findings. Instead, the court announced that the original would be filed with the Clerk by 5:00 p.m. later that day, Friday, July 22nd. Unfortunately, the written order was not filed until the following Monday, July 25th.
Although we are quite reluctant to reverse the sentence on so mechanical a technicality, we are unable to find a legal basis to avoid so doing. In Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla.1993), which we are bound to follow, the written order was filed as here three days late. Accordingly, another resentencing is necessary.
REVERSED.
STONE and STEVENSON, JJ., concur. ORDERED that appellee’s motion filed June 22, 1995, for clarification is granted. No resentencing on murder conviction is required.
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Stuberfield v. State, 690 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…er to apply juvenile or adult sanctions, strictly applying the provisions of section 39.059(7), Florida Statutes, as explained in Troutman and held in light of conditions as they were at the time of the former hearing.4 . See, e.g., Jones v. State, 657 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Pearson v. State, 657 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Walker v. State, 656 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Knight v. State, 656 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Philmore v. State, 656 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Wood v. State, 6…
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Goodman v. State, 693 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…the appellant’s sentence for this offense must be vacated because the 55-month term of incarceration followed by one year of probation exceeds the statutory maximum for the crime. § 812.014(2)(c)l. Fla. Stat. (1995); § 775.082(3)(d); Jones v. State, 657 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (sentence vacated because it was beyond statutory maximum). This is not a case where the recommended sentence exceeds the maximum sentence. See Green v. State, 691 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). All of the appellant’s convicti…
Authorities Cited
- Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993)
- Edler v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993)
- Jones v. State, 634 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Medina v. State, 634 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)