BRIDGETTE BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Bridgette Brown appealed her conviction challenging the trial court's denial of her motion for judgment of acquittal, admission of hearsay evidence, and conditions of probation and costs imposed. The court affirmed the conviction and evidentiary rulings but partially struck certain probation conditions that were not orally pronounced and cost assessments that lacked statutory authority.
The court affirmed the firearm prohibition as a mandatory condition for convicted felons but struck the portion addressing other weapons because it was not announced in open court. The court struck the prohibition on excessive intoxicants because it was not orally pronounced at sentencing but affirmed the remainder of that condition. The court struck $200 in costs ($100 court improvement fund and $100 prosecution costs) lacking statutory authority and affirmed only $200 in court costs with authority to reimpose appropriate costs on remand.
[1] A condition of probation prohibiting possession of weapons may be affirmed in part, striking the portion concerning weapons other than firearms if that portion was not an…
[2] A condition of probation prohibiting excessive use of intoxicants must be orally pronounced at sentencing.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We affirm the portion of this condition that prohibits Brown, a convicted felon, from possessing, carrying or owning a firearm [...] We strike the second portion of the condition concerning other weapons because it was not announced in open court.”
Establishes that firearm restrictions for felons are mandatory and authorized by statute, but weapons conditions must be announced in open court to be valid.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBridgette Brown was convicted and sentenced to probation with various conditions and costs imposed. The trial court imposed probation conditions restr…
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RYDER, Judge.
Bridgette Brown challenges the trial court’s denial of her motion for judgment of acquittal, admission of hearsay evidence and imposition of probation conditions and court costs. We find merit only in her arguments addressing probation conditions and costs. We therefore affirm on the other issues presented without discussion. For the reasons addressed below, we strike certain conditions of her probation and costs imposed.
Brown first challenges condition of probation number four, which provides: “You will neither possess, carry or own any weapons or firearms. You will not possess, carry or own any weapons without first procuring the consent of your [probation] officer.” We affirm the portion of this condition that prohibits Brown, a convicted felon, from possessing, carrying or owning a firearm. § 790.23, Fla.Stat. (1991); Hall v. State, 652 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We strike the second portion of the condition concerning other weapons because it was not announced in open court. Tomlinson v. State, 645 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
Brown also contests condition seven, which states: “You will not use intoxicants to excess or possess any drugs or narcotics unless prescribed by a physician. Nor will you visit places where intoxicants, drugs or other dangerous substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed or used.” We strike the portion of this condition that prohibits the excessive use of intoxicants because it was not orally pronounced at sentencing; we affirm the balance of the condition as a precise definition of a general prohibition that need not be announced in court. Tomlinson.
Brown also challenges .the court’s imposition of the following costs: $255 in court costs, $100 to the court improvement fund and $100 for costs of prosecution. The court cited no statutory authority for these costs, either at the sentencing hearing or in its written order. While Brown’s appeal was pending, we decided Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Pursuant to Reyes, we strike the levy of $100 to the court improvement fund because no statute authorizes this cost. We strike the $100 assessment for costs of prosecution. That cost is discretionary and the state did not expressly request it, nor did the court announce it at sentencing. Reyes. As to the $255 charged for court costs, Brown concedes that $200 of that amount is appropriate under section 27.3455, Florida Statutes (1991). As we noted in Reyes, costs under section 27.3455 are mandatory and need not be orally announced. While the additional $55 imposed for court costs may include mandatory costs, we are unable to ascertain this because the written order does not refer to any statutory authority. Accordingly, we affirm costs in the amount of $200 and strike the remaining costs of $255. On remand, the state may seek to reimpose appropriate costs in accordance with Reyes.
Judgment and sentence affirmed, portions of probation conditions and costs assessed stricken.
FRANK, C.J. and THREADGILL, J., concur.
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Elvia Wardell Mathews v. State, 662 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…four insofar as it prohibits the ownership or possession of a firearm, but strike the part of condition four relating to weapons. Further, we strike the portion of condition seven that prohibits the excessive use of intoxicants. See Brown v. State, 658 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Second, $130 was assessed for prosecution costs. However, at the sentencing hearing, there was no request for such costs as required by section 939.01(1), Florida Statutes (1993). Consequently, this cost must be stricken. On re…
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Conley v. State, 681 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…ons were improperly imposed. We therefore strike those costs and conditions. Specifically, we strike the $45 assessment for the costs of prosecution because such costs were neither requested nor orally pronounced at sentencing. See Brown v. State, 658 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We also strike all of probation condition nine and that portion of probation condition 13 which requires Conley to pay for drug and alcohol testing, evaluation, and treatment, because those were special conditions which were not…
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Burnes v. State, 683 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…ese costs; defendant’s circumstances and ability to pay are not relevant; and publication of these costs in the Florida Statutes provides every defendant with adequate notice). Accord Jones v. State, 661 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Brown v. State, 658 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). [*1158] REVERSED AND REMANDED. PETERSON, C.J., and COBB and ANTOON, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Tomlinson v. State, 645 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Hall v. State, 652 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)