CLOVER BOYKIN, PETITIONER,
v.
HONORABLE EDWARD A. GARRISON, CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE OF THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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A trial judge issued a memorandum prohibiting acceptance of negotiated disposition pleas, Alford pleas, and no-contest pleas in his division, effective January 17, 1995. The court granted a writ of mandamus, holding that a trial judge must exercise discretion regarding these plea types and cannot categorically refuse to consider them.
A trial judge must exercise discretion regarding negotiated, no-contest, and Alford pleas and cannot categorically refuse to consider them. When a plea is knowing and voluntary, has a factual foundation, and the state has agreed to it, the judge's discretion ends and the plea must be accepted.
[1] A trial court must exercise discretion when discretion is provided by law; a refusal to exercise such discretion is an error subject to mandamus relief.
[2] Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provide trial courts with discretion to accept or reject negotiated, no contest, and Alford pleas.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a judge cannot refuse a concession to a judgment of guilt merely because the trial judge does not like "best interest" pleas. There is no residuum of discretion to insist that a defendant make a public acknowl-edgement of actual guilt before a plea of guilty is legally acceptable. When the plea is knowing and voluntary, when there is a factual foundation to support it, when the state has agreed to it, then the discretion has ended and the plea must be accepted.”
Establishes that judges must exercise discretion on pleas and cannot categorically refuse certain plea types based on personal preference.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJudge Garrison took over Criminal Division "W" from Judge Lupo and issued a signed memorandum announcing that effective January 17, 1995, he would not…
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner has filed a petition for writ of prohibition that fails to state a sufficient legal basis for disqualification of respondent. However, petitioner has demonstrated an entitlement to mandamus relief. We therefore treat the petition for writ of prohibition as a petition for writ of mandamus and grant the petition.
Respondent issued a signed memorandum stating in pertinent part:
Effective Tuesday, January 17, 1995, Judge Garrison will be taking over Criminal Division “W” from Judge Lupo. Judge Garrison will be reviewing various procedures prior to that changeover and expects that there will be some changes.
One change that is for sure is effective January 17, 1995 the following types of pleas will not be accepted in Division “W”:
1. Negotiated disposition pleas (those pleas where a specific sentence bargain is contemplated).
2. Alford pleas.
3. No Contest pleas.
All parties who wish to take advantage of one of the above types of plea are encouraged to set those before January 13, 1995 before Judge Lupo.
We agree with petitioner that the effect of respondent’s memorandum is an announcement by respondent that he will refuse to exercise his discretion in the stated matters. The law is well settled that a trial court must exercise its discretion where discretion has been provided; a refusal to so exercise is error and is subject to a mandamus remedy. Glosson v. Solomon, 490 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); accord Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So. 2d 719 (Fla.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935, 94 S.Ct. 2649,41 L.Ed.2d 239 (1974); Fazio v. Russell Building Movers, Inc., 469 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). The Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), expressly provide the trial court with the discretion to accept or reject negotiated, no contest and Alford, or so-called “best interest,” pleas. See rules 3.170, 3.171 and 3.172, Fla.R.Crim.P. (1995); Rigabar v. Broome, 658 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (citing Brown v. State, 367 So. 2d 616 (Fla.1979), and explaining that the trial court has the discretion to reject a negotiated plea). The refusal to consider no contest and Alford pleas would be in direct contravention of this court’s holding in Rigabar v. Broome, 658 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), reh’g denied with opinion, No. 95-0333 (Fla. 4th DCA July 5,1995). Therein this court stated that a judge cannot refuse a concession to a judgment of guilt merely because the trial judge does not like “best interest” pleas. There is no residuum of discretion to insist that a defendant make a public acknowledgement of actual guilt before a plea of guilty is legally acceptable. When the plea is knowing and voluntary, when there is a factual foundation to support it, when the state has agreed to it, then the discretion has ended and the plea must be accepted.
At 1041. In Rigabar, No. 95-0333, this court also explained in its denial of rehearing that this principle applies with equal force to no contest pleas.
Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to consider and to exercise its discretion regarding negotiated, no contest and Alford pleas consistent with the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rigabar. PETITION GRANTED.
GUNTHER, C.J., and DELL and KLEIN, JJ., concur.
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Steinmann v. State, 839 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…story record, and any request for expunction of a criminal history record may be denied at the sole discretion of the court.” Id. (Emphasis added). It is error for the trial court to refuse or fail to exercise its discretion. See Boykin v. Garrison, 658 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Glosson v. Solomon, 490 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). The record in this case indicates that the trial court did not exercise any discretion in deciding not to expunge appellant’s record. Therefore, we reverse and remand for the…
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Haim Gutkind v. State, 765 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…story record, and any request for expunction of a criminal history record may be denied at the sole discretion of the court.” Id. (Emphasis added). It is error for the trial court to refuse or fail to exercise its discretion. See Boykin v. Garrison, 658 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Glosson v. Solomon, 490 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). The record in this case indicates that the trial court did not exercise any discretion in deciding not to expunge appellant’s record. Therefore, we reverse and remand for t…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (U.S. 1970)
- Rayfield Moore v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 289 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1974)
- Brown v. State, 367 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 1979)
- Sapp v. Haskins, 417 U.S. 935 (U.S. 1974)
- Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Drew, 417 U.S. 935 (U.S. 1974)
- Glosson v. The Honorable Harold Solomon, 490 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Morrison v. State, 658 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Nunzio Michael Fazio v. Russell Bldg. Movers, Inc., 469 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)