DARRYL WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1995-08-09
No. 94-01350
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and PATTERSON and LAZZARA, JJ., concur.
658 So. 2d 1172 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1995) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 1995 WL 467299 · 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 8421
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Darryl Williams appeals his convictions for burglary of a conveyance and grand theft of a firearm following a bench trial. The appellate court affirms the convictions but strikes certain probation conditions that either lacked oral pronouncement at sentencing or were impermissibly vague.


Holding

The court affirmed the convictions and the portions of probation conditions that are general statutory conditions or validly defined, but struck those portions that either required oral pronouncement but lacked it or were impermissibly vague. Specifically, the firearms restriction based on section 790.23 was affirmed as a general condition, but the weapons restriction and officer-consent language were struck. The intoxicant excess restriction and drug possession restriction in condition (7) were struck, but the prohibition on visiting places of unlawful use was affirmed.


Headnotes

[1] A condition of probation prohibiting possession of firearms is a general condition that need not be orally pronounced at sentencing.

[2] A probation condition prohibiting the carrying of weapons not enumerated in statute must be orally pronounced at sentencing.

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Key Quotes

“Since section 790.23, Florida Statutes (1991), makes it unlawful for any person convicted of a felony to own, possess, or have in his eare, custody, or control any firearm, the first sentence of condition (4) is a general condition for which no oral pronouncement is needed.”

Establishes that statutory firearms restrictions are general conditions requiring no oral pronouncement at sentencing.

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Facts & Procedural History

Williams was adjudicated guilty after a nonjury trial of burglary of a conveyance and grand theft of a firearm under Florida Statutes sections 810.02(…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Darryl Williams, challenges the trial court’s judgments and sentences. After a nonjury trial, the appellant was adjudicated guilty of burglary of a conveyance and grand theft of a firearm, in violation of sections 810.02(1) and (2)(b) and 812.014(2)(c)(3), Florida Statutes (1991). The appellant was sentenced to serve two concurrent terms of two years probation and was ordered to pay restitution. This timely appeal followed.

Although we affirm the appellant’s convictions without discussion, we agree with his contention that the trial court erred by imposing certain conditions of probation. Probation condition (4) states: “You will not possess, carry or own any firearms. You will not possess, carry, or own any weapons without first procuring the consent of your officer.” Since section 790.23, Florida Statutes (1991), makes it unlawful for any person convicted of a felony to own, possess, or have in his eare, custody, or control any firearm, the first sentence of condition (4) is a general condition for which no oral pronouncement is needed. Fitts v. State, 649 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Therefore, we affirm that portion of condition (4). However, we strike the portion of condition (4) that prohibits the carrying of weapons other than those enumerated in section 790.23 since it was not orally pronounced at sentencing. Malone v. State, 652 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We also strike the remainder of the condition which implies that a felon can possess weapons otherwise prohibited with the consent of his probation officer. Malone, 652 So. 2d at 903.

Probation condition (7) states: “You will not use intoxicants to excess or possess any drugs or narcotics unless prescribed by a physician. Nor will you visit places where intoxicants, drugs or other dangerous substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used.” That portion of condition (7) which provides that appellant shall not use intoxicants to excess is a special condition of probation which must be orally pronounced at sentencing. Williams v. State, 653 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Since it was not orally pronounced, it must be stricken. We also strike that portion of the condition that prohibits appellant from possessing “any drugs or narcotics unless prescribed by a physician” since it is too vague. Parsons v. State, 650 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). However, we affirm the remaining portion of the condition which prohibits the appellant from visiting places where intoxicants are unlawfully sold, dispensed, or used since it is valid as a more precise definition of a general prohibition and, as such, need not be orally pronounced. Parsons, 650 So. 2d at 177.

Accordingly, we strike those portions of probation conditions (4) and (7) as discussed above and affirm the judgments and sentences in all other respects.

Affirmed as modified.

SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and PATTERSON and LAZZARA, JJ., concur.


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Cited By

  • Navarrion Johnson v. State, 701 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
    …2d 599 (Fla.1996); Stark v. State, 650 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). . See Weber v. State, 691 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Levely v. State, 685 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Cooper v. State, 660 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Williams v. State, 658 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Hall v. State, 661 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Parsons v. State, 650 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). . In Houston v. State, 701 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), we noted that the other districts had not adopted our analysis of co…

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