THOMAS E. DYER, SR., APPELLANT,
v.
DAN GOODMAN, INC., A NEW YORK CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a defaulted note action, holding that reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded even when the primary judgment remains uncollected and the fee agreement is contingent, provided the fee does not exceed the contingent fee agreement with counsel.
Reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing party in an action on a defaulted note even when the primary judgment remains uncollected and the fee agreement with counsel is contingent, provided the awarded fee does not exceed the fee agreement with counsel.
[1] Reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing party in an action on a defaulted note even when the primary judgment remains uncollected and the fee agreement…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Collection of the primary obligation is not a prerequisite to an award of reasonable fees.”
The court rejected the appellant's argument that uncollected primary judgments make attorney's fee awards unenforceable windfalls in contingent fee cases.
The plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant on a defaulted note and sought attorney's fees as the prevailing party. The trial court awarde…
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm a judgment awarding attorney’s fees to the plaintiff, as the prevailing party, in this action on a defaulted note. The fee awarded is supported by the record and is based on the court’s determination of reasonable hours and a reasonable hourly rate. A multiplier of “1” was employed, which means, effectively, that the “lodestar” fee, based on the hourly rate and time, was not enhanced. The fee as computed is substantially less than the fee counsel will receive under the contingent fee agreement between the plaintiff and counsel if the primary judgment is collected. Therefore, it does not run afoul of the proscription in Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985), that reasonable fees awarded not exceed the prevailing party’s fee agreement with counsel.
We reject Appellant’s assertion that where the primary judgment remains uncollected, the award of a judgment for attorney’s fees is an unenforceable windfall where the fees are contingent. It cannot be disputed that judgments for reasonable attorney’s fees, where authorized by statute or contract, may be awarded where the party’s fee contract with counsel is contingent. Collection of the primary obligation is not a prerequisite to an award of reasonable fees. See Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla.1990); Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Moxley, 557 So. 2d 863 (Fla.1990). Finding no error or abuse of discretion as to any of the issues asserted, the judgment is affirmed.
STONE, POLEN and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)
- Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990)
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Moxley, 557 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1990)