JOHN MCKEE, III, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN MCKEE, JR., DECEASED, APPELLANT,
v.
CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ORGANIZED UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The estate of John McKee, Jr. appealed a dismissal of its inverse condemnation action challenging the City of Tallahassee's development restrictions on property classified as successional forest. The court affirmed the dismissal on ripeness grounds, holding that the estate failed to exhaust administrative remedies and did not demonstrate that further variance applications would be futile.
The court held that the inverse condemnation action was not ripe because the variance denial did not constitute a final decision on permitted development intensity, and the estate cannot establish that further variance applications would be futile given the estate's incomplete initial application and City assurances of favorable consideration for a properly prepared application.
[1] An inverse condemnation action is not ripe when the denial of a variance does not constitute a final decision regarding the type and intensity of development permitted on…
[2] A property owner cannot establish futility to satisfy ripeness requirements for an inverse condemnation action when their variance application was incomplete and did not…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the City's variance denial did not constitute a "final decision" regarding the type and intensity of the development that will be permitted on the property”
Establishes that a variance denial alone does not satisfy the finality requirement for ripeness in inverse condemnation cases.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe City of Tallahassee imposed development restrictions on McKee's property by classifying it as successional forest under the City's comprehensive p…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Futility Doctrine cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
John McKee, III, as personal representative of the estate of John McKee, Jr., appeals a final judgment dismissing on ripeness grounds the estate’s inverse condemnation action which sought to establish a taking of the estate’s property based on the development restrictions imposed by the classification of the property as suecessional forest under the City’s comprehensive plan and Environment Management Ordinance and on the denial by the City’s Environmental Variance Board of a variance from the development restrictions. Because competent, substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the trial court that the inverse condemnation action was not “ripe,” we affirm.
We agree with the trial court that the record establishes that the City’s variance denial did not constitute a “final decision” regarding the type and intensity of the development that will be permitted on the property, Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So. 2d 1030, 1035-1036 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 570 So. 2d 1304 (Fla.1990); City of Jacksonville v. Wynn, 650 So. 2d 182, 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
In addition, because McKee’s variance application did not include a required development plan or address the three ordinance criteria for a variance and, therefor, could not constitute a “meaningful application,” McKee cannot now establish that any further attempts to obtain a City permit for economic use of the property would be futile. Glisson, 558 So. 2d at 1036; Tinnerman v. Palm Beach County, 641 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
Thus, McKee has not satisfied the ripeness requirements to bringing this action.
In reaching our conclusion that the futility doctrine does not apply here, we place great weight on the numerous assurances by City officials in the record that a subsequent variance application properly drawn and presented, including a development plan, would be given favorable consideration. See e.g., Tin-nerman, 641 So. 2d at 526. See also, City of Jacksonville Beach v. Prom, 656 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA), cause dismissed, 661 So. 2d 825 (Fla.1995).
Further, because the substantial cost of the preparation of a complete development plan, $28,000 to $50,000 according to this record, might well exceed the value of the property under the uses allowed by the City’s ordinance,1 we also place weight on representations made at oral argument that the City will initially work with the property owner’s conceptual development plan to minimize the regulatory expense.
AFFIRMED.
JOANOS, MICKLE and VAN NORTWICK, JJ. concur. . Neither we nor the trial court have been presented with the issue of whether the maximum use allowed by the city ordinance would nevertheless be so limited as to constitute a taking.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Alachua Land Invs., LLC v. City OF Gainesville, 107 So. 3d 1154 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…e than procedural finality because it includes an opportunity for government to change its mind.”). Additionally, where its options were not fully exercised, ALI has not demonstrated that the futility doctrine applies here. See McKee v. Tallahassee, 664 So. 2d 333, 334 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (concluding that the city’s decision was not [*1162] “final,” the futility doctrine did not apply, and the “taking” claim was not ripe, where the municipal board denied a variance from development restrictions, but city offi…
-
State v. Beach Grp. Invs., LLC, 201 So. 3d 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)…d Inv’rs, LLC, 107 So. 3d at 1163. Where a variance is a reasonably possible means of allowing additional flexibility in the agency’s permit decision, the owner must apply hot only for a permit but also a variance. See McKee v. City of Tallahassee, 664 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Here, Beach Group admittedly did not apply for a variance. Had it done so, it could have argued that the 1997 ECL should have been applied or that continued beach restoration would prevent the erosion anticipated by the DEP. Th…
Authorities Cited
- E.O. v. State, 558 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- The City OF Jacksonville v. Wynn, 650 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Laszlo Madari v. Gabor N. Bozsoky & the Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 641 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
- Tinnerman v. Palm Beach Cnty., 641 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- The City OF Jacksonville Beach v. Prom, 656 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)