B. DOUGLAS HIND-MARSH, APPELLANT,
v.
ALBERT PUGLIA, ETC., APPELLEE
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A representative who signs an instrument without indicating a representative capacity is personally obligated, even if the instrument names the represented person, unless a contrary understanding is established.
Puglia, an officer of Trimex, Inc., signed a corporate check payable to Hind-Marsh without indicating he signed in a representative capacity. Hind-Mar…
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PER CURIAM.
B. Douglas Hind-Marsh appeals a final judgment entered, pursuant to a bench trial, in the defendant, Albert Puglia’s favor.
We reverse and remand with directions to enter judgment in Hind-Marsh’s favor.
In February of 1986 Puglia, an officer of Trimex, Inc., signed a cheek made payable to Hind-Marsh for $42,982.00. The check was imprinted with the corporation’s name at the top, but Puglia’s signature did not indicate that he was signing in a representative capacity. In March of that same year, Hind-Marsh went to the drawee, Capital Bank, to cash the check and was informed that there were insufficient funds in the account on which it was drawn. Ultimately, Hind-Marsh filed an action against Puglia personally to recover on the dishonored cheek. Following a bench trial, the trial judge entered judgment in Puglia’s favor without giving any reasons for his decision.
The relevant and controlling statute at the time the cause of action arose was section 673.403, Florida Statutes (1985).
See Serna v. Arde Apparel, Inc., 657 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (holding that dishonor of checks later sued upon is event giving rise to cause of action).
That section provides that an authorized representative, such as Puglia, who signs his name to an instrument “is personally obligated if the instrument names the person represented but does not show that the representative signed in a representative capacity,” unless the immediate parties establish a contrary understanding. § 673.403(2)(b), Fla.Stat. (1985).
In the instant case, Puglia offered no evidence to establish such a contrary understanding existed between the parties at the time he signed the check. Compare Newport Seafood, Inc. v. Neptune Trading Corp., 555 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
For the foregoing reason, we reverse and remand with directions to enter judgment in the plaintiff, Hind-Marsh’s favor.
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Medina v. Wyche, 796 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…Patricia F. Fonseca and John R. Fonseca, The Law of Modem Commercial Practices § 6.56, at 6-104 (2d rev. ed.2000).3 The landlord relies on such cases as BBD Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Magid, 673 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) and Hind-Marsh v. Puglia, 665 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), but those cases involved checks written prior to January 1, 1993, [*624] which was the effective date of the new UCC provision. Ch. 92-82, § 62, Laws of Fla. We therefore reverse the judgment of $34,348 against Medina individuall…
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BBD Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. Magid, 673 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…city.” Quite simply, Ma-gid is personally liable because he did not indicate the checks were signed in a representative capacity and because there is no evidence that the parties agreed Magid would not be personally liable. See Hind-Marsh v. Puglia, 665 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Serna v. Milanese, Inc., 643 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Provecasa v. Gemini Associated Corp., 532 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Second, there are sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy due process requirements. Magid delive…
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de Maria v. Potamkin, 680 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…82). Based on the parole evidence presented, the court correctly concluded that De Maria did not overcome the presumption created by section 673.403(2), Florida Statutes (1989)2, and was personally liable for the indebtedness. Hind-Marsh, v. Puglia, 665 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Placet, Inc. v. Ashton, 368 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 347 (Fla.1979), and cert. denied sub nom. Esser v. Ashton 378 So. 2d 343 (Fla.1979); Speer v. Friedland, 276 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973). Affirmed.…
Authorities Cited
- Newport Seafood, Inc. v. Neptune Trading Corp., 555 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)
- Serna v. Arde Apparel, Inc., 657 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)