SUZANNE DE MARIA, APPELLANT,
v.
ALAN POTAMKIN, APPELLEE
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De Maria appeals a judgment finding her personally liable on a promissory note signed to guarantee a $200,000 corporate loan. The court affirmed, holding that De Maria failed to overcome the statutory presumption of personal liability under Florida law.
De Maria is personally liable on the promissory note. The trial court, as finder of fact, properly weighed credibility and found Potamkin's testimony credible that De Maria had personally guaranteed the note. De Maria failed to overcome the statutory presumption of personal liability under section 673.403(2), Florida Statutes (1989).
[1] A signature on a promissory note, with the individual's name typed below it and no indication of signing in a representative capacity, creates a presumption of personal l…
[2] Parol evidence may be admitted to determine whether a party signing a promissory note intended to be personally liable.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We hold that the trial court, as finder of fact, was acting within its province of weighing the credibility of the witnesses when it found Potamkin's testimony credible and chose to disbelieve De Maria's version of the events.”
Establishes that the appellate court defers to the trial court's credibility determinations in weighing conflicting parol evidence.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1990, Potamkin loaned $200,000 to The Classic Touch, Inc. De Maria signed a promissory note for the loan amount, with the corporation's name typed …
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SHEVIN, Judge.
Suzanne De Maria [De Maria] appeals a final judgment finding her personally liable on a promissory note. We affirm.
In 1990, Alan H. Potamkin loaned The Classic Touch, Inc., $200,000. Potamkin was assured by De Maria’s husband, Joseph De Maria, that De Maria would personally guarantee the indebtedness. Potamkin’s business practice was to extend loans only in exchange for personal guarantees. De Maria signed a promissory note, prepared by The Classic Touch, Inc’s corporate secretary, for the loan amount; the corporation’s name was typed under her signature.1 There is no indication that De Maria signed only in her representative capacity. The corporation repaid $75,-000.
Potamkin sued De Maria, individually, and the corporation to recover the unpaid amount of $125,000. At the bench trial, the parties presented conflicting parole evidence regarding the parties’ expectations at the time of the loan as to whether De Maria had personally guaranteed the note. There was also conflicting evidence regarding whether De Maria was an officer of The Classic Touch, Inc. The court found De Maria and the corporation jointly and severally liable for the note and entered judgment against both defendants. De Maria appeals.
We hold that the trial court, as finder of fact, was acting within its province of weighing the credibility of the witnesses when it found Potamkin’s testimony credible and chose to disbelieve De Maria’s version of the events. Ross v. Bandi, 566 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); S. Kornreich & Sons, Inc. v. Titan Agencies, Inc., 423 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Based on the parole evidence presented, the court correctly concluded that De Maria did not overcome the presumption created by section 673.403(2), Florida Statutes (1989)2, and was personally liable for the indebtedness. Hind-Marsh, v. Puglia, 665 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Placet, Inc. v. Ashton, 368 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 347 (Fla.1979), and cert. denied sub nom. Esser v. Ashton 378 So. 2d 343 (Fla.1979); Speer v. Friedland, 276 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).
Affirmed.
. The note is signed as follows:
/s/ Suzanne De Maria Suzanne De Maria
. We note that section 673.403 was repealed by chapter 92-82, section 1, Laws of Florida, effective January 1, 1993. Section 673.4021, Florida Statutes, was enacted to take the place of 673.403. Ch. 92-82, § 2, Laws of Fla. The amendment is not retroactive to this January 1990 transaction. Serna v. Milanese, Inc., 643 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Aldo Berti v. Cedars Healthcare Grp., Ltd., 812 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…Because it affirmatively appears that the appellant was personally liable, see § 673.4021(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995); Spofford v. Hanna, 102 Fla. 261, 135 So. 536 (1931); Williamson v. Bertino, 685 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); De Maria v. Potamkin, 680 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Steele v. Hallandale, Inc. 125 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960), on a guarantee of the provisions of an agreement, which included an arbitration clause, between the appellee and another person, see Management Computer Controls, Inc.…
Authorities Cited
- Elliott Ross v. Bandi, 566 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- S. Kornreich & Sons, Inc. v. Titan Agencies, Inc., 423 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Speer v. Friedland, 276 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Goshgarian v. Kaufman, 643 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
- Vera-Nunez v. State, 368 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Placet, Inc. v. Ashton, 368 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Hind-Marsh v. Puglia, 665 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)