ALEX ABRAHAM, APPELLANT,
v.
ADAM DZAFIC, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Alex Abraham and his employer A & K Service Corporation moved for summary judgment in a negligence suit brought by Adam Dzafic, an injured co-employee, arguing they were immune from liability under Florida's workers' compensation statute. The trial court granted immunity for A & K but denied it for Abraham. The appellate court reversed, holding that Abraham, as a co-employee acting in furtherance of the employer's business without gross negligence or willful misconduct, was also entitled to immunity.
Abraham was entitled to co-employee immunity under section 440.11 because Dzafic's injury arose out of and in the course of employment, Abraham was acting in furtherance of the employer's business, no gross negligence or willful and wanton conduct occurred, and the employees were not assigned to primarily unrelated work.
[1] An employer is immune from suit for injuries to an employee that arise out of and in the course of employment, provided the employee is entitled to workers' compensation…
[2] A co-employee is immune from suit for injuries to another employee if both were acting in furtherance of the employer's business, the injured employee is entitled to work…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because the workers' compensation immunity provisions are not applicable to an employer unless the injury arises "out of and in the course of employment," section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1993), the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of A & K implicitly held that Dzafic, traveling in the van from work, was acting "in the course of employment" when he was injured.”
Establishes the legal basis for finding Abraham entitled to immunity by necessary implication from the trial court's grant of immunity to the employer.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAbraham, driving a van owned by A & K Service Corporation, collided with another A & K van in which Dzafic was riding. The accident occurred while bot…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Co-Employee Immunity cases and more on FLexlaw
FRANK, Acting Chief Judge.
Alex Abraham, driving a van owned by A & K Service Corporation, collided with another A & K van in which Adam Dzafic was riding. The injured Dzafic sued both A & K and Abraham. A & K and Abraham each filed a motion for final summary judgment alleging essentially that, as a matter of law, Dzafic was injured in the course and scope of his employment and was therefore entitled to worker’s compensation coverage. A further contention was that A & K, as Dzafic’s employer, and Abraham, as Dzafic’s co-employee, were immune from liability pursuant to section 440.11, Florida Statutes (1993). After a hearing, the trial court granted A & K’s motion but denied Abraham’s. Abraham has appealed and we reverse.
The accident occurred as the A & K employees were traveling from a job site at the Publix grocery store in Fernandina Beach to a hotel in that area to spend the balance of the day before traveling to another Florida job site. A & K’s supervisor had chosen the hotel for the employees and the company gave them a stipend for food. At no time did Dzafic allege that Abraham acted wantonly, recklessly, or with gross negligence. The trial court held that A & K was entitled to immunity from suit under section 440.11, Florida Statutes (1993). That same statute also provides Abraham immunity from suit if he is “acting in furtherance of the employer’s business,” if Dzafic is entitled to receive worker’s compensation benefits, if Abraham had not acted “with willful and wanton disregard or unprovoked physical aggression” or with gross negligence, or if Abraham and Dzafic had been acting in furtherance of the employer’s business but were not “assigned primarily to unrelated works.”
Because the workers’ compensation immunity provisions are not applicable to an employer unless the injury arises “out of and in the course of employment,” section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1993), the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of A & K implicitly held that Dzafic, traveling in the van from work, was acting “in the course of employment” when he was injured. The only inference to be drawn from that fact is that Abraham, driving another van from the same place, was also acting “in furtherance of the employer’s business.” At the time of the accident, both Abraham and Dzafic were traveling employees, “deemed to be in-the continuous conduct of [the] employer’s business.” Leonard v. Dennis, 465 So. 2d 538, 540 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 476 So. 2d 673 (Fla.1985). See also McCarroll v. Reagan, 396 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
The trial court might have concluded that co-employee immunity was not applicable because Abraham and Dzafic were “assigned primarily to unrelated works.” Nothing in the facts we have considered suggests that such is the case, however. Abraham and Dzafic were employees of the same contractor working on the same construction site. Having simultaneously finished their work, they were traveling together to the same hotel for rest and relaxation. Although one was a painter and the other was a fluorescent lighting technician, and their work skills may have been “unrelated,” their work was not. The holding of Johnson v. Comet Steel Erection, Inc., 435 So. 2d 908, 909 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), is instructive in this case:
Where appellant, an employee of the general contractor, was injured as a result of the ordinary negligence of the subcontractor’s employee while both were employed on-site in the same construction project, the fact that appellant was a common laborer for the general contractor and the tortfeasor was a welder for the subcontractor did not make their work “unrelated” so that the immunity enjoyed by the subcontractor from suit by an employee of the general contractor would be inapplicable.
There was no allegation that Abraham was grossly negligent or that he engaged in other behavior that would cause a loss of his co-employee immunity. Hence, we reverse and remand with the direction that the trial court enter a final summary judgment for Abraham.
LAZZARA and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Harley L. Vause v. BAY Med. Ctr., 687 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…The only eases which have specifically addressed what constitutes “unrelated works” have held that while employees may have different duties as related to the same project, it does not mean they are involved in “unrelated works.” Abraham v. Dzafic, 666 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Johnson v. Comet Steel Erection, Inc., 435 So. 2d 908, 909 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).2 In Johnson, the court held, Where appellant, an employee of the general contractor, was injured as a result of the ordinary negligence of the subcon…
-
Taylor v. Sch. Bd. OF Brevard Cnty., 888 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004)…tests referred to in Victorin, the bright-line “physical location/business purpose” test and the case-by-case “same project” ' test seem to have developed through a series of district court decisions in the mid- to late-1990s. In Abraham v. Dzafic, 666 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), the Second District concluded that two employees of a contractor, one a painter and the other a fluorescent lighting technician, were not assigned primarily to unrelated works, a decision with which I agree. See id. at 233. The d…1 / 2
-
Fitzgerald v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 840 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…JJ., concur. . See, e.g., Dade County Sch. Bd. v. Laing, 731 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Turner v. PCR, Inc., 732 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), quashed on other grounds, 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla.2000); Vause, 687 So. 2d at 261-63; Abraham v. Dzafic, 666 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Johnson v. Comet Steel Erection Co., 435 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). . See, e.g., Lopez, 734 So. 2d at 1096-98.…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Leonard v. Dennis, 465 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Anderson v. Jud. Admin. Comm'n of the State of Fla., 435 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Katheran M. McCARROLL v. Reagan, 396 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)