DAVID MINCEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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David Mincey appealed his robbery conviction, raising three issues. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial based on the trial court's improper denial of the public defender's motion to withdraw due to a conflict of interest.
Once a public defender certifies a conflict of interest based on adverse or hostile interests between clients under Florida Statutes section 27.53(3), the trial court must grant separate representation and cannot reweigh the facts considered by the public defender in making that determination. This rule applies even if representation of one of the adverse clients has been concluded.
[1] A trial court must grant separate representation when a public defender moves to withdraw based on a conflict of interest due to adverse or hostile interests between clie…
[2] A trial court cannot reweigh the facts considered by a public defender in determining that a conflict of interest exists.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“once a public defender moves to withdraw from the representation of a client based on a conflict due to adverse or hostile interests between the two clients, under section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1991), a trial court must grant separate representation.”
Establishes the mandatory nature of granting withdrawal motions based on certified conflicts
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA few days before trial, appellant's appointed public defender filed a motion to withdraw based on a newly acquired conflict of interest involving adv…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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JOANOS, Judge.
In this direct appeal from a conviction and sentence for robbery, appellant raises three issues, one of which requires reversal and remand for a new trial.
A few days before trial was scheduled to begin, appellant’s appointed public defender filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, certifying conflict based on information only recently acquired. The trial court denied the motion, rejecting the public defender’s argument based on Nixon v. Siegel, 626 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), and determining that the court had the responsibility to go behind the certification of conflict and determine whether a conflict actually existed.
Subsequently, the supreme court issued its opinion in Guzman v. State, 644 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla.1994), in which it made specific reference to the pertinent language in Nixon:
[Ojnce a public defender moves to withdraw from the representation of a client based on a conflict due to adverse or hostile interests between the two clients, under section 27.53(3), Florida Statutes (1991), a trial court must grant separate representation. Nixon v. Siegel, 626 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). As the district court stated in Nixon, a trial court is not permitted to reweigh the facts considered by the public defender in determining that a conflict exists. This is true even if the representation of one of the adverse clients has been concluded. Id. at 1025.
See also Banks v. State, 661 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Hope v. State, 654 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
Although section 27.53(3) speaks in terms of conflict arising “at any time during the representation of two or more indigents” (emphasis supplied), the court clearly stated in Guzman that it did not matter that the representation of one of the adverse clients had been concluded. Thus, we cannot distinguish the present case on the basis that the public defender’s representation of one of the clients with allegedly conflicting interests had been concluded by the time appellant’s ease came to trial.
Accordingly, the conviction and sentence are reversed and remanded for a new trial.
BOOTH and BENTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Valle v. State, 763 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…t 639^40 (citing R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4 — 1.7(a)). The fact that the representation of the adverse client has been concluded does not necessarily eliminate the conflict. Guzman; Nixon v. Siegel, 626 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Mincey v. State, 666 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). In Reardon v. State, 715 So. 2d at 348, the prior representation of a witness by the public defender had been very brief, and the trial court had denied the motion to withdraw. On certiorari we sympathized with the trial court’…
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Morales v. State, 699 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…PER CURIAM. We grant the petition for writ of certiorari, and quash the trial court’s order denying the petitioner’s public defender’s motion to withdraw as counsel. See Guzman v. State, 644 So. 2d 996 (Fla.1994); Mincey v. State, 666 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). WARNER, POLEN and GROSS, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Guzman v. State, 644 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1994)
- Forrest Hope v. State, 654 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Lavell Nixon v. The Honorable Paul Siegel, 626 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- Earline Banks v. State, 661 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)