JAMES P. DAVIS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
James Davis appeals the revocation of his community control sentence for aggravated child abuse, challenging both the lack of a written statement of grounds for revocation and the trial court's failure to credit time served on community control against his new sentence. The appellate court reverses and remands, requiring the trial court to specify the violation in its written order and to credit all previously served time against the new combined sentence.
The trial court's revocation order must include in writing the violation orally pronounced at the revocation hearing. Additionally, all time previously spent on community control must be credited against newly imposed terms of imprisonment and probation to ensure the combined terms do not exceed the statutory maximum.
[1] A written order revoking community control must state the grounds for the revocation.
[2] A trial court must credit time previously spent on community control against a newly imposed term of probation.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court's written order of revocation failed to state the ground upon which revocation was based. We affirm the order, but remand with directions to the court to include in the written order the violation orally pronounced at the revocation hearing.”
Establishes the requirement that written revocation orders must specify the grounds for revocation based on Gregg precedent.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDavis was convicted of aggravated child abuse, a second-degree felony, and sentenced to two years of community control with a special condition to ser…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Revocation Of Community Control cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, James Davis, appeals an order revoking community control, contending that the trial court did not enter a written order of revocation, and that it imposed a split sentence of incarceration and probation without credit for time previously spent on community control. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Pursuant to a conviction of aggravated child abuse, a second-degree felony, Davis was ordered to serve two years of community control, which included the special condition that he serve 180 days in county jail, followed by eight years’ probation and five years’ administrative probation. He had served both the jail sentence and approximately one month of community control before an affidavit of violation was filed. The trial court revoked Davis’s community control and sentenced him to seven years in prison, with credit for 309 days time served, to be followed by eight years’ probation.
The trial court’s written order of revocation failed to state the ground upon which revocation was based. We affirm the order, but remand with directions to the court to include in the written order the violation orally pronounced at the revocation hearing. Gregg v. State, 643 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
The trial court properly credited Davis with the 180 days he served in county jail against the incarcerative portion of his new sentence, but it erroneously did not credit him for the period of community control served after release from jail. Any time previously spent on community control must be credited against a newly imposed term of probation to ensure that the combined terms of incarceration and probation or community control do not exceed the statutory maximum. Waters v. State, 662 So. 2d 332 (Fla.1995); Gardner v. State, 656 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Because the trial court sentenced Davis to seven years in prison, to be followed by eight years’ probation, which meets the 15-year statutory maximum, all time previously served must be credited against his newly imposed terms of imprisonment and probation for the same offense. REVERSED and REMANDED for farther proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ERVIN, MINER and MICKLE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Gamble v. State, 737 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…, 662 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Although the facts are sufficient to support revocation, we are required to remand to the trial court for correction of the written revocation order to reflect the specific violations found. Davis v. State, 667 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. BOOTH, MINER AND VAN NORTWICK, JJ., CONCUR.…
-
Hires v. State, 688 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…pellant is entitled to “some” credit for time spent on supervised release against the probationary portion of his current split sentence, since his current split sentence constitutes the maximum penalty as to one of his offenses, see Davis v. State, 667 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), again, the record does not establish how much time the appellant previously spent on supervised release. The appellant may also pursue this claim under rule 3.850. The sentence is affirmed. MINER, ALLEN and MICKLE, JJ., concur…
Authorities Cited
- Waters v. State, 662 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1995)
- Gardner v. State, 656 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Ulysses Gregg v. State, 643 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)