THOMAS D. UTTERBACK, APPELLANT,
v.
SUSAN D. STARKEY AND JACK MARTIN COE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A former husband appeals post-dissolution judgments requiring him to pay attorney's fees and costs to his former wife and the children's guardian ad litem. The court affirms, holding that the appellant is barred by collateral estoppel from relitigating whether he was the "prevailing party" under the parties' stipulation, because a prior final judgment in the same case had already determined no prevailing party existed.
The court affirmed the judgments, holding that Utterback is barred by collateral estoppel from relitigating whether he was the prevailing party. The prior final judgment in the same case determined that there was no prevailing party, and that determination precludes Utterback from now claiming he prevailed.
[1] A prior final judgment in the same case can preclude relitigation of issues under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
[2] The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to issues that have been finally determined, even if asserted in a subsequent collateral proceeding within the same action.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Under that aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, often called "collateral estoppel," which precludes relitigation of issues already finally determined, Utterback was foreclosed below and is foreclosed here from contarily claiming that he indeed "prevailed."”
Establishes that collateral estoppel bars Utterback from relitigating the prevailing party issue based on a prior final determination.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a dissolution case, Utterback (former husband) and Starkey (former wife) had a court-approved stipulation providing that the "prevailing party" wou…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Final Adjudication cases and more on FLexlaw
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
The former husband appeals from adverse post-dissolution judgments requiring him to pay attorney’s fees and costs to his former wife and to the court-appointed guardian ad litem of their children. His sole contention is that she, not he, is liable for these expenses because, he argues, he was the “prevailing party” in the underlying litigation under the terms of a court-approved stipulation between the parties that the “prevailing party is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs.” See Moritz v. Hoyt Enters., 604 So. 2d 807 (Fla.1992); Dean v. Dean, 655 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
We affirm because of the effect of a previous similar judgment for other costs and fees — which Utterback voluntarily satisfied without appellate challenge — entered against him (obviously under section 61.16, Florida Statutes (1993); see Dean, 655 So. 2d at 243) on the express holding, made in response to his specific contention to the contrary on rehearing, that there had been in fact no “prevailing party” in the case with the result that the stipulation did not apply.
Under that aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, often called “collateral estoppel,” which precludes relitigation of issues already finally determined, Utterback was foreclosed below and is foreclosed here from eontrarily claiming that he indeed “prevailed.”1 Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917 (Fla.1995); Stanton v. Stanton, 60 So. 2d 273 (Fla.1952); 32 Fla.Jur.2d Judgments & Decrees §§ 125-126 (1994).
In this respect, it does not matter that the issue-preclusive effect of the earlier adjudication is asserted later in the same case, rather than in separate, subsequent litigation. Probably because res judicata principles in general apply only to final, appealable determinations, see 33 Fla.Jur.2d Judgments & Decrees § 173 (1994), and successive final judgments in the same case are at least unusual, see Del Castillo v. Ralor Pharmacy, Inc., 512 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), it is true that the principle is often broadly and imprecisely stated as applying in subsequent “suits” or “actions.” See 32 Fla.Jur.2d Judgments and Decrees § 140.
Nevertheless, when there is indeed a final earlier adjudication,2 its “effect ... as res judicata is not confined in its operation to subsequent independent proceedings, but also applies to all collateral proceedings in the same action.”3 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 596 (1994); accord Hicks v. Hicks, 26 Tenn.App. 641, 176 S.W. 2d 371 (1943); 2 A.C. Freeman, A Treatise of the Law of Judg ments § 627a, at 1325 (Edward W. Tuttle ed., 5th ed. 1925) (“It is essential, however, that an adjudication be final and not merely interlocutory, in order that it may operate as an estoppel.”); see also Lorenzo v. Associated Trade Inv., Inc., 625 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Sundale Assocs., Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 471 So. 2d 100, 103-104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), and cases cited.
Affirmed.
.It is probably small comfort to the appellant that, since the case involved his successful efforts, as the children's custodial parent, to restrict and regulate the mother’s severely abused visitation rights, he may well have been right all along on the merits of the prevailing party issue. Moritz v. Hoyt Enterprises, Inc., 604 So. 2d 807 (Fla.1992); Green Cos., Inc. v. Kendall Racquetball Inv., Ltd., 658 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Foley v. Fleet, 652 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
. The previous money judgment is identical in form to and thus "just as” appealable as those now before us. See Clearwater Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78 (Fla.1976); Altamonte Hitch & Trailer Serv., Inc. v. U-Haul Co., 483 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).
. The law on this point turned out to be quite to the contrary of the view the writer so confidently expressed at oral argument.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Montgomery Blair Sibley v. Sibley, 885 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…s, when there is indeed a final earlier adjudication, its “effect ... as res judicata is not confined in its operation to subsequent independent' proceedings, but also applies to all collateral proceedings in the same action.” Utterback v. Starkey, 669 So. 2d 304, 305 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (footnotes and citations omitted). The former husband argues that it would work a manifest injustice for this court to enforce the March 4 order. The Florida Supreme Court “has long recognized that res judicata will not be i…
-
Barrero v. Ocean Bank, 729 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…similarly foreclose the relitigation of the issue of appellate attorney’s [*415] fees and costs. See Thomas v. Perkins, 723 So. 2d 293, (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Gomez-Ortega v. Dorten, Inc., 670 So. 2d 1107, 1108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Utterback v. Starkey, 669 So. 2d 304, 305 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). . This rule provides: (b) Enlargement. When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time by order of the court, by these rules, or by notice given thereunder, for cause shown the court at any time…
-
Fla. Power Corp. v. First Baptist Institutional Church OF ST. Petersburg, Inc., 177 So. 3d 103 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)…d the easement, and its challenge to the attorney’s fee award amounts to an untimely attack on the propriety of the final judgment. Accordingly, we are compelled to affirm the attorney’s fee award in favor of First Baptist. See Utterback v. Starkey, 669 So. 2d 304, 305 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Hemmerle v. Air Conditioning Equip., Inc., 635 So. 2d 1053, 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). For the same reason, we affirm in part the order taxing costs in favor of First Baptist. However, we reverse the order taxing costs to t…
Authorities Cited (11 total)
- Moritz v. Hoyt Enters., Inc., 604 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1992)
- Stogniew v. McQUEEN, 656 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 1995)
- del Castillo v. Ralor Pharmacy, Inc., 512 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Clearwater Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1976)
- The Green Cos., Inc. v. Kendall Racquetball Inv., Ltd., 658 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Altamonte Hitch & Trailer Serv., Inc. v. U-Haul Co. OF E. Fla., 483 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)
- Foley v. The Honorable J. Leonard Fleet, 652 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Sundale Assocs., Ltd. v. Se. Bank, N.A., 471 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
- Riley v. State, 655 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Robert v. Dean, 655 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)