MICHAEL MEADOWS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Court vacates consecutive county jail sentences exceeding one year for felony charges, holding that county jail time for felony-only sentences cannot exceed one year total.
County jail incarceration for felony charges only may not exceed one year, and consecutive jail sentences violating this limit must be vacated.
[1] County jail sentences for felony charges only may not exceed one year in the aggregate when the defendant is not already serving county jail time on another case, and con…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where a defendant is sentenced for felony charges only and is not already serving county jail time on another case, incarceration in the county jail may not exceed one year.”
Court citing Gilbert v. State and statutory authority for the one-year limit on county jail sentences for felonies.
Defendant pleaded guilty to dealing in stolen property (second-degree felony) and admitted to a probation violation on the same day. The trial court s…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Felony Sentencing cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
In this case we vacate the sentence imposed and remand for resentencing. On October 18, 1995 the defendant pleaded guilty to dealing in stolen property, a second degree felony. § 812.019(1), Fla.Stat. (1995). That same day, in an unrelated case, the defendant admitted to a probation violation. On the dealing in stolen property charge the court sentenced the defendant to probation and as a special condition thereof sentenced him to 364 days in the county jail. At the same sentencing hearing, in the probation violation case, the court extended the defendant’s probation and again, ordered that he serve 364 days in the county jail.
The court ordered that the probationary periods be served concurrently. The court also ordered, however, that the county jail terms be served consecutively. It is this latter portion of the sentence that the defendant, correctly, contends is error. ‘Where a defendant is sentenced for felony charges only and is not already serving county jail time on another case, incarceration in the county jail may not exceed one year.” Gilbert v. State, 661 So. 2d 960, 961 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (citing § 922.051, Fla.Stat. (1993) and Singleton v. State, 554 So. 2d 1162 (Fla.1990)); see Cheney v. State, 640 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Dewitt v. State, 639 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Carson v. State, 635 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Kline v. State, 509 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
Accordingly, the sentence imposed is vacated and the cause remanded for resentencing.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Freddy Morales, 678 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla.1992); State v. Eason, 592 So. 2d 676 (Fla.1992); Zequeira v. State, 671 So. 2d 279, 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)(“Sentencing under the habitual offender statute as well as the imposition of minimum mandatory terms is permissive, not mandatory.”). JORGENSON and SHEVIN, JJ., concur.…1 / 2
-
Hudson v. State, 682 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…027 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The imposition of minimum mandatory terms under the habitual offender statute is permissive, not mandatory, so the sentence imposed is not illegal.2 See State v. Morales, 678 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Zequeira v. State, 671 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). Furthermore, if the trial judge had resen-tenced the defendant to a greater term of imprisonment subsequent to the entry of a jurisdictionally permissible term, it would have constituted double jeopardy. Evans v. State, 675 So. 2…
-
Frye v. State, 690 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…cing a defendant as an habitual offender, he had no discretion and was required to impose the mandatory minimum term. As the imposition of mandatory minimum terms is permissive, not mandatory,1 we remand the case for resentencing. Zequeira v. State, 671 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). On remand, the trial judge is free to exercise the sentencing discretion permitted by the habitual violent offender statute. We also note concerning resentencing that, as to the conviction for burglary with assault or battery (…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Singleton v. State, 554 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1990)
- Cheney v. State, 640 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Kline v. State, 509 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Dewitt v. State, 639 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Rodriguez v. State, 635 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
- Carson v. State, 635 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Taylor v. State, 661 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Gilbert v. State, 661 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)