JIMMY HUDSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Hudson challenges his sentence as illegal, arguing the trial court improperly amended it to include a mandatory minimum term under Florida's habitual violent felony offender statute. The court affirmed the original sentence, holding that imposition of minimum mandatory terms is permissive rather than mandatory, and the sentence was never actually amended.
The original sentence imposed by the trial court was never amended, so it remains valid and in effect. The imposition of minimum mandatory terms under the habitual offender statute is permissive, not mandatory, making the sentence legal. Hudson may challenge the sentence again if the Department of Corrections attempts to enforce a mandatory minimum term.
[1] A trial court's imposition of minimum mandatory terms under the habitual offender statute is permissive, not mandatory.
[2] The Department of Corrections lacks the authority to add conditions to a sentence; this is a judicial function.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The imposition of minimum mandatory terms under the habitual offender statute is permissive, not mandatory, so the sentence imposed is not illegal.”
Establishes the core holding that mandatory minimum terms are discretionary rather than required under Florida's habitual offender statute.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHudson pleaded guilty to a crime in exchange for a twelve-year sentence upon qualifying as a habitual violent felony offender. The pre-sentence invest…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Minimum Mandatory Term cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The defendant filed a motion to correct illegal sentence contending that the trial court improperly amended his sentence to add a minimum mandatory term pursuant to the habitual violent felony offender statute. See Fla.Stat. § 775.084(4)0995).
The state and the defendant had agreed that he would plead guilty in exchange for a twelve year sentence should he be found to qualify as a habitual violent felony offender. The pre-sentence investigation report showed that he did so qualify and he was sentenced to twelve years in prison. There was no mention of a minimum mandatory portion of the sentence in either the written plea agreement, the colloquy at sentencing or the sentencing documents. After the defendant began serving his sentence, the Department of Corrections wrote to the trial judge and stated that the sentencing documents did not refer to a mandatory term but they had set up the defendant’s record to show a twelve year mandatory sentence pursuant to Florida Statute section 775.084.1 The defendant filed a motion to correct illegal sentence and the trial judge ruled that the sentence previously imposed by the court would remain in effect.
Since the state maintains and the record shows that the defendant’s sentence has never been amended from the original sentence imposed, we affirm.
However, this affirmance is without prejudice to the defendant to again challenge his sentence should the Department of Corrections seek to enforce a mandatory term. Washington v. State, 662 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The imposition of minimum mandatory terms under the habitual offender statute is permissive, not mandatory, so the sentence imposed is not illegal.2 See State v. Morales, 678 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Zequeira v. State, 671 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
Furthermore, if the trial judge had resen-tenced the defendant to a greater term of imprisonment subsequent to the entry of a jurisdictionally permissible term, it would have constituted double jeopardy. Evans v. State, 675 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Gonzalez v. State, 596 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
Affirmed.
. We know of no authority for the Department of Corrections to add additional conditions to a sentence. This is a court function. See Slay v. Singletary, 676 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Thomas v. State, 612 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Wilson v. State, 603 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
. We recognize conflict with other districts on this point, see White v. State, 618 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Sims v. State, 605 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Martin v. State, 608 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), although the Fourth District has also held that the imposition of mandatory minimum terms is discretionary. See Green v. State, 615 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Hudson, 698 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1997)…[*832] HARDING, Justice. We have for review Hudson v. State, 682 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), which expressly and directly conflicts with the opinions in White v. State, 618 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), Sims v. State, 605 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), and Martin v. State, 608 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), on the iss…
-
Pearson v. Moore, 767 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…on court made clear that DOC has no authority to amend, “correct,” or otherwise alter a sentence imposed by a sentencing court. Sentencing is an exclusively judicial function. Separation of powers was also the basis for decision in Hudson v. State, 682 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), where DOC “wrote to the trial judge and stated that the sentencing documents did not refer to a mandatory term but they had set up the defendant’s record to show a twelve year mandatory sentence pursuant to Florida Statute sectio…
-
State v. Meyers, 708 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…such an individual. We acknowledge that.we have previously held that the imposition of mandatory minimum terms under the habitual offender and habitual violent felony provisions of section 775.084 are permissive, not mandatory. See Hudson v. State, 682 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), approved, 698 So. 2d 831 (Fla.1997); State v. Morales, 678 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). However that construction is entirely consistent with our analysis today. While the “may” as used in the habitual felony offender and…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Evans v. State, 675 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Wilson v. State, 603 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
- Washington v. State, 662 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
- Genorval Slay v. Singletary, 676 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- White v. State, 618 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Sims v. State, 605 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Thomas v. State, 612 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
- Green v. State, 615 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Martin v. State, 608 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
- Gonzalez v. State, 596 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)