KELLI PETRYSIAN, APPELLANT,
v.
METROPOLITAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1996-03-22
No. 95-1642
PETERSON, C.J., and DAUKSCH and ANTOON, JJ., concur.
672 So. 2d 562 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1996) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Holding

A change in the applicable rule of law from a later appellate decision in an unrelated case is not a ground to vacate a final order.


Facts & Procedural History

Appellant sought to vacate a final order based on subsequent supreme court decisions that changed the applicable law. The trial court denied her motio…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying her Rule 1.540 motion, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. In Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Phillips, 640 So. 2d 53 (Fla.1994), based on World Wide Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Welker, 640 So. 2d 46 (Fla.1994), the supreme court quashed this court’s opinion in Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Phillips, 609 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).

In Petrysian v. Metropolitan General Insurance Co., 645 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), based on the supreme court’s decision in Welker, we upheld the trial court’s determination that Petrysian did not have the asserted insurance coverage. Subsequently, in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Douglas, 654 So. 2d 118 (Fla.1995), the supreme court receded from its application of Welker to the circumstances of Nationwide. Although supreme court review of Douglas was pending at the time we decided Petry-sian’s ease, Petrysian did not seek further review of our decision. It is likely she would have prevailed had she done so.

A change in the applicable rule of law resulting from a later appellate decision in an unrelated case is not a ground to vacate a final order. Theisen v. Old Republic Insurance Co., 468 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). We regret that appellant was frustrated by the timing of the supreme court’s decisions, but we cannot grant relief from the application of the law as it existed at the time of her appeal.

AFFIRMED.

PETERSON, C.J., and DAUKSCH and ANTOON, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Pinder v. State, 217 So. 3d 130 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)
    …n strategy is premised on two flaws: (i) assigning retroactive effect to State v. Varner, contrary to the judicial rule that a change in the law from a later appellate court is not a ground to vacate a final order, Petrysian v. Metro. Gen. Ins. Co., 672 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); and (ii) mischarac-terizating Pinder I’s holding by incorrectly maintaining that Pinder I affirmed the trial court’s upward departure based on a “threat” that was never charged. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.701(d)(ll). But for P…
  • Segall v. Wachovia Bank N.A. (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Petrysian v. Metro. Gen. Ins. Co., 672 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (“A change in the applicable rule of law resulting from a later appellate decision in an unrelated case is not a ground to vacate a final order.”). KLINGENSMITH, C.J., WARNER and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.…

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