EMMANUEL SNEED, ET AL., APPELLANT,
v.
H.B. DANIEL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., ETC., APPELLEE
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The Sneeds appealed the dismissal of their negligence suit against H.B. Daniel Construction Company for alleged failure to comply with the 120-day service requirement under Florida Rule 1.070(i). The court reversed, holding that service on an improper defendant within 120 days satisfies the rule's purpose and prevents the rule from operating as a trap for the unwary.
Service on an improper defendant within the 120-day period satisfies Rule 1.070(i)'s requirement, and dismissal is improper even though the service of process was invalid. The rule is an administrative tool to move cases efficiently through courts, not a secondary statute of limitations or trap for the unwary.
[1] Service of process on an incorrect party within the 120-day period satisfies the rule's requirement for timely service, even if the service itself is invalid.
[2] The purpose of the 120-day service rule is to serve as an administrative tool for case management, not as a trap for unwary litigants or a secondary statute of limitation…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is not intended to be a trap for the unwary, nor a rule to impose a secondary statute of limitations based on time of service.”
The court's characterization of Rule 1.070(i)'s proper interpretation and purpose
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEmmanuel Sneed, a minor, was injured on July 30, 1989, when metal scaffolds owned by H.B. Daniel Construction Company fell on him at a church. The com…
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ANTOON, Judge.
Emmanuel Sneed, a minor, and his parents appeal the trial court’s summary dismissal of their negligence suit against H.B. Daniel Construction Company for failure to comply with rule 1.070(i) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. We reverse.
The Sneeds’ complaint alleged that, while visiting a church on July 30, 1989, Emmanuel was seriously injured when metal scaffolds owned by H.B. Daniel Construction Company (Construction Company) fell on him. The complaint was filed on May 21,1993, and was served on W.S. Grissett, a former resident agent and director of the Construction Company, thirty-nine days later, on June 29, 1993. The Construction Company filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the service on Mr. Grissett was improper and because the complaint improperly referred to the Construction Company as H.B. Daniels Construction Company instead of its correct name, H.B. Daniel Construction Company. Sneed responded to the motion to dismiss by amending the complaint to correct the spelling. On September 29, the trial court quashed the service of process on Mr. Gris-sett. On January 11, 1995, H.B. Daniel II, a director, was served with a copy of the complaint which correctly spelled the name of the Construction Company.
The Construction Company then filed another motion to dismiss, this time contending that dismissal was proper because the service on Mr. Daniel was not within 120 days of the date of the filing of the initial complaint as required by rule 1.070®.1 The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the Sneeds’ complaint with prejudice.
The issue before this court is whether the Sneeds’ service of process on Mr. Gris-sett was sufficient to satisfy the 120-day requirement of the rule. We join the second and third districts in answering this question in the affirmative.
In Stoeffler v. Castagliola, 629 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) rev. denied, 639 So. 2d 976 (Fla.1994), the plaintiff served process on the wrong person within 120 days of the date of filing his complaint. The second district concluded that it was improper to dismiss the action even though the service of process was invalid. In Caban v. Skinner, 648 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994), the third district held that dismissal was improper where service, albeit invalid, was effected within the 120-day period. Accord Smith v. Saunders, 652 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). In reaching this result we are persuaded by what we understand the purpose of rule 1.070(i) to be. It is not intended to be a trap for the unwary, nor a rule to impose a secondary statute of limitations based on time of service. The results of such an interpretation would be harsh in a system where great emphasis is placed on deciding cases justly on the merits. We instead understand the rule to be an administrative tool to efficiently move cases through the courts. The service on Mr. Grissett accomplished just that purpose. Accordingly, we reverse the order dismissing the complaint and remand this case for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
GOSHORN and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . Rule 1.070(i) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, if service is not made upon the defendants within 120 days after filing of the initial pleading, the action shall be dismissed without prejudice, absent a showing of good cause. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.070(i) (formerly designated as Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.070(j)).
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Paola A. Alvarado-Fernandez v. Mazoff, 151 So. 3d 8 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…of service.... We instead understand the rule to be an administrative tool to efficiently move cases through the courts.’ ” Gary J. Rotella & Assoc., P.A. v. Andrews, 821 So. 2d 468, 469 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (quoting Sneed v. H.B. Daniel Constr. Co., 674 So. 2d 158, 159 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)). We have also held that the extraordinary effort of a defendant’s evasiveness can provide good cause to extend the time for service under rule 1.070(j). Moore v. McCluskey, 875 So. 2d 760, 762 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Although…
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Bice v. Metz Constr. Co., Inc., 699 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…la, 629 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). In dismissing Bice’s action against the Hoenigs and James Young & Co., the trial court rejected this argument without explanation. Smith, Caban and Stoeffler, as well as Sneed v. H.B. Daniel Constr. Co., Inc., 674 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) and Bankers Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 684 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), stand for the proposition that dismissal of an action is improper where service, albeit invalid, was effected within the 120-day period. This line of cases can be…
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The Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n v. Alena Kartenovich, 749 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…and citations omitted). This temporary injunction fails at the threshold because there is no showing of a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. The injunction must be reversed. See Florida High School Activities Assoc., Inc. v. Adderly, 674 So. 2d 158, 159 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). That being so, we need not analyze the other elements of the four-part injunction test.2 We note as a procedural matter that the temporary injunction should not have been entered without requiring a bond. Because the stand…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gay Stoeffler v. Castagliola, 629 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Caban v. Skinner, 648 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
- Smith v. Saunders, 652 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)