SEAN J. REITER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1996-05-22
No. 94-04597
LAZZARA and FULMER, JJ., concur.
674 So. 2d 189 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1996) Caution
Cited by 23 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Sean Reiter appeals his grand theft conviction and sentence, challenging both the sufficiency of evidence and several probation conditions. The court affirmed the conviction but modified the probation conditions by striking or modifying several provisions that lacked proper oral announcement or statutory authority.


Holding

The conviction was affirmed as supported by sufficient evidence. However, several probation conditions were struck or modified: the portion of condition 12 requiring Reiter to pay for drug tests was stricken as not a standard condition; condition 13 regarding waiver of extradition was stricken; the $280 court costs and $250 fine in condition 10 were stricken for lack of statutory authority; and the restitution amount was modified to $100 to conform to the oral pronouncement.


Headnotes

[1] Probation conditions that are standard or provided for in a rule of criminal procedure form need not be orally pronounced at sentencing.

[2] A probation condition requiring payment for random testing is invalid if not orally pronounced and not a standard condition.

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Key Quotes

“Since Reiter had sufficient notice of conditions 4, 6, and 7 in the "Order of Probation" form in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986, these conditions need not be orally pronounced.”

Establishes that standard probation conditions provided in the required form do not require oral announcement.

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Facts & Procedural History

Reiter was convicted of grand theft and sentenced to probation with various conditions. Several conditions were imposed in writing without oral pronou…

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Opinion of the Court
PATTERSON, Acting Chief Judge.

PATTERSON, Acting Chief Judge.

Sean J. Reiter appeals from his judgment and sentence for grand theft. We find no merit in his argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and, therefore, affirm his conviction. However, we find merit in his argument that several of his probation conditions are invalid or need modification.

Reiter argues that probation conditions 4, 6, 7, 12, and 13 must be stricken because they were not announced at sentencing. Since Reiter had sufficient notice of conditions 4, 6, and 7 in the “Order of Probation” form in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986, these conditions need not be orally pronounced. See State v. Hart, 668 So. 2d 589 (Fla.1996). Condition 12, which requires Reiter to submit to random blood, breathalyzer, and urinalysis examinations, is a standard condition of probation which is applicable to any probationer under section 948.03, Florida Statutes (1993). See § 948.03(l)(j), Fla.Stat. (1993). Therefore, it need not be orally pronounced. Hayes v. State, 585 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 593 So. 2d 1052 (Fla.1991). However, the portion of condition 12 which requires Reiter to pay for such tests was not mentioned at the sentencing hearing, and is not a standard condition. Therefore, we strike that portion of condition 12. See Catholic v. State, 632 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). Condition 13 requires Reiter to “waive extradition should a violation of supervision occur.” We strike condition 13 because it is a special condition which was not orally pronounced. See Nank v. State, 646 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

Condition 8 requires Reiter to “work diligently at a lawful occupation, advise your employer of your probation status, and support any dependents to the best of your ability, as directed by your officer.” Reiter argues that this condition should be modified to include the words “insofar as may be possible” to prevent him from being in violation because of economic circumstances beyond his control. In Gregory v. State, 616 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), the defendant also challenged this condition on the ground that he could be penalized for circumstances beyond his control. This court interpreted the qualifying phrase “to the best of your ability” as applying to the requirement that he work diligently at a lawful occupation. Under Gregory, condition 8 is acceptable without change.

In condition 10, the trial court imposed $280 in court costs and a $250 fine. Because the order of probation gives no statutory authority for the imposition of the costs and fine, we strike those portions of the condition. Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (en banc); Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

Finally, at sentencing, the trial court ordered Reiter to pay $100 in restitution to Kenny Rogers’ Roasters. However, the probation order requires payment of $400 in restitution. Therefore, the written order must be modified to conform to the court’s oral pronouncement. Williams v. State, 525 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).

Affirmed as modified.

LAZZARA and FULMER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By (12 total)

  • Queen v. State, 832 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
    …onounced at sentencing because it is a special rather than a general condition. See Steinard v. State, 711 So. 2d 105, 106 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 718 So. 2d 171 (Fla.1998); McDaniels v. State, 679 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Reiter v. State, 674 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Thus both of these conditions must be stricken. [*958] However, condition (13), although not a standard condition of probation nor a general condition, has been upheld even though not orally pronounced at sentencing because proba…
  • Vernia Smith v. State, 100 So. 3d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)
    …vocation order correctly reflecting the trial court’s oral ruling. See Stark v. State, 712 So. 2d 454, 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (finding that the written order of probation should match the trial court’s oral pronouncements); see also Reiter v. State, 674 So. 2d 189, 190-91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (finding that the “written [probation] order must be modified to conform to the court’s oral pronouncement”). Smith’s main contention on appeal is that the record fails to contain evidence that he violated condition seven…
  • Shacker v. State, 106 So. 3d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)
    …leged violations. As the State concedes, the written order should correctly reflect the oral pronouncement. See Smith v. State, 100 So. 3d 258, 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); see also Stark v. State, 712 So. 2d 454, 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Reiter v. State, 674 So. 2d 189, 190-91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the Court below to strike those portions of the order finding that Shacker had committed violations 1, 5, 7 and 8.1 . Violation 1 reads “Violation of Condition (L.l) o…

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