M.S., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, who was fifteen at the time of these events, pled no contest to simple battery and was committed to a level 8 program for “an indeterminate period of time, not longer than: a) nineteenth birthday; b) the maximum sentence allowable by law....” The order should have specified a commitment for one year1, the maximum allowable sentence for this misdemeanor, because otherwise his sentence could be construed as running until his nineteenth birthday. We disagree with his additional argument that the court did not state reasons for the commitment to level 8 instead of the recommended level 6. Section 39.052(3)(e)3, Florida Statutes (1993) requires that the court “state for the record” the reasons, and that was met in this case by the court’s statements which were transcribed.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
STONE, KLEIN and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. . Sentencing appellant to the "maximum sentence allowable by law” is, in our opinion, not recommended, because it requires additional research to determine when appellant’s sentence has been completed.
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Cited By (18 total)
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J.B. v. State, 829 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…E PLACEMENT IS FOR AN INDETERMINATE PERIOD, BUT NO LONGER THAN THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE ALLOWABLE BY LAW OR THE TWENTY FIRST (21st) BIRTHDAY,” [*378] fails to state the maximum length of commitment and as such is inadequate. We agree. See M.S. v. State, 675 So. 2d 215, 216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In M.S., the disposition order at issue provided that appellant was committed to a level eight program for “an indeterminate period of time, not longer than: a) nineteenth birthday; b) the maximum sentence allowable by law…
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L.W.G. v. State, 785 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…imum term of imprisonment is error because such language could allow the sentence to be construed as running longer than the statutory maximum provided for the particular offense. See R.P. v. State, 695 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); M.S. v. State, 675 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also J.A.L., 778 So. 2d at 409. Accordingly, we affirm L.W.G.’s adjudication of delinquency, but remand for the entry of two separate disposition orders, one for each offense. The disposition order for battery, a first-degre…
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I.B. v. State, 816 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…r than the statutory maximum provided for the particular offense." L.W.G. v. State, 785 So. 2d 696, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citing J.A.L. v. State, 778 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); R.P. v. State, 695 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); M.S. v. State, 675 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)). These cases suggest that the trial court should designate that the commitment should be for the shorter period. Since we find that the disposition must be corrected for other reasons, we need not decide whether this court will…
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