L.W.G., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A juvenile adjudicated delinquent for battery and disruption of an educational institution challenges the trial court's use of a single disposition order for both offenses and its use of indeterminate sentencing language. The appellate court affirms the adjudication but reverses and remands for separate disposition orders with determinate sentences complying with statutory maximums.
When a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent for multiple offenses, separate disposition orders must be entered for each offense. Additionally, disposition orders must not use language allowing for indeterminate commitment periods that could exceed the statutory maximum for the particular offense; instead, they must specify determinate maximum periods based on the statutory limits for each offense.
[1] When a trial court adjudicates a juvenile delinquent for multiple offenses, separate disposition orders must be entered for each adjudicated offense.
[2] Committing a juvenile for an indeterminate period of time no longer than a specific birthday or the maximum term of imprisonment is error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a trial court adjudicates a juvenile delinquent for more than one offense, separate disposition orders must be entered for each adjudicated offense in order to prevent confusion.”
Establishes the primary rule that separate disposition orders are required for multiple offenses.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceL.W.G., a juvenile, pled no contest to battery (a first-degree misdemeanor) and disruption of an educational institution (a second-degree misdemeanor)…
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PER CURIAM.
L.W.G., a juvenile, pled no contest to battery and disruption of an educational institution and was adjudicated delinquent. She does not challenge her adjudication. Rather, she contends, and the State concedes, that the trial court erred in using one disposition order for both offenses and in committing her for an indeterminate period of time no longer than her twenty-first birthday or the maximum sentence allowable by law. We agree.
When a trial court adjudicates a juvenile delinquent for more than one offense, separate disposition orders must be entered for each adjudicated offense in order to prevent confusion. See B.H. v. State, 721 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); see also J.A.L. v. State, 778 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); J.P.C. v. State, 773 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). Moreover, language committing a juvenile for an indeterminate period of time no longer than a specific birthday or the maximum term of imprisonment is error because such language could allow the sentence to be construed as running longer than the statutory maximum provided for the particular offense. See R.P. v. State, 695 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); M.S. v. State, 675 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also J.A.L., 778 So. 2d at 409. Accordingly, we affirm L.W.G.’s adjudication of delinquency, but remand for the entry of two separate disposition orders, one for each offense. The disposition order for battery, a first-degree misdemeanor, should specify that L.W.G.’s commitment may run no longer than one year, and the disposition order for disruption of an educational institution, a second-degree misdemeanor, should specify that her commitment may run no longer than sixty days. See §§ 784.03(l)(b), 877.13(3), 775.082(4)(a) and (b), Fla. Stat. (2000).
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
DELL, GUNTHER and KLEIN, JJ„ concur.
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J.B. v. State, 829 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…etermined that the order should have specified a commitment for one year, the maximum allowable sentence for this misdemeanor, because otherwise his sentence could be construed as running until his nineteenth birthday. Id.; see also L.W.G. v. State, 785 So. 2d 696, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“language committing a juvenile for an indeterminate period of time no longer than a specific birthday or the maximum term of imprisonment is error because such language could allow the sentence to be construed as running l…
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A.W. v. State, 882 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…rial court erred in failing to enter separate disposition orders for the two offenses. The State concedes and agrees that the matter should be remanded with instructions to enter separate disposition orders for the two,offenses. See L.W.G. v. State, 785 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (holding that when a trial court adjudicates a juvenile delinquent for more than one offense, separate disposition orders must be entered for each adjudicated offense). ..REMANDED. STONE, TAYLOR and HAZOURI, JJ„ concur.…
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I.B. v. State, 816 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…f time no longer than a specific birthday or the maximum term of imprisonment is error because such language could allow the sentence to be construed as running longer than the statutory maximum provided for the particular offense." L.W.G. v. State, 785 So. 2d 696, 696 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citing J.A.L. v. State, 778 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); R.P. v. State, 695 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); M.S. v. State, 675 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)). These cases suggest that the trial court should designate tha…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- M.S. v. State, 675 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Washington v. State, 695 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
- R.P. v. State, 695 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- B.H. v. State, 721 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- J.P.C. v. State, 773 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- J.A.L. v. State, 778 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)