A.L., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for trespass at a convenience store, but the appellate court reversed because the State failed to prove that the juvenile actually entered the convenience store property. The court held that mere presence in an adjacent pizza parlor and subsequent escort by police to the store's parking lot does not constitute willful entry onto the property as required for trespass.
The State failed to prove the first element of trespass—willful entry upon the property. The court reversed the adjudication of delinquency because there was no evidence that A.L. purposely or intentionally entered the convenience store premises before being escorted there by police as part of his detention.
[1] To establish the crime of trespass, the State must prove that the defendant willfully entered upon or remained in property without authorization, license, or invitation,…
[2] The element of 'willfully' in a trespass statute requires proof that the entry or remaining upon the property was intentional, knowing, and purposeful.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Four elements must be satisfied in order to establish the crime of trespass as defined by section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1995): 1) willfully entering upon or remaining in any property; 2) other than a structure or conveyance; 3) without being authorized, licensed, or invited; 4) where notice against entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation.”
Establishes the required elements for trespass that the State must prove
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA.L. had been previously warned by store employees and police not to return to a convenience store. On the evening of arrest, A.L. was at a pizza parl…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Burden Of Proof (Beyond A Reasonable Doubt) cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
A.L. appeals from an adjudication of delinquency for trespass. For the following reasons, we reverse.
A.L. had been told by employees of a convenience store, as well as by the police, not to return to the store. On the evening of his arrest, A.L. was at a pizza parlor adjacent to the convenience store when the store’s employee recognized A.L., called the police, and told them that A.L. and his friends were creating a disturbance. The officers arrived at the scene, parked then-cars in the convenience store parking lot, and approached A.L. The officers escorted A.L. to their parked cars, and arrested him for the offense of trespass.
We reverse, as there is absolutely no evidence in the record that A.L. was on the convenience store property before he was escorted to the parked police cars. Four elements must be satisfied in order to establish the crime of trespass as defined by section 810.09, Florida Statutes (1995): 1) wilfully entering upon or remaining in any property; 2) other than a structure or conveyance; 3) without being authorized, licensed, or invited; 4) where notice against entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation.
The State failed to prove the first element of wilfulness, as there was no evidence that A.L. purposely or intentionally entered upon the forbidden premises. See Rozier v. State, 402 So. 2d 539, 542-43 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (“ ‘Willfully’ generally, and as used in this trespass statute, refers to a general intent and merely means that, as in burglary, the entry or remaining be intentionally, knowingly and purposely done.”), approved, 436 So. 2d 73 (Fla.1983); see also Patterson v. State, 512 So. 2d 1109, 1110 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (under Florida Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal), “willfully means intentionally and purposely”); Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Crim.) [p. 141] (Under section 810.09, Florida Statutes, “[w]illfully means intentionally and purposely”). The first officer on the scene did not testify at the hearing; the two officers who arrived after A.L. had been detained did not testify that A.L. had been on the convenience store property before he was brought over to the store’s parking lot in connection with his detention. His acquiescence to police authority in the parking lot cannot be viewed as intentional or purposeful entry upon the property. Finally, the two testifying store employees were not able to place A.L. on their property on the day of the arrest.
Accordingly, we reverse the adjudication of delinquency, as the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of the crime of trespass.
REVERSED.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Smith v. State, 778 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…cer may not make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor, such as this trespass, unless every element of the crime is committed in his presence. See § 901.15(1), Fla. Stat. (1997); Carter v. State, 516 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). In A.L. v. State, 675 So. 2d 703, 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), the court listed four elements that must be satisfied to establish the crime of trespass under section 810.09, Florida Statutes: 1) wilfully entering upon or remaining in any property; 2) other than a structure or a conveya…
-
Seago v. State, 768 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…the defendant willfully entered or remained on property; (2) other than a structure or conveyance; (3) without being authorized, licensed, or invited; (4) when notice against entering or remaining had been given to the defendant. See A.L. v. State, 675 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). In this case the State offered no evidence that on the day in qhestion Seago’s entry on the property was not “authorized, licensed, or invited” by the store owner, notwithstanding that the police had previously warned him not to…
-
K.M.B. v. State, 69 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…) other than a structure or conveyance; (3) without being authorized, licensed, or invited; (4) when notice against entering or remaining had been given to the defendant.” Seago v. State, 768 So. 2d 498, 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (citing A.L. v. State, 675 So. 2d 703, 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)). When an invitation has been extended to enter an open business, actual communication is necessary to put a person on notice that he is no longer welcome on the property and may be arrested for trespass. Smith v. State, 778…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Patterson v. State, 512 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Rozier v. State, 402 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- State v. Rozier, 436 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1983)