EDDIE SEAGO, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Eddie Seago appeals his convictions for drug possession, obstruction, battery on an officer, and trespass. The court reversed his trespass conviction because the State presented no evidence that his store entry was unauthorized, though it upheld the other convictions and found the arrest and search lawful despite the defective trespass charge.
The court reversed the trespass conviction because the State failed to prove the element that Seago's entry was unauthorized, licensed, or invited. However, the arrest was lawful based on probable cause from the prior warning and observation on the premises, and the search incident to arrest was valid, so the court affirmed the suppression denial and the other convictions.
[1] A conviction for trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance requires proof that the defendant willfully entered or remained on the property without authori…
[2] The State must present evidence that a defendant's entry onto property was not authorized, licensed, or invited by the owner, even if police had previously issued a tresp…
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Establishes the statutory elements required to prove trespass, including the critical element of lack of authorization.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePolice gave Seago a trespass warning at a neighborhood grocery store. Within days, officers spotted him there again and arrested him. The store owner,…
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NORTHCUTT, Judge.
Eddie Seago appeals his convictions for possession of cocaine, obstructing or opposing an officer without violence, battery on a law enforcement officer and trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance. He contends that the evidence did not prove him guilty of the trespass, that his arrest on that charge was illegal, and that evidence obtained in a search incident to that arrest should have been suppressed. Seago also challenges his sentence as a prison releasee reoffender. We agree with his first point, but otherwise affirm.
Police officers spied Seago at a small neighborhood grocery store within a few days after they had given him a notice against entering the premises, and they undertook to arrest him for trespassing. The other charges against Seago stemmed from this encounter. The store owner, Mr. Qader, had signed a blanket authorization allowing the police to issue trespass notices to persons at his store. Sometimes the police told him which persons they had warned and provided him photos, and sometimes they did not. Mr. Qader testified that he was unaware that the police had warned Seago, and he acknowledged that Seago was a regular customer. For his part, Seago conceded that the officers had given him a trespass warning sometime prior to the incident. But when his girlfriend needed items from the store, she would call Mr. Qader to tell him that she was sending Seago down to pick them up. Seago then went to the store and purchased the items.
Section 810.09(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), provides:
A person who without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance:
1. As to which notice against entering or remaining is given, [ ] by actual communication to the offender ... com mits the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance.
Thus, to convict for violating this statute, the State must prove four elements: (1) the defendant willfully entered or remained on property; (2) other than a structure or conveyance; (3) without being authorized, licensed, or invited; (4) when notice against entering or remaining had been given to the defendant. See A.L. v. State, 675 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
In this case the State offered no evidence that on the day in qhestion Seago’s entry on the property was not “authorized, licensed, or invited” by the store owner, notwithstanding that the police had previously warned him not to come on the premises. Consequently, the trial court should have granted Seago’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the trespass charge.
This does not mean that Seago’s arrest for trespassing was illegal, however. Facts constituting probable cause need not meet the standard of conclusiveness and probability required to support a conviction. See Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300, 312 (Fla.1997); State v. Riehl, 504 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). Having issued the trespass notice to Seago and then observing him on the premises, the officers had probable cause to believe that he had committed the offense of trespass. See State v. M.A.D., 721 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Melton v. State, 546 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Therefore, the arrest and search incident to arrest were valid, and the trial court properly denied Seago’s motion to suppress.
We reverse Seago’s conviction for trespassing, affirm his other convictions, and reject without discussion his argument that he was not eligible for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender. ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and DANAHY, PAUL W., (Senior) Judge, Concur.
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Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Roberts, 938 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…r Vehicles v. Whitley, 846 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 858 So. 2d 333 (Fla.2003); Blue v. State, 837 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Silva, 806 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Seago v. State, 768 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Smith, 687 So. 2d 30, 33 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Favino, 667 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); State v. Riehl, 504 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 2d DCA),…
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E.W. v. State, 873 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…See State v. Dwyer, 317 So. 2d 149, 150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). In other words, the “[f]acts constituting probable cause [for an arrest] need not meet the standard of conclusiveness and probability required to support a conviction.” See Seago v. State, 768 So. 2d 498, 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The record in this case shows that appellant pulled away from, and struggled with, the school resource officer, when the officer attempted to handcuff appellant. Once the dean of the school told appellant that his failure t…
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Leary v. State, 880 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…310, 1312-1313 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). We do not need to reach that question, however, because taking all inferences from the facts in favor of the state, it appears that the deputies had probable cause to arrest Leary for trespass. See Seago v. State, 768 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The next issue is whether the deputies’ inventory search of the trunk of Leary’s car was lawful. This search led to the discovery of a firearm, which was the basis for the criminal charge in this case. The search of a car incid…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Walker v. State, 707 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1997)
- State v. Riehl, 504 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
- State v. In the Interest of M.A.D., 721 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
- Melton v. State, 546 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- A.L. v. State, 675 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)