L.Y.H., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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This special concurrence argues that while current Florida law limits juvenile court jurisdiction to age 18, the legislature should amend statutes to allow jurisdiction to extend as long as the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) provides services to former foster care children.
The concurring judge agrees with the majority opinion that current law mandates termination of juvenile jurisdiction at age 18 but writes to advocate for legislative change to extend this jurisdiction.
L.Y. and Melody, former foster children, are subject to the termination of juvenile court jurisdiction upon reaching age 18. Their counsel argues that…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
We have held that a trial court’s failure to advise a child of the right to counsel at each stage of a proceeding and to ensure that any waiver of that right is freely and intelligently made is reversible error. In re D.L.A., 667 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). We directed:
On remand, the trial court shall advise appellant fully regarding his right to counsel and, should appellant indicate a desire to waive that right, ensure, by a “thorough inquiry,” that such waiver is freely and intelligently made. After having done so, the trial court shall afford appellant the opportunity to plead anew to the charges made in the petition.
Id. at 331.
We accordingly reverse and remand with directions.
ALLEN, MICKLE and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
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- In the Interest of D.L.A., 667 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)