PETER TWIDDY, APPELLANT,
v.
SALVADOR ROCA AND SONIA ROCA, APPELLEES
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Peter Twiddy appealed an award of attorney's fees and costs to defendants Salvador and Sonia Roca based on an offer of judgment in a personal injury action. The court reversed, holding that the 1987 version of section 768.79 (applicable because the cause of action accrued in 1989) did not permit attorney's fees awards to defendants absent a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The court reversed the award of attorney's fees and costs. Under the 1987 version of section 768.79 applicable to this case (because the cause of action accrued in 1989), attorney's fees could only be awarded to a defendant who made an offer of judgment if there was a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Since no such judgment existed, the defendants were not entitled to attorney's fees or costs.
[1] An award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes, is controlled by the version of the statute in effect when the cause of action accrued.
[2] Under the 1987 version of section 768.79, Florida Statutes, a defendant who makes an offer of judgment is not entitled to attorney's fees and costs when the jury finds no…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 768.79 is controlled by the statute in effect when the cause of action accrued, not when the offer was made.”
Establishes the governing principle for determining which version of the statute applies to attorney's fees awards.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTwiddy sued the Rocas for injuries from an automobile accident on August 8, 1989. The Rocas made an offer of judgment of $5,000.00, which Twiddy did n…
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellant, Peter Twiddy, challenges the trial court order awarding attorney’s fees and costs to the appellees, Salvador and Sonia Roca, pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1987). We agree that the trial court erred and reverse.
In this personal injury action, Twiddy sued the Rocas for injuries he allegedly sustained in an automobile accident that occurred on August 8, 1989. The Rocas made an offer of judgment of $5,000.00, to which Twiddy did not respond. After a trial, the jury found no negligence and, therefore, no liability on the part of the Rocas. Pursuant to their offer of judgment, the trial court awarded them $17,000.00 in attorney’s fees and costs relying on section 768.79.
An award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79 is controlled by the statute in effect when the cause of action accrued, not when the offer was made. See Metropolitan Dade County v. Jones Boatyard, Inc., 611 So. 2d 512 (Fla.1993); City of Punta Gorda v. Burnt Store Hotel, Inc., 650 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Brodose v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, 622 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). While we recognize that following the 1990 amendment to section 768.79, attorney’s fees may now be awarded to a defendant who makes an offer of judgment where there has been a finding of no liability on the part of the offeror, the 1987 version of the statute which did not so provide is applicable to the instant action since the cause of action accrued in 1989.
The 1987 version of section 768.79 provides that there must be a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff before costs and attorney’s fees can be awarded to a defendant who has made an offer of judgment pursuant to the statute. See Luizza v. Yaeger, 571 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Kline v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 568 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Since there was no judgment for Twiddy against the Rocas in this case, the Rocas are not entitled to attorney’s fees or costs under section 768.79(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1987).
We, therefore, reverse the order awarding attorney’s fees and remand for treatment consistent herewith.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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BDO Seidman, LLP v. British CAR Auctions, Inc., 802 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…ponsible for fees if the amount of the judgment is twenty-five percent less than a defendant’s offer of judgment. . Because the underlying cause of action in this case accrued in 1992, the 1991 offer of judgment statute applies. See Twiddy v. Roca, 677 So. 2d 387, 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). . Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12 (Fla.1992), ruled on the constitutionality of section 45.061, Florida Statutes (1987). . It appears that a Florida court’s ruling on state law may be binding on federal courts, even where…
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Twiddy v. Guttenplan, 678 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…he award of attorney’s fees to the Rocas because Twiddy recovered nothing from the Rocas and the statute in effect when the cause of action accrued required the recovery of a plaintiffs verdict against the defendant making the offer. Twiddy v. Roca, 677 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Twiddy did, however, recover judgment against Guttenplan, so our reasoning in Twiddy v. Roca does not apply. Even so, we are required to reverse because the joint offer of judgment was not specific enough to enable the trial ju…
Authorities Cited
- Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Jones Boatyard, Inc., 611 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1993)
- Kline v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 568 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Gillette v. State, 571 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Brodose v. The Sch. Bd. OF Pinellas Cnty., 622 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- City OF Punta Gorda v. Burnt Store Hotel, Inc., 650 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)