PETER TWIDDY, APPELLANT,
v.
JESSICA GUTTENPLAN, APPELLEE
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Peter Twiddy appealed a judgment awarding attorney's fees to Jessica Guttenplan under Florida's offer of judgment statute. The court reversed, holding that a joint offer of judgment made on behalf of two non-joint tortfeasors without clear allocation between them was insufficiently specific to support an attorney's fees award.
The court reversed the award of attorney's fees to Guttenplan because the joint offer of judgment was not sufficiently specific. The court could not determine what portion of the $5,000 offer was attributable to Guttenplan alone, making it impossible to determine whether the $2,100 judgment against her was at least 25% less than the offer on her behalf, as required by the statute.
[1] A joint offer of judgment is not invalid per se, but may be invalid due to its nature, validity, and enforceability against an offering party.
[2] A joint offer of judgment must be specific enough to determine the amount attributable to each offeree to assess whether a judgment against one offeree is at least twenty…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a joint offer pursuant to section 768.79 is not invalid per se, but may be found invalid by reason of the nature of the offer and its validity and enforceability against an offering party”
Establishes that joint offers are permissible but subject to validity requirements based on their specific terms and enforceability
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTwiddy, a passenger injured in an automobile accident on August 8, 1989, sued Guttenplan (the driver) and the Rocas (operators of the other vehicle). …
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellant, Peter Twiddy, appeals the final judgment awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1987) to appellee, Jessica Guttenplan. For the reasons below, we reverse.
Twiddy filed a personal injury action seeking damages for injuries he allegedly sustained in an automobile accident that oc curred on August 8, 1989. Twiddy alleged he was a passenger in a car operated by Guttenplan when that car collided with another vehicle operated by Salvador Roca. An offer of judgment was filed by the attorney for the Rocas ostensibly on behalf of the Rocas and Guttenplan. The offer of judgment agreed to pay Twiddy $5,000, and contained a requirement that Twiddy execute a full and final release as to all defendants. The offer was not signed by Guttenplan or her attorney, but reflected in its Certificate of Service that a copy was sent by mail to Guttenplan’s attorney. Twiddy never responded to the offer of judgment.
After a trial, the jury found no liability on the part of the Rocas, and a final judgment was entered in their favor. A final judgment finding Guttenplan negligent was entered for Twiddy in the amount of $2,100. The trial judge awarded both the Rocas and Gutten-plan attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79. We reversed the award of attorney’s fees to the Rocas because Twiddy recovered nothing from the Rocas and the statute in effect when the cause of action accrued required the recovery of a plaintiffs verdict against the defendant making the offer. Twiddy v. Roca, 677 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
Twiddy did, however, recover judgment against Guttenplan, so our reasoning in Twiddy v. Roca does not apply. Even so, we are required to reverse because the joint offer of judgment was not specific enough to enable the trial judge to determine that the $2,100 verdict against Guttenplan was at least twenty-five percent less than the offer made on her behalf. We have previously held that a joint offer pursuant to section 768.79 is not invalid per se, but may be found invalid by reason of the nature of the offer and its validity and enforceability against an offering party. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 641 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Because the offer allegedly made on behalf of Guttenplan was not signed by her or her attorney, its enforceability is questionable. Moreover, the total offer on behalf of both the Rocas and Guttenplan was for $5,000. It is, therefore, impossible to determine the amount attributable to each offeree in order to make a further determination whether the judgment against only one of the offerees for $2,100 was at least twenty-five percent less than the offer on her behalf. The fact that the offer was made on behalf of two defendants who were not joint tortfea-sors makes the necessary determinations as to the applicability of section 768.79 impossible to perform with any certainty. We, therefore, reverse the award of attorney’s fees to Guttenplan and remand for treatment consistent herewith.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and FULMER, J., concur.
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Allstate Indem. Co. v. Solen Hingson and Annette Hingson, 808 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2002)…e of Civil Procedure 1.442 did not apply to pre 1997 offers, case law interpreting the earlier rule and statute clearly contemplated that a demand be specific enough to allow each party to evaluate it independently. See, e.g., Twiddy v. Gut-tenplan, 678 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). . Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 was amended in 1997 to provide: A proposal may be made by or to any party or parties and by or to any combination of parties properly identified in the proposal. A joint proposal shall st…
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Barnes v. THE Kellogg Co., 846 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…mon law. See Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 28 Fla. L. Weekly S225, S225, 2003 WL 1089304, — So. 2d -, - (Fla. Mar. 13, 2003). As a result, virtually any proposal that is ambiguous is not enforceable. See, e.g., Twiddy v. Guttenplan, 678 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). A proposal to two or more plaintiffs who each have a claim for their own separate damages is normally unenforceable because it requires them to aggregate their damages or settle their separate claims in some collective fashion. S…
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Danner Constr. Co., Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 760 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…e defendants’ joint liability does not allow for apportionment under section 768.81, Florida Statutes (1997). This circumstance typically exists in cases where one defendant is vicariously liable for the negligence of another. Twiddy v. Guttenplan, 678 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), provides a good illustration of why a distinction is necessary. In Twiddy, two defendants made a joint offer to a single plaintiff, which is the same situation we have before us wherein Dan-ner and TMC made a joint offer to Reyno…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 641 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Twiddy v. Roca, 677 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)