ARNALDO TOMAS GONZALEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Arnaldo Gonzalez appeals the trial court's denial of credit for 43 days served in county jail as a condition of community control against his ultimately imposed six-year prison sentence. The court reverses and remands, holding that defendants are entitled to credit for jail time served as a special condition of community control when later sentenced to prison for violating that community control.
Yes. A defendant must receive credit for time served in county jail as a special condition of community control against a subsequent prison sentence imposed for violating that community control. The trial court's order denying credit is reversed and the case is remanded for the court to credit the 43 days served against the six-year prison sentence.
[1] A defendant is entitled to credit against a prison sentence for time spent incarcerated as a special condition of community control.
[2] Incarceration imposed as a condition of community control is treated the same as incarceration imposed as a condition of probation for the purpose of awarding credit for…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“for purposes of awarding credit for jail time served, there is no difference between incarceration imposed as a condition of probation and incarceration imposed as a condition of community control.”
Establishes that Willis v. State makes clear the legal equivalence between probation and community control jail time for credit purposes.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGonzalez pleaded nolo contendere to aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in April 1994. H…
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PER CURIAM.
On April 15, 1994 the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court adjudicated him guilty of these offenses and sentenced him to six months community control followed by two years probation.1 On July 26, 1994, an affidavit of violation of community control was filed. On September 14, 1994 the trial court entered an order finding the defendant had violated his community control and modified his sentence. The community control was to be extended one year from September 14 with a special condition that the defendant serve 43 days in the Dade County Jail, followed once again by two years of probation.
Ultimately, after two more affidavits of community control violations had been filed the trial court, on November 6,1995, revoked the defendant’s amended community control and sentenced him to six years in prison. The court gave the defendant 165 days credit for the time he spent incarcerated before the imposition of this sentence.
On January 29, 1996, defendant filed the instant “Motion for Time Previously Served.” On February 15, 1996, the trial court denied the motion. The defendant appeals.
Preliminarily, we note that we treat the defendant’s motion as having been filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a) of the rules of criminal procedure. See Martin v. State, 525 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). The only claim made by the defendant with any merit is his contention that he should have received credit against his six year prison sentence for the 43 days he spent in the Dade County jail as a special condition of his community control. Willis v. State, 543 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), makes it clear that for purposes of awarding credit for jail time served, there is no difference between incarceration imposed as a condition of probation and incarceration imposed as a condition of community control.
Sentences consisting of a period of probation, or by inference community control, preceded by a period of confinement as a special condition are known as Villery2 sentences. Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161,164 (Fla.1988). Poore makes clear that if a defendant violates his community control in a Villery sentence, the sentencing judge “may impose any sentence he or she originally might have imposed, with credit for time served and subject to the guidelines recommendation.” Id. (emphasis added).
Meintzer v. State, 399 So. 2d 133, 134 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), holds: “If, as here, a defendant is first put on probation with the condition that he serve certain time in the county jail and he serves that time and later violates his probation and is then sentenced to prison he is entitled to credit against his prison sentence for the time served in the county jail as a condition of probation.” See also Robinson v. State, 502 So. 2d 1306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Frizzell v. State, 473 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Roesch v. State, 446 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
Consequently, the order appealed is reversed and the cause remanded for the court to credit the defendant for the 43 days he served in the county jail as a condition of his community control against the ultimate six year prison sentence he received. Defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit.
. See Skeens v. State, 556 So. 2d 1113 (Fla.1990)(authorizmg the “stacking” of community control and probation in a single sentence).
. Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1980).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Swyck v. State, 693 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…ict is aligned with those courts which have certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida. Chaney v. State, 678 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). The Third District continues to grant the requested relief as has this court. Gonzalez v. State, 678 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).…
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Moreland v. State, 700 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…e 3.800(a), only if it exceeded the maximum allowed by law. Accord Brown v. State, 689 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Berry v. State, 684 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). But see Swyck v. State, 693 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Gonzalez v. State, 678 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). Otherwise, according to Sullivan, a claim for such relief would be appropriate in a motion filed pursuant to rule 3.850. However, such a claim would now be time barred in this case. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b). However, as to the t…
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Vanderblomen v. State, 709 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…without specifically discussing whether the alleged denials of credit had resulted in sentences beyond the “maximum period set forth by law for a particular offense.” See, e.g., Tucker v. State, 679 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Gonzalez v. State, 678 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Wiggins v. State, 670 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Worthington v. State, 667 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Slone v. State, 659 So. 2d [*148] 1208 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Fulton v. State, 659 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Gra…
Authorities Cited
- Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1988)
- Villery v. The Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1980)
- Meintzer v. State, 399 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Martin v. State, 525 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
- Skeens v. State, 556 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 1990)
- Roesch v. State, 446 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Willis v. State, 543 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Frizzell v. State, 473 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Robinson v. State, 502 So. 2d 1306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- J.H. Dowling, Inc. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n OF Perry, 502 So. 2d 1306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)