GEORGE KNUTH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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George Knuth appeals his DUI manslaughter conviction, challenging the trial court's decision to modify the jury instruction on causation after closing arguments were completed. The court reverses and remands for a new trial, finding that the post-argument instruction change violated Knuth's right to present a final argument responsive to the jury charge he would face.
Yes. The trial court erred by changing the jury instruction on causation after the defendant's final closing argument without affording defense counsel the opportunity to address the jury on the modified instruction. This change was a substantial departure from the instruction to which Knuth's attorney had responded, and the error can only be remedied by retrial.
[1] A trial court errs by changing a jury instruction after closing arguments when the change substantially departs from the instruction to which counsel responded in their c…
[2] A defendant is prejudiced when the trial court alters a jury instruction after closing arguments, preventing counsel from addressing the jury on the parameters of the fin…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Closing arguments are the last and best opportunity trial counsel have to directly address the jury on what they should or should not decide within the parameters of the proper instructions the jury is about to receive from the trial judge.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that defendants must have opportunity to present closing argument in response to the jury instructions they will actually receive
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceKnuth operated a motor vehicle that struck a guard rail; the guard rail penetrated his car and killed a passenger. His blood alcohol level at the time…
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FRANK, Acting Chief Judge.
In a shotgun attack upon his conviction for DUI manslaughter, George Knuth urges eight grounds for reversal and remand for a new trial. After full consideration of each contention, the only point we pass upon is the trial court’s post-closing argument change in the state’s jury instruction. Knuth is correct in his challenge to the trial court’s action. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
This criminal proceeding arose from Knuth’s operation of a motor vehicle; he struck a guard rail which then penetrated his car and killed a passenger. His blood alcohol level at the time of the event was highly disputed in the trial court.
At the charge conference, Knuth’s counsel submitted a proposed DUI jury instruction positing the principle that the negligent operation of a motor vehicle must have been a cause contributing to the death of the victim for a conviction to be obtained. The trial court refused to give the instruction and adopted the instruction offered by the state. Thus, the trial court informed the jury that it need find only that Knuth’s operation of a motor vehicle caused the death of the victim. Knuth’s counsel’s closing argument was responsive to the state’s instruction. Upon completion of Knuth’s final argument, however, the trial court, at the state’s request, instructed the jury that the relevant causation elements would be that Knuth caused or contributed to the cause of the victim’s death. This instruction was a substantial departure from the instruction which Knuth’s attorney responded to in presenting his closing argu ment. Knuth’s counsel objected, but the court nonetheless changed the instruction. Knuth was found guilty.
Knuth has relied upon King v. State, 642 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), which has an analogous significance in the present matter. In King the trial judge refused to give a requested defense instruction. King’s attorney was forced to present a final argument without the ability to assert that her client, charged with capital sexual battery, could have been guilty of the less serious crime of lewd and lascivious assault. Subsequently, the trial court reversed the decision not to give the lewd and lascivious assault instruction and the jury was charged with that instruction, but only after King’s attorney had completed her final words to the jury. Finding error, this court reasoned in King:
Closing arguments are the last and best opportunity trial counsel have to directly address the jury on what they should or should not decide within the parameters of the proper instructions the jury is about to receive from the trial judge.
642 So. 2d at 650. Thus, even though the trial courts in King and this matter ultimately gave an appropriate instruction, the failure to give the instruction before the defendants had their final say generated prejudice that can only be remedied by retrial.
Reversed and remanded.
PARKER and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
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Citator
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McGRIFF v. State, 12 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…convict and the instruction was likely to cause confusion). Finally, the error was especially prejudicial because it was done after the closing argument, when the defense had no opportunity to address this new theory of the case. See Knuth v. State, 679 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); King v. State, 642 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), disapproved of on other grounds by Welsh v. State, 850 So. 2d 467 (Fla.2003). Accordingly, because the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the law of principals and the…
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Immanuel Kirkland-El v. State, 883 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…to receive from the trial judge.” 642 So. 2d at 650. The court determined that even though the instruction was ultimately given, it did not cure the error that occurred, depriving King of his right to a fair trial. Id. Likewise, in Knuth v. State, 679 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), Knuth requested, in his DUI manslaughter trial, a jury instruction that required a finding that the negligent operation of a motor vehicle was a contributing cause to the death of the victim in order for a conviction to be obtain…
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Smith v. State, 743 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…have to directly address the jury on what they should or should not decide within the parameters of the proper instructions the jury is about to receive from the trial judge.” Id. In Knuth v. State, the defendant was charged with DUI manslaughter. 679 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). At the charge conference, counsel requested a jury instruction “positing the principle that the negligent operation of a motor vehicle must have ■ been a cause contributing to the death of the victim for a conviction to be obtain…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- King v. State, 642 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)