ALONZO HENRY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1996-09-20
No. 96-1536
PETERSON, C.J., and COBB, J., concur.
679 So. 2d 885 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1996) Positive Treatment
Cited by 12 cases

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Holding

The court held that a second motion for postconviction relief raising the same ineffective assistance of counsel claims as a prior denied motion is successive and properly denied.


Headnotes

[1] A successive motion for postconviction relief raising the same claims as a prior motion, which was decided on the merits, may be summarily denied.

[2] A defendant is generally entitled to only one opportunity to raise a specific claim for postconviction relief.

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Facts & Procedural History

Henry appealed the denial of his second motion for postconviction relief, which raised the same ineffective assistance of counsel claims as his first …

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Opinion of the Court
W. SHARP, Judge.

W. SHARP, Judge.

This is Henry’s second appeal from a denial of a Rule 3.850 motion, which raises essentially the same ineffective assistance of trial counsel argument raised in his first motion. In the order of the trial court which denied the first rule 3.850 motion, the judge wrote an extensive order explaining why Henry is not entitled to relief. The judge rebutted each of Henry’s claims and attached pertinent parts of the record. This court affirmed without opinion. Henry v. State, 670 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).

Although the trial court did not grant Henry a hearing on his first 3.850 motion, it did consider his claims on the merits. Thus the second order denying the almost identical 3.850 motion was properly summarily denied by the trial court as being successive. Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455 (Fla.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 951, 114 S.Ct. 398, 126 L.Ed.2d 346 (1993); Davis v. State, 589 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1991). A defendant is only entitled to one bite at the same apple.

Further, precedent establishes an additional reason to affirm denial of relief in this case. Henry pled nolo contendere, and waived his right to trial in three felony cases. His argument that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to further investigate the case is simply an insufficient attack on the plea bargain. See Stano v. State, 520 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla.1988) (by entering plea, defendant rendered further investigation by his counsel pointless). As the trial judge noted in the first order in the prior rule 3.850 motion, Henry was originally facing a maximum sentence in the three cases of ten years, thirty years, and life, if he had been sentenced as an habitual offender. His plea bargain resulted in one ten-year sentence and two eleven-year sentences, all to run concurrently. There are no allegations in this, proceeding or the prior one which are sufficient to show Henry did not freely and voluntarily enter into these pleas.

AFFIRMED.

PETERSON, C.J., and COBB, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Guzman-Aviles v. State, 226 So. 3d 339 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)
    …front the State’s evidence and that he was not coerced into entering the plea. The court concluded that Guzman-Aviles voluntarily entered his plea and that his motion was “simply an insufficient attack on the plea bargain,” citing to Henry v. State, 679 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), and Stano v. State, 520 So. 2d 278, 279-80 (Fla. 1988) (holding that the defendant could not go behind his plea by alleging that counsel should have investigated more because entry of the plea cuts off inquiry into all that…
  • Shironald Beauford v. State, 689 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
    …ry denial of Beauford’s second Rule 3.850 motion1. Beauford is barred from raising issues which could or should have been raised in his first Rule 3.850 motion. This one attempts to do that and thus it is successive and improper. See Henry v. State, 679 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Scott v. State, 656 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH, W. SHARP and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850.…
  • Jones v. State, 744 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
    …PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See McKay v. State, 715 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 728 So. 2d 203 (Fla.1998); Henry v. State, 679 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 686 So. 2d 578 (Fla.1996); Siegel v. State, 586 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). COBB, W. SHARP, and GOSHORN, JJ., concur.…

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