CAMERON L. MILLER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant's conviction for felony marijuana possession affirmed, but multiple probation conditions struck as improper, including those regarding firearms, intoxicants, drug testing costs, and vague area-restriction language.
Probation conditions that improperly delegate judicial authority to probation officers, lack statutory authorization, or are vague must be struck from a sentence.
[1] Probation conditions that are vague or impermissibly delegate judicial authority to probation officers are invalid and must be struck.
[2] Probation conditions must have statutory authorization; costs imposed on probationers require express statutory reference.
Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Condition eighteen directs the defendant not to frequent or loiter in high drug areas or areas so designated by his probation officer.”
The court found this condition vague and impermissibly delegated judicial authority to the probation officer.
Cameron Miller was convicted of felony possession of marijuana and sentenced to probation with eighteen conditions, including restrictions on firearm …
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PER CURIAM.
The defendant appeals his judgment and sentence for felony possession of marijuana. We find error only in the imposition of certain conditions of probation. We modify the probation order as follows: strike that portion of condition four which implies that the defendant’s probation officer may consent to the defendant’s possession of a firearm and that portion of condition four which pertains only to weapons; strike that portion of condition six relating to the excessive use of intoxicants; strike that portion of condition thirteen that requires the defendant to pay for random testing; and strike conditions twelve and fifteen. See Roberson v. State, 654 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Daughtery v. State, 654 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Luby v. State, 648 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We also strike condition eighteen because it is vague and impermissibly delegates judicial authority to the defendant’s probation officer. Condition eighteen directs the defendant not to frequent or loiter in high drug areas or areas so designated by his probation officer. See Huff v. State, 554 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Finally, we strike condition nine which requires the defendant to pay twelve dollars to First Step, Inc., because the trial court provided no statutory reference for the imposition of this cost. See Roberson, 654 So. 2d 1256.
Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and modify the probation conditions as discussed above.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND and FULMER, JJ., concur.
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Caton v. State, 862 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…of probation to First Step, Inc., because the trial court provided no statutory reference for the imposition of this cost. On remand, the trial court may impose this cost after appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Miller v. State, 679 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Murphy v. State, 666 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Reversed and remanded with directions. CASANUEVA and CANADY, JJ., concur.…
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Garcia-Rodriguez v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)…us or vague. See Johnson v. State, 701 So. 2d 367, 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) ("[A]ny ambiguity in a condition imposed at sentencing will affect the state's ability at a later date to establish a willful violation of that condition."); Miller v. State, 679 So. 2d 1186, 1186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (condition prohibiting loitering in high drug areas stricken as vague); Wilson v. State, 781 So. 2d 1185, 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (condition prohibiting contact with victim was ambiguous as applied); People v. Barajas, 131…
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Authorities Cited
- Luby v. State, 648 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Huff v. State, 554 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Roberson v. State, 654 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Daughtery v. State, 654 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)