ADAM LAWRENCE CATON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Adam Catón appeals his probation conditions imposed after revocation of his probation for burglary and grand theft. The court reverses and remands because the trial court failed to conduct a statutory inquiry regarding Catón's ability to pay a court facilities fee and failed to cite statutory authority for a monthly fee to First Step, Inc.
The trial court's order was a nullity because it was entered after the sixty-day period provided by rule 3.800(b)(2) had expired. The $150 Court Facilities Fee and the $1 monthly First Step fee are struck; on remand, the trial court may reimpose these fees only after compliance with statutory requirements and appropriate procedures.
[1] A trial court's order granting relief on a motion to correct a sentencing error is a nullity if entered after the expiration of the sixty-day time period provided by rule…
[2] A trial court must conduct a statutory inquiry into a defendant's ability to pay a discretionary court facilities fee.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court's order was a nullity because it was entered after the expiration of the sixty-day time period provided for in rule 3.800(b)(2)”
Establishes the strict procedural bar for orders correcting sentencing errors filed after the sixty-day period.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCatón was sentenced to probation with conditions including a $150 Court Facilities Fee and a $1 per month fee to First Step, Inc. After Catón filed a …
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KELLY, Judge.
Adam Lawrence Catón appeals from his judgment and sentence for burglary and grand theft following the revocation of his probation. Catón alleges that the trial court erred in imposing certain conditions of probation. We agree and reverse.
As a .condition of Caton’s probation, the court ordered Catón to pay a $150 Court Facilities Fee (condition 22), and $1 per month to First Step, Inc. (condition 25).
After filing a notice of appeal in this court, Catón filed a motion to correct a sentencing error pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), arguing that these fees should be stricken because the trial court failed to conduct an inquiry pursuant to section 939.18(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), regarding his ability to pay the Court Facilities Fee, and failed to cite the statutory authority for the $1 per month fee to First Step, Inc. After the sixty-day time period provided in rule 3.800(b)(2) had expired, the trial court entered an order in which it found that Catón did not have the ability to pay the $150 fee and imposed this fee as a lien.
The trial court found that Catón had the ability to pay the $1 per month fee and upheld the imposition of this cost.
We agree with Catón that the trial court’s order was a nullity because it was entered after the expiration of the sixty-day time period provided for in rule 3.800(b)(2). See Jackson v. State, 793 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding order granting relief on motion to correct sentencing error a nullity where the order was entered after the expiration of the sixty-day time period); McGuire v. State, 779 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (holding that the trial court cannot extend the time to resolve a motion for correction of sentence while appeal is pending after the motion has already been automatically denied by expiration of sixty-day period and there has been no request for an extension within the sixty-day period).
Accordingly, we strike the $150 discretionary Court Facilities Fee in condition 22 because of the trial court’s failure to conduct the statutorily required inquiry. On remand, the trial court may impose this fee after compliance with section 939.18. See Vidal v. State, 820 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). We also strike condition 25 requiring Catón to pay $1 per month of probation to First Step, Inc., because the trial court provided no statutory reference for the imposition of this cost. On remand, the trial court may impose this cost after appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Miller v. State, 679 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Murphy v. State, 666 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
Reversed and remanded with directions.
CASANUEVA and CANADY, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Ayoub v. State, 901 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…$150 court facility fee from the cost orders, probation orders, and community control orders and remand for the trial court to reconsider imposition of the cost if it makes the necessary findings required by section 939.18(l)(b). See Caton v. State, 862 So. 2d 901, 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Patterson v. State, 796 So. 2d 572, 574 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Ayoub further challenges a $3 cost imposed pursuant to Pasco County Ordinance 97-03 for the Juvenile Assessment Center. Ayoub argues that the trial court lacked st…
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Waller v. State, 911 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…L COURT FACILITIES FEE The trial court imposed a $150 court facilities fee pursuant to section [*229] 939.18, Florida Statutes (2002), without conducting an inquiry regarding Mr. Waller’s ability to pay. See § 939.18(l)(b); see also Caton v. State, 862 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Mr. Waller preserved this issue by raising it in a motion to correct sentencing error filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). The statute authorizing this cost expressly required the trial court to make…
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Selwyn v. State, 903 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)…to pay or whether payment of the cost would prevent him from making restitution or paying child support. Section 939.18(l)(b) requires both inquiries. The State again concedes the error, and we agree that the cost must be struck. See Caton v. State, 862 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). On remand, the trial court may impose the cost after compliance with section 939.18(l)(b). See id. IV. In his rule 3.800(b)(2) motion, Sel-wyn challenged the imposition of $800 in public defender fees, contending that “[t]he tr…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Robbie Jackson v. State, 793 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- McGUIRE v. State, 779 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)
- Vidal v. State, 820 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)
- Miller v. State, 679 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Murphy v. State, 666 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Mullenmaster v. Newbern, 679 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)