JONATHAN SHORTRIDGE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jonathan Shortridge was convicted of first-degree felony murder and robbery with a firearm. While the District Court affirmed his convictions, it remanded for the trial court to provide written reasons for sentencing him to life imprisonment plus a consecutive 17-year term, which constitutes an impermissible departure under sentencing guidelines.
The court affirmed appellant's convictions but remanded for the trial court to enter written reasons for the departure from sentencing guidelines. The court also held that appellant was properly sentenced as an adult under the amended statutory provisions effective October 1, 1994, even though his offenses were committed before that date, because he was sentenced after the effective date.
[1] A consecutive sentence imposed for a robbery conviction following a life sentence for felony murder constitutes a departure from sentencing guidelines that requires writt…
[2] A court may depart from sentencing guidelines based on an unscored capital crime, but must provide written reasons for such departure.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when the guidelines recommend a life sentence and the trial court imposes life plus a consecutive term of years, such sentence is a departure requiring written reasons”
Establishes the legal requirement that consecutive sentences after a guideline life sentence must be accompanied by written departure reasons under Ivey v. State.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was convicted of first-degree felony murder and robbery with a firearm. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction foll…
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellant, convicted of first degree felony murder and robbery with a firearm, challenges his convictions and his sentence. We find no reversible error in appellant’s convictions, but remand to correct certain sentencing errors.
Appellant was sentenced to life for the murder conviction, followed by a consecutive seventeen-year term for the robbery conviction. Under Ivey v. State, 633 So. 2d 530, 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), ‘when the guidelines recommend a life sentence and the trial court imposes life plus a consecutive term of years, such sentence is a departure requiring written reasons.” The court here offered no written reasons for the departure. However, since it is permissible to depart based on an unscored capital crime under Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403, 414 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901, 109 S.Ct. 250, 102 L.Ed.2d 239 (1988), we remand to allow the court to enter written reasons for departure. See Ivey.
Parenthetically, we note that appellant’s challenge to his sentencing as an adult must fail. The case relied on by appellant, Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla.1993), was overruled by statute in 1994 to eliminate Troutman’s strict requirements for resentencing juveniles as adults. Amended section 39.059(7)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), effective October 1, 1994, provides: “Any decision to impose adult sanctions must be in writing, but is presumed appropriate, and the court is not required to set forth specific findings or enumerate criteria in this subsection as any basis for its decision to impose adult sanctions.” Ch. 94-209, § 51, at 834-835, Laws of Fla. Here, as in Lutz v. State, 664 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), although appellant committed his offenses before the amendment, he was sentenced on December 1, 1994, after the October 1, 1994 effective date of the amendment, thus making the amendment applicable to appellant. As such, the court’s cursory conclusion here that “juvenile sanctions no longer apply” is sufficient. Appellant was properly sentenced as an adult.
Remanded for entry of written departure reasons.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Gerrard Davis v. State, 691 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed on the authority of Grayson v. State, 671 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), and Shortridge v. State, 681 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). WARNER, POLEN and GROSS, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1988)
- Troutman v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993)
- Edler v. State, 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993)
- Ohio Power Co. v. Thomas, 488 U.S. 901 (U.S. 1988)
- Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States, 488 U.S. 901 (U.S. 1988)
- Lutz v. State, 664 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Ivey v. State, 633 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)