MARK MITCHELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1996-10-23
Nos. 95-3646, 95-3647
WARNER, PARIENTE and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
681 So. 2d 891 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1996) Positive Treatment
Cited by 18 cases

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Synopsis

Mitchell's probation was revoked for violations stemming from two grand theft convictions and one burglary conviction. The appellate court affirmed the revocation but remanded for the trial court to enter written findings specifying which violation allegations supported revocation, and to resentence due to computational errors and an ambiguous oral pronouncement on the 1994 grand theft sentence.


Holding

The revocation of probation is affirmed, but remanded because the written order must recite which allegations supported revocation. Resentencing is required for the 1994 burglary conviction due to a computational error in applying the 1.15 multiplier, and resentencing is also required for the 1994 grand theft due to an ambiguous oral pronouncement of sentence that requires clarification.


Headnotes

[1] A written order revoking probation must recite the specific grounds upon which the revocation is based.

[2] Resentencing is required when a sentencing scoresheet contains a computational error.

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Key Quotes

“We affirm the revocation of probation, but remand for the trial court to enter a written order reciting which of the allegations it relied upon for the revocation.”

Establishes the core holding requiring written findings in probation revocation orders.

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Facts & Procedural History

Mitchell was placed on probation for a 1993 grand theft and again for a 1994 grand theft and burglary. Amended affidavits alleging multiple probation …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant was placed on probation for a 1993 grand theft and was again placed on probation for a 1994 grand theft and burglary. Subsequently, amended affidavits were filed alleging multiple violations of probation. After a consolidated evidentiary hearing, the trial court revoked both probation orders.

We affirm the revocation of probation, but remand for the trial court to enter a written order reciting which of the allegations it relied upon for the revocation. See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 85 L.Ed.2d 636 (1985); Glendon v. State, 669 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). While the trial judge orally pronounced the grounds for revoking probation, the written order merely revokes the appellant’s probation without reflecting the court’s reasoning.’

We also remand for resentencing as to the 1994 grand theft and burglary convictions. The written sentencing orders reflect concurrent sentences of five years’ incarceration for the 1993 grand theft, nine years for the 1994 grand theft, and nine years for the 1994 burglary. Resentencing is required for the burglary conviction due to a computational error on the sentencing scoresheet. See Dawson v. State, 532 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). The appellant’s total sentencing score of 131 was erroneously multiplied by 1.15, where this calculation is properly reserved for initial scores of 40 or less. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.990(a).

Resentencing is also appropriate for the 1994 grand theft due to an ambiguous oral pronouncement by the trial court:

On the grand theft I’m not sure if you can give him nine years on the grand theft.... [T]he max you can do is five years and at that point in time we can see how much time he’s got. You go with ... five years less any time served depending on how he scores on the guidelines and run that concurrent with the burglary charge.

A defendant’s sentence is properly what the trial court intended it to be. Gonzales v. State, 488 So. 2d 610, 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Here, however, the trial court’s intent is unclear. The State concedes that this pronouncement of a tentative five-year sentence, seemingly contingent on some future guidelines score, requires clarification. This is particularly so considering that the written order for nine years’ incarceration followed the court’s open skepticism about the propriety of such a sentence. Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to clarify the sentence intended for the 1994 grand theft, and to enter such a corrected sentencing order as may be appropriate. See Gates v. State, 535 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).

WARNER, PARIENTE and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Watts v. State, 688 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
    …trial court at the hearing. Lastly, we must remand for the trial court to enter a separate written order revoking probation and reflecting the reasons for the revocation. See Taylor v. State, 681 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Mitchell v. State, 681 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Horne v. State, 675 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Glendon v. State, 669 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Wood v. State, 653 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). We reference some of the many eases where we have addressed this sam…
  • Thomas v. State, 711 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
    …icient evidence to revoke. We do agree with appellant that he was entitled to a written statement by the trial court reflecting the reasons for the revocation. We therefore affirm the revocation but remand for the written order. Mitchell v. State, 681 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). STONE, C.J., and GROSS, J„ concur. . Durden v. State, 577 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Vezina v. State, 644 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Purvis v. State, 420 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).…
  • Aidone v. State, 763 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
    …ation, a trial court must at least specify which conditions of probation have been violated, and should also relate evidence or reasons supporting the judge’s findings. See Taylor v. State, 681 So. 2d 910, 910 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Mitchell v. State, 681 So. 2d 891, 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (affirming revocation but remanding for entry of written order “reciting which of the allegations it relied upon for the revocation”); see also Watts v. State, 688 So. 2d 1018, 1018 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Larangera v. State, 6…

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