MARIO LAVON JENNINGS, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the term '12 a.m.' in the statute is not unconstitutionally vague and refers to midnight.
Mario Jennings was convicted of drug offenses committed near a school. The statute enhanced the penalties if the crime occurred between 6 a.m. and 12 …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Constitutional Law cases and more on FLexlaw
WELLS, Justice.
We have for review the decision of the district court in Jennings v. State, 667 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), which expressly declares a state statute valid. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Mario Jennings was convicted of one count of selling cocaine within 1000 feet of a school and three counts of possessing cocaine within 1000 feet of a school with the intent to sell. Pursuant to section 893.13(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1993), the sale or possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, although otherwise a second-degree felony, is a first-degree felony if the crime is committed within 1000 feet of a school and occurs “between the hours of 6 a.m. and 12 a.m.” (Emphasis added). Since the incidents that gave rise to the convictions occurred on June 29, 1994, at 7:28 p.m. and on July 2, 1994, at 1:20 p.m., Jennings was convicted of a first-degree felony.
On appeal, Jennings argued that the term “12 a.m.” in section 893.13(l)(c) is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to put reasonable persons on notice as to whether the period of time in which an offense is subject to reclassification ends at noon or midnight. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed his convictions and held that in context 12 a.m. means midnight.
We agree and adopt the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Benton in the court below. Accordingly, we approve the decision of the district court and sustain that portion of section 893.1S(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1993), containing the reference to 12 a.m. against constitutional attack. The statute covers the eighteen-hour period from 6 a.m. until 12 a.m., which is the time that marks the beginning-of the next day.
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Prescott v. State, 753 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…ses drugs with intent to sell, as long as the possession occurs within 1000 feet of a school. There is no requirement that the state also prove that the defendant intended the sale to take place within 1000 feet of the school. Cf. Jennings v. State, 682 So. 2d 144 (Fla.1996). It is the location of the possession that controls, not the defendant’s subjective intent regarding the potential place of sale. We also find no abuse of discretion in permitting a properly qualified witness to testify about whether dru…
-
State v. Nichols, 892 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…nstr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); Brown v. State, 629 So. 2d 841, 842 (Fla.1994). On the other hand, a statute “need not attain ideal linguistic precision.” Jennings v. State, 667 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 1st DCA), aff'd, 682 So. 2d 144, 145 (1996). If the statutory language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to what conduct is proscribed, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. Brown, 629 So. 2d at 842. Genuine doubt about a statute’s meaning should always be resolved…
-
McCANN v. State, 711 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…ritten in language which is relevant to today’s society. See Warren v. State, 572 So. 2d 1376 (Fla.1991). However, a statue need not be “a paradigm of legislative drafting” to be valid. See Jennings v. State, 667 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1st DCA), approved, 682 So. 2d 144 (Fla.1996). The legislature’s failure to define a statutory term does not in and of itself render the statute unconstitutionally vague. See Mitro at 645. It is not the role of the courts to imagine odd scenarios that might test limits of a statute,…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jennings v. State, 667 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)