ANTHONY PRESCOTT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Anthony Prescott was convicted of possession of cannabis and cocaine with intent to deliver within 1000 feet of a school. The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed his convictions, holding that the statute prohibits possession with intent to sell anywhere, as long as the possession occurs within 1000 feet of a school, and that expert testimony about drug amounts and packaging was properly admitted.
The statute prohibits possession with intent to sell anywhere, as long as the possession itself occurs within 1000 feet of a school. The location of possession controls, not the defendant's subjective intent regarding where the sale would occur. Sufficient evidence supported the conviction based on exclusive or constructive possession and expert testimony about drug amounts and packaging.
[1] Possession of controlled substances with intent to sell within 1000 feet of a school is established by proof of possession with intent to sell, where the possession occur…
[2] The location of the possession of controlled substances, not the defendant's subjective intent regarding the place of sale, is the controlling factor for offenses committ…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The statute is not ambiguous. In this case, the prohibited conduct is possession with intent to deliver and sell. The fact that this offense occurs within 1000 feet of a school is a factor only in increasing the degree of crime charged and in the nature of the sentence.”
Establishes the court's interpretation that proximity to school affects sentencing, not the required location of the intended sale.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDeputies executing a search warrant found drug paraphernalia, 24 envelopes containing marijuana, plastic baggies with marijuana or cocaine rocks, appr…
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STONE, C.J.
Appellant was convicted of possession of cannabis with intent to deliver or sell within 1000 feet of a school and possession of cocaine with intent to deliver or sell within 1000 feet of a school. The drugs, together with drug paraphernalia, were found in Appellant’s apartment1 across the street from a school. Although others may have had access, the apartment was used by Appellant as a residence.
Deputies, executing a search warrant, found miscellaneous drug paraphernalia in the apartment, along with a tea pot with 24 manila envelopes containing marijuana, clear plastic baggies in the kitchen cabinets with either marijuana or one or two rocks of cocaine in each package, and a large baggie containing approximately 6.4 grams of crack cocaine individually wrapped in commonly sold sizes. They also found a digital scale commonly used by dealers to measure cocaine. There was expert testimony that the amount of cocaine and cannabis confiscated was consistent with that found on others arrested for dealing in those drugs, and that such a large amount was not consistent with mere personal use.
During jury deliberation, the jury made the following inquiry:
In order to find the defendant guilty of charge A, does it have [to] be proven that he was intending to sell the drugs 1000 feet from the school, or that the drugs were found 1000 feet from the school.
In response, the court informed the jury:
The answer is, that it does not have to be proved that he possessed the drugs with intent to sell them or deliver them within the thousand feet of the school.
A juror then stated, “In other words, it doesn’t matter if he sells them in Timbuktu, it’s where the thousand feet comes into play.” The court responded, “right.” We conclude that the trial court properly interpreted the statute prohibiting possession of the contraband within 1000 feet of a school with intent to sell it, anywhere.
Florida Statute Section 893.13(l)(c) (1995) provides that:
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver a controlled substance in, on, or within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising a public or private elementary, middle, or secondary school between the hours of 6 a.m. to 12 a.m.
The statute is not ambiguous. In this case, the prohibited conduct is possession with intent to deliver and sell. The fact that this offense occurs within 1000 feet of a school is a factor only in increasing the degree of crime charged and in the nature of the sentence. The statute applies to anyone who possesses drugs with intent to sell, as long as the possession occurs within 1000 feet of a school. There is no requirement that the state also prove that the defendant intended the sale to take place within 1000 feet of the school. Cf. Jennings v. State, 682 So. 2d 144 (Fla.1996). It is the location of the possession that controls, not the defendant’s subjective intent regarding the potential place of sale.
We also find no abuse of discretion in permitting a properly qualified witness to testify about whether drugs were intended for personal use or for sale based on the amount and packaging of the drugs. See Scarlett v. State, 704 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), rev. denied, No. 92028, 717 So. 2d 537 (Fla.1998); Bruce v. State, 616 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Baten v. State, 579 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). We note that in the instant case Appellant does not question the witnesses’ qualifications as experts in street level narcotics sales.
We also reject Appellant’s allegation that there was insufficient evidence to establish his possession of the contraband. The state presented sufficient evidence that the place in which the contraband was found was within Appellant’s exclusive possession. See Brown v. State, 412 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), approved, 428 So. 2d 250 (Fla.1983); Parker v. State, 641 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). And, in any event, the evidence supports a finding of constructive possession. See Dupree v. State, 705 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Wale v. State, 397 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
GUNTHER and POLEN, JJ., concur. . The apartment actually belonged to Appellant’s father, but the father has been ill for some time and lives with another son.
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Citator
Cited By
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Lewis v. State, 754 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…ienced, properly qualified police officer may testify about whether drugs were intended for personal use or for sale, the State relies on a number of Florida decisions that are materially distinguishable on their facts. See, e.g., Prescott v. State, 753 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (experts in street-level narcotics sales were properly allowed to testify about whether cocaine and cannabis confiscated from defendant’s apartment were intended for personal use or for sale, based on amount and packaging); Scarl…
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Ishmael D. Damen v. State, 793 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the court held that expert testimony regarding the quantity and packaging of drugs may be admitted to indicate an intent to sell, with the proviso that the witness must first be properly qualified. See also Prescott v. State, 753 So. 2d 568, 569 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). However, it may be an abuse of discretion to admit such testimony where the evidence lacks specificity and relies upon generalized patterns of behavior. Lewis v. State, 754 So. 2d 897, 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). With these p…
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Pura Ramos v. State, 798 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…when properly qualified as an expert, may testify regarding whether drugs were intended for personal use or for sale, based on the amount and packaging of the drugs.” Scarlett v. State, 704 So. 2d 615, 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); see Prescott v. State, 753 So. 2d 568, 569 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Here, Hermanson' previously testified about the packaging of the cocaine in separate bags before testifying, in response to the state’s limited question, that the number and weight of the cocaine rocks was not consistent wi…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Brown v. State, 428 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1983)
- Wale v. State, 397 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Burney v. State, 705 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
- Dupree v. State, 705 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
- Bruce v. State, 616 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- Parker v. State, 641 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Eli Scarlett v. State, 704 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Cash v. State, 412 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Baten v. State, 579 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
- Jennings v. State, 682 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1996)