CHARLES WAYNE BRANTLEY, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE CYNTHIA A. HOLLOWAY, RESPONDENT
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Petitioner Brantley seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to rule on his motion for reduction of sentence filed 61 days after sentencing. The court denies the petition, holding that Brantley's unexplained delay in filing the motion caused the trial court to lose jurisdiction before it could meaningfully consider the motion, regardless of whether the mailbox rule applied or the deadline was extended to Monday.
The petition for writ of mandamus is denied. The trial court lost jurisdiction to rule on the motion because Brantley's unexplained delay in filing it gave the court virtually no time to consider it within the jurisdictional period. Although the trial court's stated reason for denial was technically incorrect, the outcome is not disturbed.
[1] A trial court loses jurisdiction to rule on a motion for reduction of sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) when the defendant's delay in…
[2] A defendant's delay in filing a motion for reduction of sentence, even if the motion is mailed within the time limit under the mailbox rule, can result in the trial court…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court lost jurisdiction to rule on this motion within hours of its receipt because of Mr. Brantley's unexplained delay in filing the motion.”
Establishes the core holding that untimely filing causes loss of jurisdiction regardless of other considerations
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrantley was sentenced on April 10, 1996. He alleges he mailed a motion for reduction of sentence on June 5, 1996 from prison, which was received and …
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ALTENBERND, Judge.
Charles Wayne Brantley requests this court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to rule upon his motion for reduction of sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b). Although the trial court denied his motion for the wrong reason, we decline to issue a writ of mandamus or certiorari. The trial court lost jurisdiction to rule on this motion within hours of its receipt because of Mr. Brantley’s unexplained delay in filing the motion.
The trial court sentenced Mr. Brantley on April 10, 1996. Mr. Brantley alleges that he mailed a motion for reduction of sentence on June 5, 1996, from prison. The motion was filéd with the trial court on Monday, June 10, 1996, sixty-one days after sentencing. The trial court denied the motion on August 5, 1996, explaining that it “was not filed within sixty days of the imposition of sentence.” Mr. Brantley argues that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus under two theories: (1) his motion was timely filed on June 5, 1996, under the “mailbox rule” adopted in Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614 (Fla.1992); and (2) it was filed on a Monday after a weekend expiration date.1
First, the “mailbox rule” provides that certain pleadings are deemed filed by prisoners when the documents are turned over to prison personnel for mailing. While Haag applies to the filing of a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 3.850, we need not decide whether it applies to the filing of a discretionary motion, such as a rule 3.800(b) motion for reduction of sentence that is not constitutionally guai’anteed.2 The sixty-day period established by rule 3.800(b) runs from the imposition of sentence and is not tolled by the filing of a motion for reduction of sentence. By waiting until the last moment to mail his motion, Mr. Brantley never gave the trial court a meaningful opportunity to rule on his motion within the allotted jurisdictional time.
Second, it is true that the last day on which the trial court could grant a reduction in sentence was automatically extended until Monday because the sixtieth day after sentencing was Sunday, June 9, 1996. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.040. Thus, the trial court’s reason for denying this motion was technically incorrect. Nevertheless, Mr. Brantley filed his motion knowing that the trial court would have virtually no time to consider it and did not request an enlargement of time pursuant to rule 3.050.
In Moya v. State, 668 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), we required a trial court to decide whether it should have raised and granted its own motion for enlargement of time when the court itself was the cause of a lengthy delay in processing such a motion. In the absence of such a holding, a trial court could simply delay all motions for reduction in sentence until it lost jurisdiction. Moya does not apply when the loss of jurisdiction is caused by the defendant’s delay in either filing a timely motion or a proper motion for enlargement of time.
Petition for writ of mandamus is denied.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur. . Mr. Brantley's petition for writ of mandamus was not accompanied by an appendix sufficient to establish the truth of these representations. The only document from the trial court in our possession is the order denying the motion for reduction of sentence.
. Effective July 1, 1996, former rule 3.800(b) is now enumerated as rule 3.800(c). Amendments to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(g) and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800, 675 So. 2d 1374 (Fla.1996).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Schlabach v. State, 37 So. 3d 230 (Fla. 2010)…ognize that what constitutes a "reasonable time" has not been quantified, and we also recognize that there has been disagreement within the courts as to whether the defendant may file a motion up until the sixtieth day. Compare Brantley v. Holloway, 685 So. 2d 31, 31-32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (refusing to grant relief where the trial court held that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on a timely filed motion for sentence reduction because the defendant did not file the motion until the last day so the trial court di…
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McCORMICK v. State, 961 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…mail on January 2, 2007, [*1101] or Day 54. According to the trial court’s order, the motion was filed in circuit court on January 5, or Day 57. The court dismissed the motion on January 12, or Day 64. The trial court cited to Brantley v. Holloway, 685 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), to justify the dismissal. There, defendant Brantley placed his motion to reduce sentence in the prison mail on Day 56. It arrived at the court on Day 61; however, because Day 60 was a Sunday, the motion could have been considered…
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Cunniff v. State, 950 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…cation period.1 On July 21, 2006, the trial court dismissed Cunniffs motion for lack of jurisdiction, stating that Cunniff “filed his motion close to the expiration of said time frame, which has since expired.” The court cited Brantley v. Holloway, 685 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), in support of its dismissal order. In Brantley, the defendant allegedly mailed his motion for reduction of sentence four days before the sixty-day period expired, and the trial court received the motion on the last day that it c…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Thurston McCLAIN, 591 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1992)
- Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1992)
- Amendments TO Fla. Rule OF App. Procedure 9.020(g) & Fla. Rule OF Crim. Procedure 3.800, 675 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1996)
- Moya v. State, 668 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)