RONALD C. CUNNIFF, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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Ronald Cunniff petitioned for certiorari review of a trial court order dismissing his motion to mitigate sentence as untimely under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c). The appellate court granted the petition and quashed the dismissal, holding that the trial court improperly rejected the motion without considering its merits when it was filed nine days before the deadline.
The trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by dismissing the motion without considering it on the merits. When a defendant timely files a motion to mitigate sentence with sufficient time remaining before the deadline for the court to consider it, the trial court must either rule on the motion's merits or extend the time for consideration, rather than dismissing it solely because it was filed close to the deadline.
[1] A document filed by a prison inmate is deemed filed with the court at the moment the inmate loses control over the document by entrusting delivery or processing to prison…
[2] A trial court departs from the essential requirements of law by dismissing a motion for mitigation of sentence as untimely when the motion is filed within the prescribed…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“By waiting until the last moment to mail his motion, Mr. Brantley never gave the trial court a meaningful opportunity to rule on his motion within the allotted jurisdictional time.”
Statement from Brantley establishing the principle that a defendant's delay in filing must actually deprive the court of meaningful opportunity; this principle does not apply when adequate time remains.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCunniff's direct appeal from his conviction and sentence was affirmed in April 2006, with the trial court receiving the mandate on May 12, 2006. Cunni…
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SILBERMAN, Judge.
Ronald Cunniff petitions for certiorari review of an order dismissing as untimely his motion for mitigation of sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c). We have jurisdiction to review the order. See Byrd v. State, 920 So. 2d 825, 826 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Seward v. State, 912 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Because the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in dismissing the motion, we grant the petition, quash the trial court’s order, and remand for the trial court to consider the motion on its merits.
In April 2006, this court affirmed Cun-niffs direct appeal from his conviction and sentence. See Cunniff v. State, 928 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (table).
The trial court received our mandate on May 12, 2006. Cunniff filed his motion to mitigate on July 2, 2006, the date on which he placed the motion in the hands of prison officials for mailing. See Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla.1992) (adopting the mailbox rule which provides that a document filed by a prison inmate is deemed filed with the court at the moment the inmate loses control over the document by entrusting delivery or processing to prison officials); Thompson v. State, 761 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla.2000) (citing Haag); Westley v. State, 903 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (citing Haag and Thompson). Under rule 3.800(c), the court had sixty days, or until July 11, 2006, in which to reduce or modify Cunniffs sentence.
Thus, Cun-niff timely filed his motion nine days before the expiration of the sixty-day modification period.1
On July 21, 2006, the trial court dismissed Cunniffs motion for lack of jurisdiction, stating that Cunniff “filed his motion close to the expiration of said time frame, which has since expired.” The court cited Brantley v. Holloway, 685 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), in support of its dismissal order. In Brantley, the defendant allegedly mailed his motion for reduction of sentence four days before the sixty-day period expired, and the trial court received the motion on the last day that it could be timely filed.
The trial court denied the motion, finding that it was not timely. Brantley filed a petition for writ of mandamus, challenging the dismissal of his motion. This court recognized that Brantley had filed the motion before the sixty-day period expired but concluded that Brantley was not entitled to relief. We explained that “[b]y waiting until the last moment to mail his motion, Mr. Brantley never gave the trial court a meaningful opportunity to rale on his motion within the allotted jurisdictional time.” Id. at 32.
Further, “Mr. Brantley filed his motion knowing that the trial court would have virtually no time to consider it and did not request an enlargement of time pursuant to rale 3.050.” Id. We acknowledged that a trial court may enlarge the time in which it could consider a timely filed motion to mitigate sentence, citing to Moya v. State, 668 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
But we added that “Moya does not apply when the loss of jurisdiction is caused by the defendant’s delay in either filing a timely motion or a proper motion for enlargement of time.” 685 So. 2d at 32.
Here, Cunniff is deemed to have filed his motion nine days prior to the expiration of the sixty-day period under rule 3.800(c), and the trial court received the motion six days prior to the expiration of the sixty-day period. Unlike the situation in Brantley, the trial court did not lose jurisdiction hours after actual receipt of the motion. Under these circumstances, the trial court should have either considered the motion on its merits or extended the time for considering the motion. Accordingly, we grant the petition, quash the order dismissing the motion as untimely, and remand for the trial court to consider the motion on its merits.
Petition granted.
SALCINES, J., and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge, Concur. . The motion bears a stamp reflecting that the clerk of the court actually received the motion on July 5, 2006, six days before expiration of the sixty-day time period.
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Schlabach v. State, 37 So. 3d 230 (Fla. 2010)…Second District opinions have specifically recognized that the trial court has an obligation to sua sponte extend the time for considering a motion to mitigate when the motion is timely filed within the sixty days. For example, in Cunniff v. State, 950 So. 2d 1255, 1257 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), where a pro se defendant timely filed a rule 8.800(c) motion, the Second District held that the “trial court should have either' considered the motion on its merits or extended the time for considering the motion.” The Seco…
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Childers v. State, 972 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…n for enlargement of time and dismissed the motion for modification of sentence, concluding that the sixty-day period allowed under rule 3.800(c) had expired. This court has granted relief under very similar facts. For example, in Cunniff v. State, 950 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), we quashed an order that dismissed a motion as untimely although there were nine days remaining in the window when the motion was filed. By contrast, Child-ers filed his motion with fifteen days re [*309] maining, and he included…
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McCORMICK v. State, 961 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…FULMER, Judge. Walter McCormick petitions for certio-rari review of an order dismissing as untimely his motion to mitigate or reduce sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c). We have jurisdiction. See Cunniff v. State, 950 So. 2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Because the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in dismissing the motion, we grant the petition, quash the trial court’s order, and remand for the trial court to consider the motion on its merits. T…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Thurston McCLAIN, 591 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1992)
- Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1992)
- Thompson v. State, 761 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2000)
- Moya v. State, 668 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Brantley v. The Honorable Cynthia A. Holloway, 685 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Seward v. State, 912 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
- Westley v. State, 903 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
- Pickens v. State, 920 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
- Byrd v. State, 920 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)