MICHAEL D. KNADLE, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, APPELLANT,
v.
ESTATE OF EVANGELINE STEWART KNADLE, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed that a decedent's homestead property, when expressly directed in the will to be sold with proceeds distributed to adult children, loses its homestead exemption character and becomes subject to creditors' claims. The court certified a question of great public importance regarding whether Florida's constitutional homestead protection applies to proceeds from such directed sales.
The homestead property lost its homestead exemption character and became subject to creditors' claims because the decedent's will specifically directed that the property be sold and the proceeds placed in the residue of the estate for distribution. The express devise to sell the homestead converted it from protected homestead property to estate assets subject to claims.
[1] A testator's direction in a will to sell homestead property and distribute the proceeds to adult children causes the proceeds to lose their homestead character and become…
[2] Homestead property devised by a will that directs its sale and inclusion of proceeds in the estate residue is subject to the claims of creditors.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“where a testator directs in her will that her homestead be sold and the proceeds divided between her adult children, the proceeds lose their homestead character and become subject to the claims of creditors”
States the controlling legal principle from In re Estate of Price that determines the outcome
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEvangeline Stewart Knadle died testate in 1994 at age 80, survived by two adult children. Her will explicitly directed the personal representative to …
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PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on appeal from an order of the lower court determining that decedent’s homestead property is an asset of the estate, subject to the claims of creditors. Because we find this case controlled by In re Estate of Price v. West Florida Hosp., Inc., 513 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA), cause dismissed, 518 So. 2d 1274 (Fla.1987), we affirm. We also certify a question of great public importance.
On November 14, 1994, Evangeline Stewart Knadle (hereinafter Decedent) died testate at the age of 80. The Decedent had no spouse and was survived by two adult children, Michael Knadle and Katherine Knadle Meiss. Decedent’s estate included personal property assets and real property declared as her homestead. Decedent’s will contained the following provision relating to the homestead property:
My Personal Representative shall sell my homestead as soon as reasonably practical and the net proceeds thereof shall be added to the residue of my estate. Within 90 days after my death, all occupants of my home shall vacate the premises with all their belongings.. The home shall remain vacant until sold. My personal Representative in his sole and absolute discretion shall make necessary repairs and improvements to the house to best market the home.
Several parties filed claims against the Decedent’s estate, including Arbor Health Care d/b/a Arbors at Orange Park, the facility that provided health care to Decedent in her final months. Specifically, Arbor sought payment of past bills in the amount of $74,440.95. The personal representative, Michael Knadle, filed an objection to Arbor’s claim and also filed a petition to determine homestead real estate, asserting that Decedent’s homestead was entitled to homestead exemption protection. Following a hearing, the lower court determined that “Since the decedent ... chose to devise her homestead property by Will, and make a gift of the homestead property to her children in that form, the homestead property is an asset of the Estate.” The personal representative appealed.
In In re Estate of Price v. West Florida Hosp., Inc., 513 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA), cause dismissed, 518 So. 2d 1274 (Fla.1987), we held that where a testator directs in her will that her homestead be sold and the proceeds divided between her adult children, the proceeds lose their homestead character and become subject to the claims of creditors. See also Elmowitz v. Estate of Zimmerman, 647 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); cf. In re Estate of Tudhope, 595 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (since homestead estate was not converted to dollars before it passed and vested in decedent’s children as in Price, proceeds could not be reached by creditors). Here, Decedent’s will specifically directed that her homestead be sold and the proceeds placed in the residue for distribution along with her other assets. Because of this devise, the property lost its homestead character and, accordingly, became subject to the claim of Arbor Health Care.
Recognizing the strong public policy of this state protecting the homestead against forced sale,2 we certify the following question of public importance: DOES SECTION 4(b), ARTICLE X OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION PROTECT THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY WHERE DECEDENT’S WILL DIRECTS THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO SELL THE PROPERTY AND PLACE THE PROCEEDS INTO THE RESIDUE OF THE ESTATE FOR DISTRIBUTION TO DECEDENT’S ADULT CHILDREN?
AFFIRMED.
BOOTH, JOANOS and WOLF, JJ., concur. . The personal representative has a buyer for the home but will not close on the sale until the conclusion of this case.
. See, e.g., Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946 (Fla.1988) (holding that the plain language of Article X, section 4(b), exempting a decedent’s homestead from forced sale by creditors applies to any natural person who is a surviving spouse or heir of the decedent); Hubert v. Hubert, 622 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (holding that homestead property devised to decedent’s son was exempt from creditors even though homestead was subject to a life estate of nonheir), rev. denied, 634 So. 2d 624 (Fla.1994); Bartelt v. Bartelt, 579 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (holding that exemption from forced sale inured to the decedent's adult son who acquired decedent’s homestead property by specific devise through residual clause).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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In re Est. OF Jack Hamel v. Theodore Parker, P.A., 821 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…estate in unusual circumstances. The best, and perhaps the only, recognized exception to the general rule occurs when the will specifically orders that the property be sold and the proceeds be divided among the heirs. See Knadle v. Estate of Knadle, 686 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Estate of Price v. W. Fla. Hosp., Inc., 513 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Mr. Parker attempts to extend this exception to a situation in which the personal representative is given the option to distribute the property either i…
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Engelke v. Est. OF Paul Engelke, 921 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…Laney, 766 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). It is only when the testator directs that a freely devisable homestead be sold and distributed to a devisee that the constitutional protection from creditors is disregarded. See Knadle v. Estate of Knadle, 686 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). In such a case, the decedent has devised money and not the homestead itself. Otherwise, the homestead protections against forced sale attach upon the moment of the owner’s death. See In re Estate of Hamel, 821 So. 2d 1276, 1280…
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Thompson v. Laney, 766 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…. Indeed, Florida law specifically provides that homestead property is not subject to the administration of the court unless the will specifically requires that the property be sold. See §§ 733.607-.608 Fla. Stat. (1995); Knadle v. Estate of Knadle, 686 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(where a testatrix directs in her will that her homestead be sold and the proceeds divided between her adult children, the proceeds lose their homestead character and become subject to the claims of creditors); Estate of Price v.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pub. Health Tr. OF Dade Cnty. v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1988)
- Bartelt v. Bartelt, 579 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- In re Est. OF Margarette Price v. W. Fla. Hosp., Inc., 513 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Hubert v. Hubert, 622 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- In re Est. OF Roger B. Tudhope v. Rudkin, 595 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Elmowitz v. The Est. of Gloria E. Zimmerman, 647 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)