LYLE THOMPSON, AS FORMER PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF BARBARA D. BLAISDELL, APPELLANT,
v.
BARBARA LANEY AND DAVID THOMPSON, APPELLEES
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The Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed in part and affirmed in part a trial court's order surcharging Lyle Thompson, the personal representative of his mother's estate. The court held that Thompson properly sold the decedent's homestead and was entitled to retain the proceeds, reversing the surcharge for the homestead's value, but affirmed other portions of the surcharge order.
The court held that Thompson was not properly surcharged for the value of the homestead property because homestead property validly devised to an heir passes free of creditors' claims and is not subject to estate administration unless the will specifically directs its sale for distribution purposes. Thompson was entitled to sell the homestead and retain the proceeds. The court reversed the surcharge for homestead value but affirmed the surcharge regarding real estate taxes paid from estate assets.
[1] A testator's direction in a will to sell homestead property and distribute the proceeds to adult children causes the proceeds to lose their homestead character and become…
[2] Homestead property devised by a will to adult children loses its homestead exemption protection when the will directs the sale of the property and the commingling of proc…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The general rule is that the homestead passes free of claims of creditors if the devisee of the property under the will is an heir of the decedent who is entitled to receive property under the laws of intestacy.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that homestead property devolves free of creditors' claims to qualifying devisees
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBarbara D. Blaisdell died at age 92 on March 1, 1996. Her will devised her residence and approximately 30% of residue to her son, Lyle Thompson, who w…
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PER CURIAM.
Barbara D. Blaisdell (decedent), died at age 92 on March 1, 1996. Her will and four codicils were admitted to probate and Lyle Thompson, her surviving son, was appointed Personal Representative. The will and codicils devised the decedent’s residence and approximately 30% of the residue to Thompson, and the remainder of the residue was devised to others, including the decedent’s grandchildren, Barbara Laney and David Thompson (Appel-lees). In June 1996, Thompson filed a petition to determine homestead, asserting that he had contracted to sell the decedent’s house for $485,000. An order on the petition was entered on June 6, 1996, and the house was sold the same date. Thompson did not use the proceeds from the sale of the residence to pay any debts, expenses or taxes of the estate.
Following a number of irregularities, Appellees filed a petition for Thompson’s removal as Personal Representative and a surcharge. Thompson was ordered to file an interim accounting for the period beginning March 1, 1996 and ending December 31, 1997, and after he did so Appellees filed timely objections. The objections to the interim accounting and the action to remove Thompson as Personal Representative were heard together. Thereafter, the trial court entered a lengthy final order sustaining objections to interim accounting and removing Thompson as Personal Representative. In case number 99-318, this court affirmed per curiam. See Thompson v. Laney, 743 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)(table).
Thereafter, Appellees filed a petition to surcharge Thompson and a hearing on the petition was held June 4, 1999. The trial court entered an order on the petition. Thompson appeals certain portions of the order that surcharges him. We find merit in only the first claim and affirm as to all others.
The decedent’s homestead was validly devised to Thompson. Under Florida law, the exemption from decedent’s creditors inured to Thompson by operation of law, as heir and devisee of the homestead property. See Art. X, § 4, Fla. Const.; see also Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946 (Fla.1988); Hubert v. Hubert, 622 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Bartelt v. Bartelt, 579 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). In Monks v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 740, 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), the Court stated:
The general rule is that the homestead passes free of claims of creditors if the devisee of the property under the will is an heir of the decedent who is entitled to receive property under the laws of intestacy.
The Court went on to say:
Where a decedent is survived by a spouse or lineal descendants, homestead property is not regarded as an asset of the estate and is not subject to administration by a personal representative.
Id.
Based on the cases cited above, we conclude that the trial court erred when it surcharged Thompson for the value of the homestead property. Indeed, Florida law specifically provides that homestead property is not subject to the administration of the court unless the will specifically requires that the property be sold. See §§ 733.607-.608 Fla. Stat. (1995); Knadle v. Estate of Knadle, 686 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(where a testatrix directs in her will that her homestead be sold and the proceeds divided between her adult children, the proceeds lose their homestead character and become subject to the claims of creditors); Estate of Price v. West Florida Hosp., Inc., 513 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)(proeeeds of sale of testatrix’ homestead, pursuant to will directing sale and distribution of proceeds to adult children, lost their homestead character and were subject to creditors’ claims). The will in the present case makes no such provision. Under the facts of this case, Thompson was entitled to sell the homestead property and its contents and keep the proceeds of the sale.1 Accordingly, we reverse that part of the trial court’s order that surcharges Thompson for the value of the homestead property and its contents.
In all other regards we affirm the order under review.
Reversed in part; affirmed in part.
. We note that our analysis of this issue does not include or affect that portion of the trial court's order that surcharges Thompson for payment of the homestead's real estate taxes for 1994 and 1995 from the estate's assets.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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In re Est. OF Jack Hamel v. Theodore Parker, P.A., 821 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002)…does not fall into the narrow exception created in Pnce, we conclude that the heirs’ homestead rights attached prior to the transfer and that the proceeds of that sale are protected from the claims of the decedent’s creditors. See Thompson v. Laney, 766 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Tudhope, 595 So. 2d 312. We therefore reverse the order on appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. STRINGER and DAVIS, JJ., concur. . In fact, because the county courts had jurisdiction over pro…
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Engelke v. Est. OF Paul Engelke, 921 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…h they retain only a remainder interest in the property. See Hubert v. Hubert, 622 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). A homestead devised to an heir is protected from forced sale to pay the expenses of administering the estate. See Thompson v. Laney, 766 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). It is only when the testator directs that a freely devisable homestead be sold and distributed to a devisee that the constitutional protection from creditors is disregarded. See Knadle v. Estate of Knadle, 686 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1s…
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Thompson v. Laney, 766 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pub. Health Tr. OF Dade Cnty. v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 1988)
- Bartelt v. Bartelt, 579 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- In re Est. OF Margarette Price v. W. Fla. Hosp., Inc., 513 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Knadle v. Est. OF Evangeline Stewart Knadle, 686 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Thompson v. Laney, 766 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
- Hubert v. Hubert, 622 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Monks v. Smith, 609 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)