DONALD M. HUBER, APPELLANT,
v.
MARY LOU HUBER, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1997-01-17
No. 96-1252
COBB, HARRIS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
687 So. 2d 42 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1997) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the husband challenged the trial court's allocation of marital assets and alimony. The appellate court found that the trial court improperly distributed assets acquired after the petition for dissolution was filed and assigned asset values without sufficient evidentiary basis, requiring reversal and remand on those issues.


Holding

The trial court erred in distributing assets acquired after the petition for dissolution was filed, as this violated Florida Statutes section 61.075(6), which establishes the filing date as the cut-off date for determining marital assets. The trial court also erred in assigning various asset values without evidentiary support and in intermingling awards based on net equity and gross value, creating mathematical confusion.


Headnotes

[1] Assets acquired after the filing of a petition for dissolution of marriage are not subject to equitable distribution.

[2] The cut-off date for identifying and classifying marital assets and liabilities is the earliest of a valid separation agreement, a date established by such agreement, or…

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Key Quotes

“The cut-off date for determining assets and liabilities to be identified or classified as marital assets and liabilities is the earliest date the parties entered into a valid separation agreement, such other date as may be expressly established by such agreement, or the date of the filing of a petition for dissolution of marriage.”

Establishes the statutory requirement that assets acquired after filing of the dissolution petition cannot be classified as marital assets subject to equitable distribution.

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Facts & Procedural History

The parties owned a successful contracting business, Huber Design and Construction, Inc., and maintained an affluent lifestyle. After business difficu…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a final judgment of dissolution awarding lump sum alimony, determining and distributing marital assets, and allocating marital debt. The parties to this action owned a successful contracting business, Huber Design and Construction, Inc., and had established an affluent lifestyle. After some business reverses in the 1980’s, the parties separated in 1990. This was a long-term marriage and, at the time of the dissolution, the wife had become an alcoholic and incapable of self-support.

The husband asserts multiple errors were committed by the trial court in signing the final judgment, which was prepared and advocated by the counsel for the wife. We find that' two require reversal. First, the trial court erred in “equitably distributing” assets acquired after filing of the petition for dissolution. The husband contends, and we agree, that this approach by the trial court contravenes section 61.075(6), Florida Statutes (1994 Supp.) which provides:

The cut-off date for determining assets and liabilities to be identified or classified as marital assets and liabilities is the earliest date the parties entered into a valid separation agreement, such other date as may be expressly established by such agreement, or the date of the filing of a petition for dissolution of marriage. The date for determining value of assets and the amount of liabilities identified or classified as marital is such date or dates as the judge determines is just and equitable under the circumstances. Different assets may be valued as of different dates, as, in the judge’s discretion, the circumstances require.

Secondly, the trial court assigned various values to assets without an evidentiary basis therefor, and intermingled awards based on “net equity” evaluations and others based on gross value to the extent that the result was, as argued by the husband, a climate of mathematical confusion.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of dissolution, but reverse and remand for rehearing in respect to the issues of lump sum alimony and equitable distribution.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

COBB, HARRIS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Brock v. Newman Brock, 690 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
    …Kirkland, 618 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); DeLoach v. DeLoach, 590 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Moon v. Moon, 594 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). . See Eckroade v. Eckroade, 570 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). . § 61.075(6); Huber v. Huber, 687 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). . § 61.075(1), Fla.Stat. . § 61.075(1), Fla.Stat. . Eckroade v. Eckroade, 570 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). . See Reich v. Reich, 652 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Miller v. Miller, 625 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993);…
  • Caruso v. Caruso, 814 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
    …nce, then Lucky Star cannot be considered a marital asset because the “cut-off’ date is November 16,1999. It was error for the trial court to equitably distribute assets acquired after the filing of the petition for dissolution. See Huber v. Huber, 687 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Although the trial court has discretion under section 61.975(6) in deter [*503] mining the valuation date for marital assets and liabilities, that discretion does not extend to permit the court to determine assets acquired after…
  • Langevin v. Langevin, 698 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
    …es (1995), which provides that the date for determining marital assets and liabilities is the earliest of the date the parties entered into a valid separation agreement or the date of filing a petition for dissolution of marriage. In Huber v. Huber, 687 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), the court reversed the trial court’s equitable distribution of assets acquired after the filing of the petition for dissolution. Although the trial court has discretion under the statute in determining the valuation date for mar…

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