SHARON A. LANGEVIN, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
ROBERT E. LANGEVIN, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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In this dissolution of marriage appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's treatment of a premarital insurance business and denial of permanent alimony to the wife, but reversed the trial court's erroneous double-counting of a joint tax liability and its inclusion of employee stock options acquired after the dissolution petition was filed.
The trial court properly accepted expert testimony on the insurance business characterization and valuation, properly denied permanent alimony based on the wife's independent financial resources and the parties' similar circumstances, but erred in requiring reimbursement for the joint tax liability (already accounted for in equitable distribution) and in distributing stock options acquired after the dissolution petition was filed.
[1] A trial court may accept expert testimony regarding the characterization and valuation of a business in a dissolution of marriage proceeding.
[2] A trial court errs in requiring a party to reimburse the other for one-half of a joint tax liability when that liability has already been accounted for in the equitable d…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“As a finder of fact, the trial court may accept such testimony.”
Establishes the trial court's discretion to accept expert testimony regarding business valuation without requiring the opposing party to present contradictory evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSharon and Robert Langevin were married for eleven years. The husband owned an insurance business that was started before the marriage. Both parties w…
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WARNER, Judge.
This is an appeal of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The wife raises seven issues on appeal. The husband raises three on cross-appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The wife challenges the trial court’s determination that an insurance business started by the husband before the marriage was only partly marital, and she also disputes the methodology of valuation. The husband’s CPA expert testified both as to the characterization of the premarital portion of the business and as to its valuation. The wife presented no testimony as to valuation. The trial court accepted the expert’s testimony. As a finder of fact, the trial court may accept such testimony. See McDaniel v. McDaniel, 658 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its treatment of the insurance business.
The husband concedes that the trial court erred in requiring the wife to reimburse the husband for one-half of a joint tax liability, because the court already accounted for the liability in the equitable distribution. We therefore reverse as to this point and direct the trial court to eliminate this requirement from the marital liability distribution in the final judgment.
We find no error in the denial of permanent alimony to the wife. The marriage was of eleven years duration, and the parties were of approximately the same age and general physical condition, despite the claims of the wife that she had chronic back problems. She worked throughout the marriage, as did the husband, and each party leaves the marriage with about $450,000 in assets. The wife had substantial, non-marital, income-producing assets, while the husband had few liquid assets. Although the husband’s income was higher, this finding alone does not justify an award of permanent alimony. See Aresty v. Weinstein, 667 So. 2d 846, 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Cornell v. Smith, 616 So. 2d 629, 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Since the wife worked throughout the marriage at a significant salary, the trial court found that the wife had sufficient financial resources to be self-supporting without assistance from the husband. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the wife’s request for permanent alimony.
On cross-appeal, the husband contends that the trial court erred in determining that the parties’ shares in an employee stock option plan were subject to equitable distribution as of the date of the final judgment. The wife agrees that the trial court’s determination is contrary to section 61.075(6), Florida Statutes (1995), which provides that the date for determining marital assets and liabilities is the earliest of the date the parties entered into a valid separation agreement or the date of filing a petition for dissolution of marriage. In Huber v. Huber, 687 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), the court reversed the trial court’s equitable distribution of assets acquired after the filing of the petition for dissolution. Although the trial court has discretion under the statute in determining the valuation date for marital assets and liabilities, that discretion does not extend to permit the court to distribute stock acquired after the filing of the petition. We therefore reverse and remand to the trial court to equitably distribute only those employee stock option plan shares owned by the parties as of the date of filing the petition for dissolution.
We affirm as to all other issues not specifically addressed in this opinion.
POLEN and GROSS, JJ., concur.
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Walker v. Walker, 85 So. 3d 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…rpose of permanent periodic alimony is not to divide future income to establish financial equality.” See Rosecan v. Springer, 845 So. 2d 927, 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (citing Segall v. Segall, 708 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Langevin v. Langevin, 698 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Wright v. Wright, 613 So. 2d 1330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)). Here, the trial court made no specific factual determination with regard to the Former Wife’s actual need for permanent alimony. We must, therefore, “reverse the award of…
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Finney v. Finney, 995 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)…ets as of different dates. See § 61.075(6), Fla. Stat. (2006). A trial court is not, however, afforded the same discretion in regards to determining marital assets. See Guelpa v. Guelpa, 885 So. 2d 409, 410 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Langevin v. Langevin, 698 So. 2d 601, 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). The date for determining marital assets is the earliest date the parties entered into a valid separation agree [*581] ment or the date the petition was filed. See § 61.075(6), Fla. Stat. (2006). In the instant case, after…
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Caruso v. Caruso, 814 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…61.975(6) in deter [*503] mining the valuation date for marital assets and liabilities, that discretion does not extend to permit the court to determine assets acquired after the filing of the petition to be marital assets. See Langevin v. Langevin, 698 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). The instant case is distinguishable from this court’s decision in Cummings v. Cummings, 719 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). In Cummings, a husband and a partner contracted to purchase the health care company prior to the dissol…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Aresty v. Weinstein, 667 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Huber v. Huber, 687 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
- Lemuel L. Cole v. State, 616 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- Cornell v. Smith, 616 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)