RICHARD W. DEASE, APPELLANT,
v.
KATHRYN B. DEASE, APPELLEE
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In this marital property division case, the Florida appellate court reversed and remanded the trial court's final judgment awarding nearly all marital assets to the wife, finding the judgment suffered from inexcusable delay (entered over two and a half years after trial and nine months after the last hearing) and contained substantive errors in asset distribution that violated equitable distribution principles.
The court reversed and remanded because the judgment was entered with inexcusable delay making it impossible to determine whether it reflected reasoned judicial judgment, and because the judgment contained substantive errors in the scheme of distribution that independently required reversal, specifically using earning ability disparities to justify unequal asset distribution contrary to established precedent and statute.
[1] A trial court's unequal distribution of marital assets based solely on disparate earning abilities, without further explanation, is improper.
[2] A final judgment distributing marital property must itemize, value, and identify the property as marital or separate.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While disparate earning abilities may justify alimony (and the court awarded alimony), it does not, at least without more explanation, justify an unequal distribution of marital assets.”
Establishes that superior earning ability is not a proper basis for unequal distribution of marital assets in Florida, distinguishing alimony from property distribution.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties went to trial on marital dissolution issues. Following trial, there was continuing post-trial activity including memoranda submissions in …
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HARRIS, Judge.
This case may well set a new standard for the delay between the final hearing and the final judgment. Indeed, Mr. Dease (acting pro se) urges that the trial court entered a final judgment without holding a trial. Mr. Dease apparently cannot remember that some thirty-one months before entry of the final judgment, the parties did indeed appear before the judge. There was some continuing post-trial activity. According to Mrs. Dease’s attorney, memoranda were submitted in October and November, 1993, and hearings were held in April and September, 1994, and in April and June, 1995. Over nine months later, a final judgment giving the wife almost all of the marital assets because “it would be inequitable to the wife to have equal division of the property since she had limited skills, training, and education and the husband has superior skills, training and education compared to the wife,” apparently prepared by the wife’s lawyer, was signed by the judge.
While disparate earning abilities may justify alimony (and the court awarded alimony), it does not, at least without more explanation, justify an unequal distribution of marital assets. See Hallman v. Hallman, 575 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (superior earning ability is not a factor for purposes of equitable distribution of marital assets). There are other errors in this judgment. First, the court provided that the parties would receive “the property in [their] possession and control.” The property was neither itemized nor valued nor is there any indication that the property is marital or separate. See § 61.075(3), Fla.Stat.; Esposito v. Esposito, 651 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Keaton v. Keaton, 634 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). In addition, the parties seem to agree that the judgment used the wrong evaluation date.
It is with some reluctance, but commitment, that we reverse based on a delayed judgment. There has already been an inexcusable delay in the resolution of this conflict. We recognize that by reversing, we are adding to that delay. But it is impossible to tell whether this judgment entered some two and a half years after the final hearing and over nine months after the last court appearance reflects the reasoned judgment of the court. In any event, the errors committed in the scheme of distribution would require reversal.
REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial on all issues except the dissolution of marriage.
COBB and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
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David v. David, 58 So. 3d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)…ntiago v. Santiago, 51 So. 3d 637 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Jonsson v. Jonsson, 715 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). However, disparate earning abilities cannot, without more, justify unequal distribution of marital assets and liabilities. Dease v. Dease, 688 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s distribution of the parties’ marital credit card debt. [*339] The husband further argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the wife one-half of the value of the husb…
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Yosi GIL v. Mirit Mendelson, 793 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…eir property in equitable distribution. The trial judge’s reason for awarding the wife substantially more than 50% of the assets, the husband’s superior earning capacity,1 as a matter of law does not justify any such result.2 Dease v. Dease, [*1062] 688 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); see Barner v. Barner, 716 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Reynolds v. Reynolds, 615 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Weimer v. Weimer, 677 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). We also agree with the husband’s position that to correct th…
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Vilardi v. Vilardi, 225 So. 3d 395 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)…or unequal distribution of marital assets and liabilities. David v. David, 58 So. 3d 336, 338 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (“[Disparate earning abilities cannot, without more, justify unequal distribution of marital assets and liabilities.”); Dease v. Dease, 688 So. 2d 454, 455 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (‘While disparate earning abilities may justify alimony (and the court awarded alimony), it does not, at least without more explanation, justify an unequal distribution of marital assets.”); Hallman v. Hallman, 575 So. 2d 73…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Keaton v. Keaton, 634 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Hallman v. Hallman, 575 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
- Esposito v. Esposito, 651 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)