ERVIN ALPHONSO BARTLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ervin Alphonso Bartley, an inmate, appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief, claiming his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate a voluntary intoxication defense and that a prior felony conviction was improperly used both to enhance his sentence and calculate guidelines. The court reversed and remanded, finding the ineffective assistance claim legally sufficient.
The court held that appellant's allegations regarding ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the voluntary intoxication defense were legally sufficient to state a claim for relief, as voluntary intoxication is a recognized defense to specific intent crimes like aggravated assault, and no record evidence of intoxication is required to state such a claim. The court could not assess the propriety of the trial court's reasoning regarding the prior conviction issue because the order lacked supporting record documentation.
[1] Voluntary intoxication is a recognized defense to specific intent crimes.
[2] Allegations that trial counsel refused to investigate or consider a voluntary intoxication defense, despite being informed of the defendant's intoxication at the time of…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Aggravated assault is a specific intent crime. E.g., State v. Shorette, 404 So.2d 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Voluntary intoxication is a recognized defense to specific intent crimes.”
Establishes that voluntary intoxication is a valid defense to aggravated assault, supporting the legal sufficiency of appellant's ineffective assistance claim.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was charged with aggravated assault and claimed he was high on crack cocaine and alcohol at the time of the offense. His trial counsel alleg…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, an inmate of the state correctional system, seeks review of an order denying his motion, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, seeking post-conviction relief. Appellant’s motion presented two grounds for relief: that his trial counsel had been ineffective because he “refused to investigate and consider the availability of voluntary intoxication [as a defense to the charge of aggravated assault] despite having been informed by [appellant] that he was high on crack cocaine and alcohol at the time of the aggravated assault”; and that a prior felony conviction had improperly been used both to enhance his sentence and to calculate his presumptive guidelines sentence. The trial court denied relief, conclud-' ing that both grounds were legally insufficient. We reverse.
The allegations of appellant’s motion regarding trial counsel’s refusal to investigate and consider a voluntary intoxication defense are legally sufficient to state a claim for relief. Aggravated assault is a specific intent crime. E.g., State v. Shorette, 404 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Voluntary intoxication is a recognized defense to specific intent crimes. E.g., Spivey v. State, 680 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Allegations substantively indistinguishable from those made by appellant have repeatedly been held sufficient to state a claim for relief. E.g., Young v. State, 661 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Brunson v. State, 605 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). It is not necessary, as the trial court presumed, that a defendant point to record evidence of intoxication at the time of the alleged offense in order to state a legally sufficient claim.
As to the second ground asserted, the trial court denied relief because, according to its order, appellant had been sentenced as an habitual violent felony offender. Therefore, the trial court reasoned, the fact that the prior felony conviction had also been used to calculate the presumptive guidelines sentence was irrelevant because appellant was not sentenced pursuant to the guidelines. We are unable to assess the propriety of this reasoning, because the order does not attach any portions of the record to support it.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Should the trial court again decide to deny relief, it shall attach to its order those portions of the record which conclusively establish that appellant is entitled to no relief.
REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.
WEBSTER, LAWRENCE and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.
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Citator
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Frey v. State, 708 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 1998)…. 2d 979 (Fla.1981) (robbery is specific intent crime); Kennedy v. State, 633 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (same). . See Heddleson v. State, 512 So. 2d 957, 959 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (kidnapping is a specific intent crime). . See Bartley v. State, 689 So. 2d 372, 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (aggravated assault is specific intent crime); Dobosh v. State, 684 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (same). . See Harris v. State, 415 So. 2d 135, 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (battery is a specific intent crime). . See Huber v.…
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Kitchen v. State, 764 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…, as alleged by appellant, appears to be legally sufficient and should not have been summarily denied without the attachment of portions of the record demonstrating conclusively that the movant is not entitled to relief. See, e.g., Bartley v. State, 689 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Appellant’s fifth ground was that trial counsel was ineffective in allowing two admittedly biased jurors to serve on his jury. In this connection, appellant quoted from the transcript of the prosecutor’s voir dire of juror Ms.…
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McKINNEY v. State, 722 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…defense at trial. This court has held that a defendant sufficiently pleads the deficient performance aspect of such a claim if he alleges that he either informed his attorney that he was intoxicated at the time of the offense, see Bartley v. State, 689 So. 2d 372, 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Young v. State, 661 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Brunson v. State, 605 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), or told his attorney that he had a history of substance abuse that, together with record evidence of his intox…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Thornton Brunson v. State, 605 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- State v. Shorette, 404 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Young v. State, 661 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Swain v. Bernie Howell, 661 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Spivey v. State, 680 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)